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ABSTRACT

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ENERGY POLICY MAKING IN NEW HAMPSHIRE:
LESSONS FOR COLLABORATION

By

Henry Phillip Herndon
University of New Hampshire, December 2017

In this thesis I investigate the organizational field that is New Hampshire’s energy policymaking community as it engages with the state regulatory institution, the Public Utilities
Commission, to grapple the challenges of designing a 21st century electricity marketplace.
The Public Utilities Commission structure and function are evolving. Historically, the
Commission has used adjudicative proceedings to carry out a ratemaking function for monopoly
utilities. The Commission’s adjudicative process is evolving to become increasingly
collaborative as it begins to carry out its new function of 21st century electricity market design. I
analyze both the new structure (collaboration) and the new function (21st century electricity
market design) of the Commission through three in-depth case studies of dockets (policy-making
processes): Energy Efficiency Resource Standard, Electric Grid Modernization, and Net
Metering.
My findings identify ways in which the Public Utilities Commission structure for making
energy policy decisions is flexible and may be shaped by stakeholders engaging in policy
processes. Stakeholders have the power to collectively design regulatory proceedings to
incorporate greater opportunities for collaboration to better suit the challenges posed by a 21st
century electricity sector. I provide recommendations on how that redesign should occur.

x

CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION

Vision of a 21st Century Energy System
Imagine a bustling New Hampshire city with a population of 20,000. Like many New
Hampshire communities, this one is centered on a river. Its downtown mill buildings are
tastefully refurbished and humming with a healthy mix of residential and commercial spaces –
apartments and businesses and breweries and restaurants, the latter two stocked near exclusively
with locally sourced menu items. But food is not the only societal system that has undergone
extensive localization in recent years. The city produces 50% of its electricity as well. The year
is 2030 and the electricity system is finally catching up with the 21st century.
Ten years prior, municipal leaders from the energy committee and city council, motivated
by commitments to fiscal conservatism and the principles of sustainability, worked together to
establish the city’s first Energy Efficiency and Clean Energy District.1 Within the district, several
21st century energy companies have since financed millions of dollars of clean energy and energy
efficiency improvements for residential, commercial, and municipal establishments alike.
Investments cover the gamut from building weatherization and LED lighting upgrades, to solar
installations and air source heat pumps, to Tesla Powerpacks and electric vehicle charging
infrastructure, to combined-heat-and-power gas-fired microturbines in some of the larger
establishments. This symphony of distributed energy resources (DERs) is conducted via internetconnected automation, communication, and control systems, which synchronize real-time
responses to changes in electric grid conditions. Homeowners, businesses, and municipal

1

See New Hampshire RSA 53-f.
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facilities alike generate much of their own electricity, and are credited for excess energy fed into
the grid and consumed by their neighbors. The city’s growing smart grid helps the larger electric
system keep costs down by managing electricity demand, and by providing other technical
services such as voltage and frequency regulation. The energy savings and revenues from 21st
century energy services are shared between the energy companies and citizens.
Day by day this vision of a localized, sustainable 21st century smart city energy system
moves closer towards reality. Over the past decade, and with increasing intensity in recent years,
the iterative cycle of policy change and market development has set in motion the remaking of
our electricity systems. At the turn of the millennium, the 21st century smart grid may have
seemed more science fiction than reality, but today, in 2017, New Hampshire communities from
Dover to Warner to Lebanon are laying the foundation on which this vision will be realized.
My focus in the pages to come will be on the electricity sector disruption associated with
expanding markets for distributed energy resources (DERs) – a category which includes
distributed generation (e.g., rooftop solar, microturbines), geothermal energy systems, smart
energy metering technology, energy efficiency, management of electricity demand, energy
storage, electric vehicles, electric vehicle charging infrastructure, and Internet of Things
synchronization of aforementioned technologies. My research examines the three major New
Hampshire regulatory policy processes addressing 21st century electricity market design through
DER integration:
•

DE 15-137: Electric and Gas Utility Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS)
(Chapter 2)

•

IR 15-296: Investigation into Electric Grid Modernization (Grid Mod) (Chapter 3)
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•

DE 16-576: Development of New Alternative Net Metering Tariffs and/or Other
Regulatory Mechanisms and Tariffs for Customer Generators (Net Metering) (Chapter 4)

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: I first contextualize New
England’s evolving energy landscape by reviewing recent policy and market trends across the
region. I then describe the series of 21st century electricity system policy challenges and
introduce the community of actors grappling with these challenges in New Hampshire’s energy
policy-making arenas. Next, I introduce the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC),
the state institution charged with regulating electric utilities and now newly tasked with resolving
energy policy disputes between utilities and DER affiliates. I then review New Hampshire
energy policy reports calling on the PUC to abandon adversarial dispute resolution and adopt a
more collaborative approach to making energy policy decisions. Next, I review the literature to
introduce and contrast adjudicative and collaborative approaches to dispute resolution. Finally, I
present my research design and methodology for answering my overarching research question:
How does the PUC process limit or support opportunity for collaboration? The purpose of my
research is to provide insight into how the NH energy policy-making community may adopt a
more collaborative approach towards solving 21st century energy system policy challenges.

New England’s Evolving Energy Landscape
Growing DER markets represent the convergence of the three overarching trends
reshaping New England’s electricity landscape: (1) increasingly competitive electricity markets;
(2) increasing decentralization of energy resources; and (3) accelerating deployment of lowerand zero-carbon energy resources. These trends are a result of a combination of local, state,
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regional, and federal policies and macroeconomic, technology-driven factors including the U.S.
natural gas revolution and the dramatic cost declines in industries like wind and solar. Actively
embracing and encouraging trends towards competitive, distributed, sustainable electricity
systems has obvious economic, social, environmental, and national security advantages for
policy makers, but redesigning the path-dependent electricity system of decades long past into
one more compatible with 21st century society raises dauntingly complex policy challenges.
The New England states have collectively implemented a multitude of policies geared
towards promoting a competitive, decentralized, and sustainable electricity market. Table 1.1
illustrates the volume of renewable energy and energy efficiency incentive policies across New
England. The regional market for solar photovoltaics (PV) has grown dramatically in recent
years, as illustrated by Fig. 1.1 and is projected to continue to expand in the years to come.
Energy efficiency programs in New England are some of the most ambitious in the nation and
region-wide funding for energy efficiency has been steadily increasing, as illustrated by Fig. 1.2.
ISO New England, the not-for-profit independent system operator for New England’s regional
electric grid, projects that from 2021 to 2026, the six states will collectively invest $1.2 billion
annually in energy efficiency programs (ISO New England, 2016). The New England states are
also beginning to explore extensive regulatory overhauls of their electric utility systems in an
effort to further guide the trends towards competition, decentralization, and decarbonization.
Table 1.2 presents an illustrative selection of policies contributing to the evolution of the
regional energy sector.
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Table 1.1 – Number of Distinct State Incentive Programs for
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in the New England States

State
Massachusetts
Connecticut
New Hampshire
Vermont
Rhode Island
Maine

Number of Distinct Incentive Programs for Renewable Energy
and Energy Efficiency (as of September 2017)
99
67
62
49
46
31

Source: Database for State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, 2017

Table 1.2 – Selection of New England Policies Supporting Competition,
Decentralization, and Decarbonization in the Electricity Sector

Policy
Electric Utility
Restructuring
Regional
Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI)
Renewable Portfolio
Standard (RPS)

Net Metering

Energy Efficiency
Resource Standard
(EERS)
Electric Grid
Modernization2

Description
Legislation directing utility divestiture of
generation fleets to introduce competition in
power generation markets
Cap and trade program for regional power sector;
in effect, puts a price on emissions from the power
sector contributing to climate change
Legislation directing utilities to procure increasing
portions of their electricity mix from renewable
sources and providing incentives for investments
in renewables
Owners of distributed generation systems (e.g.,
rooftop solar) may receive credits for excess
generation fed into grid from utilities
Mandated energy savings targets for electric (and
in some cases gas) utilities and incentives for
energy efficiency investments
Regulatory reform initiatives seeking to remake
electric utility incentive structures and encourage
market-based DER deployment

Applicable In
CT, ME, MA, NH, RI

All New England States

All New England States

All New England States

All New England States

CT, MA, NH, RI, VT

2

See in particular CT PURA 17-06-02 (Section 103 of June Special Session Public Act 15-5); MA Grid
Mod (D.P.U. 12-76-B); MA Smart Grid Pilot Programs; MA Energy Storage Initiative; NH Grid Mod
(PUC IR 15-296); NH Net Metering Alternatives Order No. 26,029 (PUC DE 16-576); RI Renewable
Energy Growth Program (Chapter 26.6 of Title 39 of RI General Laws); RI Power Sector Transformation
Initiative (PUC Docket No. 4600); and VT Review of Utility Regulation (PSB Case No. 17-3142-PET).
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Figure 1.1 – Historical Installed PV Capacity Survey Results: December 2013 – December 2016 (MWAC) (Source:
ISO New England, 2017b)

Figure 1.2 – 2004-2014 Trends in Energy Efficiency Funding in the Six New England States (Source: ISO New
England, 2016)
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Despite the wave of activity, continuing the progress towards a 21st century electricity
system requires that policy makers address further policy challenges. Policy action and evolving
markets can have an iterative, circular relationship: policy and advancing technology feed
innovation and market transformation, which raise new questions and challenges about how the
market should continue its evolution, which in turn calls for further policy action. This is
particularly the case for electricity markets, which, importantly, have never resembled anything
close to a free, unregulated market, save perhaps for the brief years following their inception in
the mid-19th century. The past decade of policy action and concurrent technological
advancements have largely succeeded in creating scalable DER markets, but in doing so have
given rise to questions about how such markets should be designed and integrated with the
existing monopolistic market for electricity services.

21st Century Energy Policy Challenges
Energy policy making can occur through legislative, executive, judicial, and
administrative/regulatory processes.3 The focus of my thesis is entirely on the
administrative/regulatory policy design processes, which occur at the New Hampshire Public
Utilities Commission (referred to as either the Commission or PUC). The overarching challenge
for energy policymakers is how to guide existing market trends toward competition,
decentralization, and decarbonization. The following seven examples provide further detail of
the current policy challenges.
3

Some might argue the administrative/regulatory branch of government is a subsidiary of the executive
branch. New Hampshire’s three regulatory Commissioners are appointed to six-year terms by the
Governor (who serves a two-year term) and approved by the Executive Council. But the interests of the
Governor’s office are represented in PUC proceedings by the Office of Strategic Initiatives (formerly
Office of Energy and Planning). For this reason, and because of the compelling case made by McCraw
1984 that there are in fact four, not three, branches of American governance, I distinguish between the
executive and the administrative/regulatory.
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Policy Challenge #1: Widespread DER adoption is inherently incompatible with the traditional
business model of regulated monopoly electric utilities. How can policy makers reconcile the
conflict between DER adoption and traditional utility business models?

In January 2013, the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), the trade association representing all
U.S. investor-owned electric utility companies, released a report warning that unchecked growth
in DER markets would inevitably erode the financial well-being of the electric utility industry
(Kind, 2013). The danger for utilities, according to the report, is that as DER adoption
accelerates it sets in motion a positive feedback loop, a vicious cycle in which customers opting
for DERs amplify the conditions driving DER adoption in the first place. DER adoption allows
customers to extricate themselves from previously compulsory participation in the pool of
customers paying for utility costs. As DER adoption spreads, the pool of customers covering the
utility’s costs becomes smaller and smaller and the portion of those costs apportioned to each
remaining customer grows larger and larger, thus driving more and more customers into the open
arms of the DER industry. Fig. 1.3 from the EEI report depicts this vicious cycle (colloquially
referred to as the utility death spiral) (EE: energy efficiency; DR: demand response). Because of
the conflict between the traditional utility business model and widespread DER adoption,
questions about DER integration are an inevitable source of tension and disagreement between
the two colliding industries.

8

Figure 1.3 – Vicious Cycle of Utility Lost Revenue from Disruptive Forces (Source: Kind 2013)

Policy Challenge #2: How can policy makers introduce competition into monopoly markets for
retail electricity services?
Regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its
benefit… Every industry… that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to
control entry… and retard the rate of growth of new firms.
– George Stigler (1971)
The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got. The natural
price, or the price of free competition, is the lowest which can be taken.
– Adam Smith (1776)

The history of the electric power system is the history of the struggle between monopoly
control and competitive market forces (Hirsh, 1999; Lambert, 2015). Gradually, beginning in the
1970s and continuing over subsequent decades, competition was introduced to bulk generation
of electricity in wholesale markets, despite intense anti-competition lobbying from incumbent
utilities (Hirsh, 1999). However, transmission and distribution systems remain tightly controlled
utility monopolies, which discourages competition in retail markets. The competitive nature of

9

electricity generation is important to understand because there are lessons to be drawn for the
current challenge of competitive DER integration. Competition in bulk generation and wholesale
electricity markets was accomplished by allowing competitive power generators equal access to
monopoly-owned transmission infrastructure. Competition can similarly be brought to the
distributed generation and retail electricity markets by allowing DER providers equal access to
monopoly-owned distribution infrastructure (see Fig 1.4).

Wholesale Electricity Markets

Generation

Transmission

Retail Electricity Markets

Distribution

DERs

Figure 1.4 – Components of the Electricity System

The electricity industry in the United States was founded on what Hirsh (1999) calls the
utility consensus. The utility consensus posited that in order to achieve the greatest economies of
scale to allow for rapid and low-risk proliferation of cheap electricity to the furthest corners of
America, a single vertically integrated corporation should receive exclusive franchise rights to
own and operate generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure in a given geographic
area, free of competition. In exchange for the exclusive monopoly franchise, the utility
corporation subjects itself to government regulation to ensure it does not abuse its monopoly
power to extort exorbitant profits from the public.
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The consensus was largely designed by the first great utility robber baron, Samuel Insull,
who realized, “In the long run, regulation means protection” (Lambert, 2015, p. 18). Importantly,
while utility managers often construe government regulation as onerous and burdensome, the
reality is that these same utility managers are responsible for the construction of the regulatory
system and simultaneously one of its greatest beneficiaries. Government regulation legitimizes
the utilities’ right to monopoly control and helps to insulate the system from competition (Hirsh,
1999). One consequence of the binary relationship between regulators and monopolies is
regulation often tends to function as a protective device rather than as a promotional or
developmental one. Regulation often suppresses rapid industrial change and innovation
(McCraw, 1984).
New Hampshire is famous (or not) for a very special section of a very special law passed
by the United States Congress in the wake of the 1970s energy crisis: President Carter’s Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). Prior to the passage of PURPA, utility
corporations enjoyed comfortable vertical integration: one company owned and operated the
entire system of generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity (see Fig. 1.4). PURPA
opened up opportunity for states to bring competition to the generation of electricity. The
introduction of competition to the generation of electricity allowed the country to diversify its
energy portfolio, reduce costs, and create a more efficient marketplace.
Wheelabrator-Frye, a New Hampshire power company operating cogeneration plants
(electricity and heat), and its ally Senator John Durkin of New Hampshire, lobbied the U.S.
Congress to include in PURPA a provision that revolutionized the competitive nature of
wholesale electricity markets (Hirsh, 1999). Prior to PURPA, utility monopolies owning
transmission infrastructure could squeeze all competitive generation companies out of the market
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by charging them excessive access fees for the use their transmission highways. Without
transmission highway access, there was no competition in the generation of electricity.
Consumers had no choice but to consume the electricity generated from power plants owned by
the vertically integrated utility, even if third-party competitive generators could produce
electricity more cheaply. In just a few years after the passage of PURPA and its special section
(thanks to Granite Staters), more than half of the utility industry’s annual generation capacity
additions came from competitive, independent power producers, dramatically reshaping electric
power markets across the country (Hirsh, 1999). This is referred to in the industry as
restructuring and/or deregulation.
Today, ISO-New England, the independent system operator for the regional electric
system, coordinates a symphony of competitive energy generators, calling power plants online
through a merit order bidding system in which the cheapest producers are at the front of the line
and the most expensive are at the back. Wholesale prices are based on real-time and forecasted
demand for electricity. Almost all New England utilities have divested of their generation fleets,
becoming poles and wires companies only. Open access to transmission infrastructure and price
signals based on demand created a competitive market for electricity generation.
Competition in bulk or wholesale generation of electricity, supplied by equal access to
transmission infrastructure and price signals based upon real-time demand for electricity, is a
very different thing from competition in retail electricity services, which would require equal
access to distribution infrastructure and similar real-time price signals. In this way, retail
markets are less competitive than wholesale markets. Much of the controversy surrounding
distributed energy resource (DER) integration is wrapped up in the challenge of expanding
competitive access to the distribution system and retail electricity markets. Competitive access
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to distribution infrastructure and price signals based on demand can create competitive retail
electricity markets, much in the way competitive access to transmission infrastructure and price
signals based on demand created a competitive wholesale electricity market (see Fig. 1.4).

Policy Challenge #3: How can policy makers redesign electricity markets to send more accurate
price signals that optimize economic efficiency?
Economic Efficiency: an economic state in which every resource is optimally allocated to serve
each individual or entity in the best way while minimizing waste and inefficiency… In terms of
production, goods are produced at their lowest possible cost, as are the variable inputs of
production (Investopedia, 2017).

Due to the regulated, command-and-control nature of the 20th century utility monopoly,
the retail electricity market is devoid of economically efficient price signals. Prices, rather than
reflecting the equilibrium of supply and demand as is the case in competitive markets, are set by
bureaucrats and utility managers, “accountants in a dark room” pouring over spreadsheets in the
“hard-to-penetrate, rate-setting place” of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) (NH Interview
1, 2016). Imagine the stereotypical archetype of U.S.S.R. central planners circa 1965, sitting in
their drab, gray office parks, flipping through abaci and carefully penciling out prices for the
next five-year plan of biscuits and boots. Today, in 2017 America, retail electricity prices are set
in much the same fashion, and have little to do with supply and demand.
The old system typically uses flat rates for retail electricity prices, rates that remain
unchanged regardless of time of consumption and regardless of the relative demand at the time
of consumption. Flat rates are “inappropriate and misleading… [and] fail to recognize real costs”
(Lazar and Gonzalez, 2015, p. 9). A kilowatt-hour (kWh) consumed at 3pm on the hottest day of
summer when air conditioners are blasting away and the electric grid is running at maximum
capacity is the same price to the average customer as a kWh consumed at times of low electricity
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demand. However, the true costs imposed on the system by these two examples of electricity
consumption, are, in the long run, dramatically different; peak-time summer electricity
consumption, when demand is at its highest, drives overall systems costs to a much greater
extent than consumption at times of low demand. By the same logic, a kWh saved during times
of high electricity demand provides a much greater value to the electric system as a whole. But
the current system, with its flat rate structure, does nothing to communicate to consumers the
true costs and benefits of their electricity consumption patterns.
An economically efficient electricity market would communicate the nuances associated
with supply and demand at the time of consumption and production to consumers and producers
of electricity. Offering smart rate options to consumers, rates that more accurately communicate
the true cost of electricity consumption based on demand, would allow the engaged customer to
reduce her individual electricity costs and simultaneously reduce costs for all system users by
improving the economic efficiency of the system as a whole. These smart rate offerings are an
essential prerequisite for the deployment of the 21st century energy vision. Without smart rates,
the very real value associated with the symphony-like city smart grid will remain unrealized.
Regulators, utilities, and other stakeholders are beginning to grapple with the challenges of
designing and implementing such smart rates to improve economic efficiency across the system
(see Lazar and Gonzalez, 2015; NARUC, 2016; and Convery et al., 2017).

Policy Challenge #4: How can 21st century electric utilities be fairly compensated for their
services?
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As illustrated by policy challenge #1, efficiency and DER adoption erode the financial
well-being of the traditionally regulated electric utility. This is because the traditional, 20th
century electric utility is compensated through two primary mechanisms: (1) volumetric sales,
and (2) regulated return on investment on capital expenditures. In other words, the utility
“wants” to sell more electricity, and the utility “wants” to spend cash on expensive system
upgrades and expansion. If states wish to advance a 21st century energy system and wish to keep
their electric utilities from going bankrupt, they must reconsider approaches to electric utility
compensation.
Many states have undergone regulatory overhauls and made their utilities indifferent to
volume of electricity flowing through their wires. This regulatory shift is known as decoupling
and is one potential remedy for the discord between the traditionally regulated utility and an
efficient, decentralized 21st century energy system (see Lazar, 2015; NREL, 2009; NARUC,
2007; Moskovitz, et al., 1992).
The second traditional component of a utility’s compensation, the incentive to prioritize
capital expenditures on grid expansion, presents a similar obstacle to DER integration. When the
utility makes capital expenditures on poles, wires, substations, etc., it expands the base from
which it earns its return on investment. The more the utility spends on infrastructure expansion,
the larger the number on which the utility earns its percentage rate of return, and the happier the
utility shareholder.
But DER competitors argue implementation of their technologies can meet electric
system planning, design, and maintenance needs at lower costs and with greater efficiency than
traditional utility solutions. DER providers are jockeying for the opportunity to supplant the need
for conventional utility solutions by deploying non-wires alternatives, i.e., coordinated systems
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of DERs. If DERs can offset the need for the utility to make investments in traditional grid
expansion, the utility loses out on a core profit opportunity. Policy makers must find solutions
that reward utilities for acting as a platform to facilitate competitive DER solutions.

Policy Challenge #5: How can DERs be fairly compensated for their services?

The smart rates discussed in policy challenge #3 present one solution to this challenge.
Smart rates can send more accurate price signals which, for example, can tell an automated
washing machine to run when electricity prices are lowest, or tell a fleet of batteries when
demand is high and compensate them accordingly for a discharge of stored energy into the grid.
But, in addition to their temporal benefits, DERs can also provide geographic benefits to the
electricity system.
Current compensation methodologies for DERs are primitive. The primary policy
mechanism for compensating distributed generation (e.g., rooftop solar), is net metering. Net
metering is a primitive compensation method for the same reason flat rates send poor price
signals to consumers; owners of distributed generation are compensated at the flat, retail rate for
electricity, i.e., the same rate they pay to consume electricity from the grid. Flat rate net metering
leads to random solar deployment, which is great for the individual who wishes to take control of
his energy use, but limited in its ability to optimize the systemic redesign of the electric grid. A
solar array plopped in a field miles away from a congruous day-time electricity load is much less
valuable than a solar array powering a commercial center whose energy use patterns roughly
correspond with the array’s production profile. Twenty-first century smart grid solutions will
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compensate DERs for locational as well as temporal values. The question remains, what are
these values, and how do we compensate DERs for them?

Policy Challenge #6: There is a lack of data informing decisions. What is the best way to collect
and share data about when, where, and how electricity is produced and consumed across the
system in order to better resolve many of the previously discussed policy challenges?

DER integration is fraught with uncertainty. For the past century, the traditional electric
utility system, immune to competitive pressures, has coasted along indifferent to innovative
opportunities presented by advancing technology, namely, computers, the Internet, and
associated data processing capabilities. While many tech-savvy industries of the modern age are
racing to collect, process, and capitalize on reams of data, utility monopolies have made
shockingly little progress in collecting and using data to optimize their systems. Utility
customers have, until now, scarcely had the option of leaving their monopoly electricity provider
for one offering more modern solutions and because of this, there has been no impetus for
utilities to innovate and enter the world of big data optimization.
Twenty-first century energy solutions require data, and lots of them. The synchronized
city smart grid will rely on data about when, where, and how energy is used, consumed, and
generated across the network. Without those data, questions about the value of DERs and smart
grid resources are impossible to answer and it is impossible to accurately compensate those
resources for the services they can provide to the system. Collecting data and creating a granular
baseline understanding about how electricity and DERs interact across the system is an essential
component of constructing a 21st century energy system.
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***
To summarize, policy and market developments are catalyzing significant shifts in
electricity markets towards competition, decentralization, and decarbonization. These shifts in
turn raise a series of new policy challenges. Old utility business/regulatory models are
economically inefficient and conflict with 21st century smart grid optimization. New competitive
actors are challenging unilateral monopoly control. Current electricity rate structures are
primitive and inhibit progress. While the old utility model is clearly obsolete, it is less clear what
its future replacement will look like. Policy makers have yet to establish economically efficient
methods for capturing the temporal and locational values of DERs. And all of the above issues
are compounded by the absence of necessary data about when, where, and how electricity is
produced and consumed across the system. Further confounding this issue, the utility controls
access to the very data that may enable the undoing of its torpid, century-long hegemony.
These six challenges, Herculean in their own right, are further exacerbated by one final
and overarching challenge. It is from this final policy challenge that I derive my research
question.

Policy Challenge #7: Twenty-first century electricity market design requires numerous and
diverse parties to engage in inter-organizational decision making. This vastly increases
complexity of decision-making processes, which are encumbered by antiquated 20th century
practices. How can we re-design the decision-making process to facilitate collaboration among
the diversity of actors?
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The three policy processes examined in my research involve dozens of organizations
colliding with one another in PUC proceedings, each vying to achieve its individual interests.
Figure 1.5 and Table 1.3 provide a brief overview and description of many, but not nearly all, of
the various organizations engaging in NH PUC regulatory proceedings for 21st century electricity
market design. Broadly speaking, actors can be divided into five categories: (1) the state; (2) the
investor-owned utilities; (3) the local DER affiliates; (4) the national interest groups; and (5)
miscellaneous actors. None of the aforementioned challenges can be adequately addressed
without first deciding how this community of actors should go about addressing them.
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The State
The Investor-owned
Utilities

New Hampshire

OCA
Office of Consumer
Advocate

National Interest Groups

Local Distributed Energy Resource Affiliates

Figure 1.5 – New Hampshire’s Energy Policy-making Community

Miscellaneous

Category

Organization
Department of
Environmental Services
(DES)
Office of Energy and
Planning (OEP)

Representatives from the Air Resources Division of DES intervene in dockets with specific environmental
outcomes (e.g., efficiency, electric vehicles, grid modernization).

Arm of the Governor’s office. (Under the Sununu administration, OEP was renamed Office of Strategic
Initiatives (OSI). I refer to it as OEP because that is what it was called during the majority of this research.)

Public Utilities
Commission (PUC)

Commissioners:
• The arbiters and final decision makers.
Relevant Divisions:
• Electric Division: Executes cost-of-service regulation for monopoly electric utility corporations. Managed
the EERS docket unilaterally; managed the Net Metering docket in partnership with the Sustainable
Energy Division.
• Legal Division: Supports other divisions in all manner of affairs. Often plays facilitation role.
• Sustainable Energy Division: Oversees implementation of state sustainable energy programs. Managed
the Net Metering docket in partnership with the Electric Division.
Administratively Attached Agencies:
• Office of the Consumer Advocate (OCA): Represents the collective interests of New Hampshire’s energy
consumers.
Consultants to the Commission:
• Raab Associates: Expert in consensus building for utility regulation, facilitated the Grid Modernization
Working Group.
• Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP) (nonprofit): Experts on all things utility regulation whose mission is
to accelerate the transition to a clean, reliable, efficient energy future.

Eversource Energy

The largest electric utility in New England with over 320 million customers. Formerly Public Service
Company of New Hampshire (PSNH).

The State

InvestorOwned Utilities

Description

Liberty Utilities

Unitil Corporation

New Hampshire’s smallest electric utility and a subsidiary of Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp. Liberty also
operates a gas business.

Small electric and gas utility (gas company: Northern Utilities).
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Table 1.3 – New Hampshire’s Energy Policy-making Community

Acadia Center
Borrego Solar
City of Lebanon (CoL)
Local
Distributed
Energy
Resource
Affiliates

Conservation Law
Foundation (CLF)
New Hampshire
Sustainable Energy
Association (NHSEA)
Northeast Clean Energy
Council (NECEC)
Patricia A. Martin
ReVision Energy
Revolution Energy

National
Interest
Groups

Miscellaneous

The Nature
Conservancy (TNC)
Consumer Energy
Alliance (CEA)
Energy Freedom
Coalition for America
(EFCA)
The Alliance for Solar
Choice (TASC)
Business & Industry
Association (BIA)
Competitive Energy
Suppliers
New England
Ratepayers Association
(NERA)
Granite State
Hydropower
Association
NH Legal Assistance

One of the largest commercial-scale solar developers in the region. Intervened in the Net Metering docket.
Represented by former PUC Commissioner, former State Senator, former State Representative, current City
Councilor of Lebanon, Clifton Below.
Intervened in all three dockets as part of regional strategy to mitigating climate change.
Represents the interests of over 90 New Hampshire-based DER companies.
Regional advocate for clean energy. Supports NHSEA regularly in regulatory matters.
Retired electrical engineer and Grid Mod collaborator.
Northern New England’s largest solar company.
A pioneer in the business and policy innovation of DER integration. Represented by the author in Grid Mod
and Net Metering dockets.
Environmental advocate.
Trade association representing fossil fuel industries masquerading as a pro-solar advocate in Net Metering
docket.
Advocated on behalf of Tesla Inc. and subsidiary SolarCity in Grid Mod and Net Metering dockets.
Advocates on behalf of U.S. solar industry.
Statewide chamber of commerce.
Direct Energy, Standard Power of America, etc.
Anti-DER advocates.

Represents New Hampshire hydropower industry.
Advocates on behalf of low- and moderate-income groups.
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Dedicated to advancing the clean energy future in the Northeast. Intervened in the three dockets that are the
subject of this thesis.

The Public Utilities Commission – Regulatory Evolution for the 21st Century

–

The role of regulators is to bring the interests of the public and
those of the corporations into identity.
Charles Francis Adams Jr., 1870s (as cited in McCraw, 1984, p. 32)

Every U.S. state has a Public Utilities Commission or the equivalent thereof. The Public
Utilities Commission (PUC) is the institution that lies at the center of New Hampshire’s energy
policy-making community. It is both the physical space within which organizations convene to
address policy challenges and the final decision maker. Because of its central importance, I will
devote a few paragraphs to the PUC.
The PUC, not by design but by default, has become the authority responsible for
resolving 21st century energy policy challenges and facilitating the integration of solar, batteries,
demand response, and other DERs into the electric system. Facilitating DER integration
represents a dramatic departure from the traditional role of the Commission: monopoly
ratemaking.
Historically, Commissions have played the role of neutral arbiter, an impartial judge
presiding over evidence-based contests between utilities and consumer advocates to ensure
monopoly power is not abused to extort exorbitant profits from the general public. The PUC’s
mandate includes the responsibility for ensuring decisions reflect the public interest.
Commissions also check monopoly power and balance the interests of utility shareholders and
electricity consumers much in the way a judicial body uncovers the truth: through adversarial
legal contests between utility lawyers on the one side and regulators and consumer advocates on
the other with the goal of arriving at Goldilocks outcomes, rates that are not too high and not too
low but just right.
Three important points to acknowledge and consider regarding the role of the PUC:
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1. In the absence of another state agency with the resources, expertise, and mandate to
manage 21st century electricity market design, the onus to do so has fallen on the
Commission as the most practical of a limited number of available candidates (despite
requiring it to diverge from its original function of setting monopoly energy rates).
2. While energy policy making occurs through Commission proceedings, the Commission
itself is not the policy designer, but rather the final rule-making arbiter who, after all of
the evidence has been presented, after the last witness has said his piece, decides the final
outcome. Special interests, utilities, solar companies, environmental and consumer
advocates, and fossil fuel lobbying groups provide the content on which final rulings are
based.
3. The traditional PUC process for resolving disputes, while providing opportunities for
collaborative approaches to decision making, invariably leads to an adversarial hearing in
which opposing coalitions are pitted against one another. The traditional, adversarial
process was designed for monopoly ratemaking and not for managing competitive DER
integration and resolving 21st century energy policy challenges.

Today, the PUC must adapt to take on its new responsibility of resolving 21st century
energy policy challenges, but it remains encumbered by an adversarial architecture designed for
its 20th century function of monopoly utility ratemaking. PUC adjudication is ill-suited for
addressing 21st century energy policy challenges. Like the energy sector surrounding it, the
Commission is in a state of evolution. In order to successfully carry out its new function, the
Commission must reassess its regulatory strategy.
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The following excerpt from Thomas K. McCraw’s Pulitzer Prize-winning history of
regulation summarizes his core thesis and provides valuable lessons for regulators:
More than any other single factor, the underlying structure of the particular industry being
regulated has defined the context in which regulatory agencies have operated… The industry may
be regarded as the dog, the regulatory agency only as the tail. Yet many students of regulation
have assumed that tails wag dogs and, further, that one standard type of tail can wag whatever
breed of dog may be attached. Such observers… have missed a larger truth: the industries that
these similarly-structured commissions regulated were extremely diverse. Thus these observers
have duplicated the errors made historically by many regulators themselves, who often paid more
attention to legal processes and administrative procedures than to the greater task of framing
strategies appropriate to the particular industries they were regulating. For all parties who seek to
understand regulation, the most important single consideration is the appropriateness of the
regulatory strategy to the industry involved (McCraw, 1984, p. 305–306).

McCraw’s argument is that regulatory strategies must be designed to match the
underlying structure of the particular industry they propose to regulate. His central point is that
the careless transposition of a regulatory strategy from one industry to the next without
consideration of the differing structures of the industries is synonymous with failure. The danger
at present is, as Commissions across the country pivot to face the disruptive challenges due to the
proliferation of DERs, they may ignore McCraw’s warning and attempt to meet these challenges
with the same tools and mindsets that served them in regulating monopoly utilities. A more
effective method would be for regulators to study and acknowledge the dramatic differences
between the structure of the centralized, monopolistic, and unimaginative utility industry of the
20th century and the decentralized, competitive, and ever-innovating DER industry of the 21st
century.
Today’s context of burgeoning DER markets and traditional utility sector disruption call
for new regulatory approaches. Sonia Aggarwal, a leading thinker in 21st energy policy issues,
articulates well the obsolescence of old approaches to regulation:
Traditional regulation was quite effective when we were trying to build out the power grid to
meet growing demand for electricity and provide universal access to electricity. Now, we are in a
period of flat or even declining electricity demand, and the old utility value engine is running out
of gas. Costs have plummeted for new technologies, offering new opportunities for utilities to
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optimize energy use. At the same time, third parties are taking advantage of those new
technologies to offer products and services directly to customers—effectively competing with
utility business and eroding sales. This is all happening amidst a growing imperative to clean up
emissions from the power system – for reasons of national security, economic stability, public
health, and climate change. Utilities are important institutions intended to serve the public interest
cost-effectively. And a new regulatory approach… can help keep utilities financially healthy as
they deliver customer and societal value during this time of transition (Aggarwal, 2016, p. 1).

A 2017 report from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory is similarly critical of
adjudication, siting, “litigated process, poor communications, relationships that do not build
trust, and a lack of consensus about outcomes” as key impediments to the alignment of utility
incentives and public policy goals (LBNL, 2017, p. 75). The 21st century electricity system will
have to incorporate and integrate the expertise and interests of both the utility sector and the
DER sector, but strict adjudicatory contests are not conducive to the integration of these two
camps and the production of creative, mutual-gain solutions.
Alternatively, collaborative processes, mediation, and consensus building are more likely
to allow the stakeholders to collectively answer the difficult and complex policy challenges
presented by today’s energy environment. In New Hampshire specifically, numerous
stakeholders and several studies have already recommended the PUC adopt a more collaborative
approach to better address the challenges of the day (Vermont Energy Investment Corporation
[VEIC], 2011; New Hampshire Office of Legislative Budget Assistant [NHLBA], 2012;
Hatfield, et al., 2013; VEIC, 2013; NH Office of Energy and Planning [NHOEP]).
In general, energy policy disputes can be managed according to one of two approaches:
adjudication or collaboration. Adjudication is the conventional structure of regulatory energy
policy-making proceedings and it has historically fulfilled a cost-of-service ratemaking function
for monopoly utilities. In 2011, a legislatively commissioned study of New Hampshire energy
policy issues found the PUC’s “adjudicated regulatory proceedings are perhaps the least effective
forum for contemplating program design changes, and reaching agreement on how effective they
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will be at market development and transformation” (Vermont Energy Investment Corporation
[VEIC], et al., 2011, p. 1-10). Similarly, a 2013 energy policy report by former Governor
Hassan’s Energy and Environment Transition Team found “regulatory processes are outdated,”
and a PUC that is “reactive and not goal oriented… hampered by a long tradition of a standard
approach” in which “innovation is suppressed” (Hatfield, et al., 2014, p. 2, 7, 7). The report
continues, “all processes are adversarial” and leave “no institutional capacity for collaboration”
(Hatfield, et al., 2014, p. 7). The report recommends a number of remedies for what it views as
an outmoded and inadequate regulatory approach to modern challenges, namely adapt the PUC
to function as “a forum that is more conducive to collaboration and less focused on litigation”
(Hatfield, et al., 2014, p. 7). Additionally, the report argues, “innovation and collaboration
require a stable and coordinated government-supported foundation upon which the private sector
can build” (Hatfield, et al., 2014, p. 1).

Contrasting Collaborative and Adjudicative Dispute Resolution
Collaborative approaches to dispute resolution have been used to address contentious and
complex electric utility regulatory issues in the past and have been shown to improve utility
regulation (Raab, 1994). In this section I will contrast collaborative and adjudicative approaches
to dispute resolution according to three types of characteristics: basis for dispute resolution;
process design; and process outcome. Table 1.4 summarizes the characteristics of the two
approaches to dispute resolution. The table represents the theoretical types of collaborative and
adjudicative processes. In practice, all processes embody characteristics of both types in varying
degrees and will fall somewhere in between these two ends of the spectrum.
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Table 1.4 – Characteristics of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes

Basis for
Dispute
Resolution
Process
Design

Process
Outcomes

Collaborative
Characterized by integrative interestbased negotiation
Information used as a
common resource
Process tailored by stakeholders

Adjudicative
Characterized by positional and rightsbased bargaining
Information used to further
each side’s position
Process prescribed, same for all cases

Procedures position parties as joint
problem solvers

Procedures position parties
as adversaries

Produces mutual gain solutions

Produces winner-take-all outcomes

Promotes positive relationships

Damages relationships

Collaboration institutionalized

Maintains silos of actors

Basis for Resolving Disputes
Standard energy policy-making processes, such as PUC adjudication, often follow rightsbased approaches in which independent standards of fairness or legitimacy are used to evaluate a
dispute. A third-party neutral entity presides over disputes and makes a ruling on who is right
(Raab, 1994; Rogers, et al., 2013). In New Hampshire, the Commission acts as the neutral arbiter
and decision maker. Rights-based approaches to dispute resolution result in positional bargaining
(Rogers, et al., 2013). Parties come to the table with their positions already established and miss
the opportunity to collectively brainstorm various creative approaches to both the process and the
solutions. Parties are also likely to take extreme positions in anticipation that their opposition
will do the same, which can obscure each party’s true interests and antagonize their opponents.
Extreme positions also lead to costly and time-consuming negotiations in which high amounts of
energy are devoted to achieving small concessions. Furthermore, when parties bargain over
positions, they become attached to and defensive about positions, which limits their ability to
consider alternatives that might equally or better satisfy their interests (Lewicki, et al., 2011;
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Fisher & Ury, 2011). In positional bargaining, parties make no effort to understand each other’s
interests except in order to undermine or discredit them. In traditional adversarial dispute
resolution processes, parties often enlist their own experts to cherry pick evidence supporting
their own positions and discrediting the positions of their opponents. Each party comes to the
table with their own sets of facts (Matsuura and Schenk, 2017).
In collaborative processes for dispute resolution, sometimes referred to as integrative
negotiation or problem-solving negotiation, stakeholders begin by communicating their interests
rather than attempting to achieve positions. This focus on interests, rather than positions, allows
for learning and creative brainstorming of various possible solutions to satisfy interests.
Stakeholders assign differing levels of value to different issues and trade across differences,
rather than working to discredit the position of their opponent in order to win favor for their own
position (Fisher & Ury, 2011).
Emerson, et al. (2011) identifies principled engagement as one of three key aspects of
any successful collaborative process. Principled engagement is comprised of four elements:
discovery, definition, deliberation, and determination. Discovery refers to participants sharing
their interests and concerns and learning about the interests and concerns of each other. Through
sharing and learning, participants develop shared definitions of problems and can deliberate the
key issues that the process will seek to address. Finally, discovery, definition, and deliberation
produce initial determinations about the focus and objectives of the process (Emerson, et al.,
2011).
Specifically in utility regulation, collaborative processes have succeeded in allowing
parties to jointly seek out and share the best technical information and use it as a common
resource (Raab, 1994). Joint fact-finding challenges all parties to collaboratively generate shared
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sets of facts for decision making. There are four key steps in joint fact-finding (Matsuura and
Schenk, 2017):
1. Parties define information needs (i.e., data needed to make the best decision)
2. Parties translate needs into research questions
3. Parties partner with respected, trusted technical experts to devise and conduct research
and study
4. Parties jointly receive the results and consider implications.
Joint fact-finding allows parties to use information as a common resource rather than as a
weapon to attack one another.

Process Design
Conventional approaches to dispute resolution do not take into consideration the unique
circumstances of each dispute but rather follow the same generic procedure regardless of the case
(Innes & Booher, 2003). Disputants have no role in designing the approach to resolving disputes.
Agendas tend to be prescribed by an external authority or decision maker. Rituals, routines,
habits, and procedures of the conventional system constrain participants and stifle creativity. The
rigid boundaries of what can and cannot be a topic of discussion limit the range of possible
solutions (Forester, 1997; Innes & Booher, 2003; Rogers, et al., 2013; Ulibarri, 2015).
Conventional rights-based processes limit face-to-face contact among disputants to rule-bound
and adversarial contexts (Gray, 1989).
Alternatively, collaborative processes are designed by the stakeholders to meet the unique
circumstances on a case-by-case basis (Rogers, et al., 2013; Schenk & Stokes, 2013). Through
collaboration stakeholders contribute to the designing of the process. Furthermore, the design
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phase of the process is not a one-and-done occurrence at the beginning of the process: it is an
iterative process of designing and redesigning. Throughout the duration of the collaboration
stakeholders must be able to follow the conversation where it leads and not be confined by rules
about what can or cannot be discussed or what can or cannot be changed (Innes & Booher,
2003). The flexibility of such inclusive collaboration empowers stakeholders to tap into all of
their knowledge and creativity in solving any number of interrelated problems rather than
focusing on issues in isolation from one another. In utility regulation, collaboration allows
parties to bypass confining or dated precedents and legal restrictions in favor of more practical
and flexible solutions (Raab, 1994). Bypassing the obstacles of traditional legal process enables
parties to jointly work out technical details at a granular level that is near impossible in contested
cases (Raab, 1994).

Process Outcomes
Most of the research addressing environmental conflicts and environmental conflict
resolution comes in the form of single descriptive case studies, making generalizability difficult.
Additionally, outcomes of environmental conflicts tend to be difficult to measure (Emerson, et
al., 2003). This is particularly true for my three case studies: because of the current nature of the
cases there has not been sufficient time to attempt to measure the environmental outcomes of the
decisions. Instead, I focus on stakeholder perceptions of the process and its outcomes.
Rights-based adjudicative processes often result in winner-take-all outcomes, leaving at
least one party feeling like the loser and thus more inclined to pursue costly appeals or litigation
(Ury, et al., 1988; Fisher & Ury, 2011; Rogers, et al., 2013; Schenk & Stokes, 2013). Winnertake-all results can strain or damage relationships, foster bitterness and resentment among
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parties, and increase the likelihood of dispute recurrence (Gray, 1989; Ury, et al., 1988; Fisher &
Ury, 2011; Rogers, et al., 2013; Schenk & Stokes, 2013). Conversely, interest-based
collaborations allow for solutions that meet the interests of all parties, which in turn deters
further disputes, and reduces long-term transaction costs (Ury, et al., 1988; Rogers, et al., 2013).
Integrative bargaining creates space for positive-sum games in which one party’s gain does not
necessitate another party’s loss (Fisher & Ury, 2011).
Collaborative processes require that stakeholders engage with one another constructively
and learn about each other’s interests. As participants learn about the other parties they also build
mutual trust, understanding, and respect, and thus build positive interpersonal relationships.
Conversely, stakeholders tend to conceal interests in adjudicative processes. Rather than
engaging openly and freely, interactions are often relegated to formal hearings and adversarial
courtroom settings where stakeholders are positioned as opponents, which is more likely to
negatively impact relationships.
In Emerson et al. (2011), a key aspect in successful collaborations is shared motivation,
which also consists of four elements: mutual trust, understanding, internal legitimacy, and
commitment. Here we see the beginning of relationship building, a phenomenon many have
identified as an outcome of collaborative processes (Fisher & Ury, 2011; Forester, 1997;
Baumann & White, 2013; Walker, et al., 2006; Innes & Booher, 2003; Rogers, et. al., 2013).
Shared motivation has also been referred to as social capital (Emerson, et al., 2011). As
collaborative processes build social capital among the diversity of parties engaged, they improve
the ability of institutions to respond collaboratively to future challenges.
Finally, collaborative processes, and the positive impacts they can have on relationships,
can foster new networks, organizations, forums, and institutions that continually grow and adapt
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in a complex and changing world (Forester, 1997). As stakeholders move through collaborative
processes, learn about each other, deliberate together, and build new relationships, they also
begin the work of developing new institutions to support repeated use of collaborative
governance. Stakeholders develop procedural and institutional arrangements to ensure the
capacity and the infrastructure for continued interactions and collaborations over time (Emerson,
et al., 2011). New institutions tend to be less hierarchical and more networked than their older,
conventional counterparts. Flexible and networked structures empower stakeholders to challenge
the status quo, which is essential in developing creative and innovative solutions to problems
(Innes & Booher, 2003).
I do not intend to suggest collaborative processes are always superior to adjudicative
processes for reaching decisions. Adjudication has the benefits of providing all stakeholders with
a voice and ensuring policy proposals are supported by detailed evidentiary exhibits.
Furthermore, just because stakeholders reach agreement on a policy does not necessarily mean
the policy is in the best interests of all stakeholders or the broader public. An adjudicator can be
held accountable to ensure the public interest is reflected in decision outcomes, in a way
stakeholders cannot. Finally, adjudication can limit some power imbalances that could allow a
more powerful group to out-manoeuver and impose an outcome on a less powerful group.
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Research Design and Methodology
My overarching research question is: How does the New Hampshire Public Utilities
Commission (PUC) process limit or support opportunity for collaboration? I answer this question
by conducting an in-depth case study of the PUC as it grapples with the new policy challenges of
distributed energy resource (DER) integration and 21st century electricity market design. To
identify institutional opportunities and barriers, I analyze three PUC dockets:
•

DE 15-137: Electric and Gas Utility Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS)
(Chapter 2)

•

IR 15-296: Investigation into Electric Grid Modernization (Grid Mod) (Chapter 3)

•

DE 16-576: Development of New Alternative Net Metering Tariffs and/or Other
Regulatory Mechanisms and Tariffs for Customer Generators (Net Metering) (Chapter 4)

I selected these cases because they represent all of the PUC dockets occurring between 2015 and
2018 that bring together utilities and DER affiliates to address policy challenges of DER
integration.
Case studies are an appropriate method for detailed qualitative studies of contemporary
phenomena within their real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the
phenomena and their context are unclear (Yin, 2014). The boundary between the policy
processes addressed in the study and the context of an evolving energy sector is murky at best,
making the subject well suited for a case study approach. This research is a single case study
with three embedded units of analysis, the three dockets. Figure 1.6 depicts a timeline of the
dockets.
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EERS Docket
Grid Mod Working Group
Net Metering Docket
May

July

Sept.

Nov.

2016

March

May

July

Sept.

Nov.

2017

March

May

July

Figure 1.6 – Timeline of EERS, Grid Mod, and Net Metering Dockets

I break each docket into process stages and analyze each stage to identify collaborative
and adjudicative characteristics. I also analyze the interaction among the individuals and
organizations involved in the PUC policy processes. I call this organizational field New
Hampshire’s Energy Policy-making Community (see Fig. 1.5, p. 20). There are two accepted
analogies for organizational fields: the game analogy and the ecological community analogy
(Scott, 2008). According to the game analogy, rules govern relations among players who
compete in an arena of conflict to win stakes. According to the ecological community analogy,
organizations existing in the same geographic space and carrying out related functions develop
relationships and interdependencies, much as organisms in an ecosystem might develop
competitive or symbiotic characteristics (Scott, 2008).
Both analogies are helpful in conceptualizing New Hampshire’s energy policy-making
community/arena. However, the game analogy is too simplistic to capture the complexities of
21st century thinking. For this reason I prefer the ecological community analogy. I find it useful
in reimagining the nuances of organizational relationships, the potential for a horticulturist to
carefully coax and cultivate his garden towards a healthy symbiosis among organisms, a climax
equilibrium.
Figure 1.7 is a model of the PUC’s adjudicative process. The model represents the forum
within which New Hampshire’s energy policy-making community engages in policy design. The
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model can be thought of as the arena in which the players of New Hampshire’s energy policymaking game compete to win victories over one another. Alternatively, it can be thought of as
the ecosystem within which the organisms comprising New Hampshire’s energy policy-making
community coexist and create structure for ecosystem functioning. For two of the three dockets
explored in the coming chapters – the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) (Chapter 2)
and Net Metering (Chapter 4) – the Commission employed the adjudicative process depicted in
Fig 1.7 to design policy and resolve disputes. I use Fig. 1.7 to create detailed process maps for
the EERS (Fig. 2.1, p. 50), Grid Mod (Fig. 3.1, p. 87), and Net Metering (Fig. 4.2, p. 107)
dockets; the descriptions below may be useful when deciphering these process maps. Electric
Grid Modernization (Chapter 3) is an investigative docket, not an adjudicative docket;
investigative dockets are used to study an issue and do not follow the model of the adjudicative
process.

Testimony Filing
Prehearing
Conference

Rebuttal Filing

Technical Sessions

Settlement
Conference

Litigated
Hearing

Discovery (Interrogatories)

Informal Meetings & Negotiations

Fig. 1.7 – Model of the PUC Adjudicative Process

Below are brief descriptions of each stage of the adjudicative process:
The prehearing conference: The initial gathering of stakeholders (intervenors) and the
Commissioners at the outset of a docket. Intervenors have the opportunity to formally comment
on how the docket process should be conducted and articulate preliminary positions.
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Testimony filing: Parties submit evidence or policy proposals for the Commission to consider
when making its final ruling.
Rebuttal filing: Testimony that directly addresses the testimony of other intervenors or defends
initial testimony against criticism.
Discovery: Intervenors subject one another other and their testimonies and rebuttal testimonies to
written questions soliciting further information, data, etc. In addition to gathering information,
the purpose of discovery is to build a record of evidence prior to the hearing by highlighting
particular aspects or weaknesses in the testimony of others.
Technical sessions: Meetings in which intervenors set procedural schedules, hear presentations
from experts, deliberate policy options, discuss discovery and discovery responses, or address a
wide range of other issues throughout each docket.
Settlement conferences: The final opportunity for parties to negotiate a consensus agreement, or
to negotiate consensus for a select number of issues prior to the hearing. Negotiations are
confidential and in cases in which a settlement agreement is not reached, parties cannot present
confidential settlement material as evidence in the hearing.
Informal meetings and negotiations: Intervenors negotiate with one another outside of official
PUC meetings.
Hearing: The culmination of the adjudicative process. Evidence is entered into the record. Parties
call witnesses to testify in defense of their proposals or in opposition to the proposals of others.
Witnesses are subjected to cross-examination.
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Table 1.5 – Characteristics for Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes (operationalized)

•
Basis for
Dispute
Resolution

•
•
•

Process
Design

Process
Outcomes

Collaborative
Adjudicative
Characterized by integrative interestCharacterized by positional and rightsbased negotiation
based bargaining
Information used as a
Information used to further
common resource
each side’s position
Identify conflict management frames using interest and position frames identified
in the literature. Examples:
o Interest: “We can agree on this, if you can agree that…”
o Position: “We insist on…”; “I won’t go any lower than…”
Do stakeholders use information to clarify and solve problems or to support or
undermine positions?
Identify intent of process component (Example: learn, brainstorm, deliberate,
create record of evidence).
Identify explicit decision rules and stakeholders' decision-making goals.
o Do parties strive to reach decisions by consensus or by prevailing?
Process tailored by stakeholders
Process prescribed, same for all cases

Procedures position parties as joint
Procedures position parties
problem solvers
as adversaries
• Identify process as typical or unique based on participants’ perception.
• Identify process decisions (order, function of steps) and agenda decisions (range of
issues) as either collective, unilateral, or set by authority.
o Example: Does process recommendation result from stakeholder dialogue
and consensus or from only one stakeholder?
• How do procedures organize stakeholder interactions?
o Example: Does one party direct interaction (verbal, written) or do multiple
parties engage in free-flowing exchange?

•
•

•

Produces mutual gain solutions

Produces winner-take-all outcomes

Promotes positive relationships

Damages relationships

Collaboration institutionalized

Maintains silos of actors

Does final decision meet the interests of multiple parties or only some?
Identify characterization frames
o Example: How do parties perceive their relationships or attribute blame for
problems?
Are new formal or informal collaborative procedures and institutions created?

Table 1.5 combines the characteristics of collaborative and adjudicative policy-making
processes and provides specific indicators for identifying them. I use table 1.5 to analyze
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stakeholders’ discourse (verbal, nonverbal, and electronic), proposals, and proceedings through
participant observation, document analysis, and personal interviews during each component of
the PUC process laid out in Fig 1.7. I also analyze the outcomes of each of the three cases (a
policy ruling by the PUC in EERS and Net Metering, and a report in Grid Mod) using Table 1.5.
In other words, I identify characteristics listed in Table 1.5 – Characteristics of Collaborative and
Adjudicative Processes – within each component depicted in Figure 1.7 – Model of PUC
Adjudicative Process – to identify opportunities and barriers for collaboration within the PUC
process.
Although my findings are specific to New Hampshire, they may be applicable in other
states grappling with the same energy policy challenges. Every U.S. state has an equivalent to the
New Hampshire PUC, as does each Canadian province and territory, many U.S. territories, and
many countries around the world. These Commissions generally serve the same function: costof-service ratemaking for monopoly utility corporations. Each Commission employs some form
of adjudication as the tool for executing cost-of-service ratemaking and other functions. More
than half of U.S. states have EERS policies (American Council for an Energy Efficiency
Economy, 2017); more than half of U.S. state PUCs have addressed net metering in some form
(Advanced Energy Economy, 2017); and 37 U.S. states took some form of policy action relating
to grid modernization in 2017 (Trabish, 2017).

Data Collection
Table 1.6 summarizes my data collection methods for each of the three cases. For the
three dockets collectively, I conducted participant observation over an 18-month period at PUC
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technical sessions, working group meetings, settlement conferences, and hearings, and Energy
Efficiency and Sustainable Energy (EESE) Board meetings.
I conducted 22 in-person and two telephone call in-depth interviews with stakeholders
engaged in these energy policy-making processes (I list 30 interviews in Table 1.6 because
several interviews addressed content for multiple dockets). Interviews are broken down by sector
in Fig. 1.8. Interviewees represent state regulatory, energy, and environmental agencies, electric
utility companies, business and trade associations, nonprofits, energy project developers,
environmental advocates, and state legislators. I purposively selected stakeholders based on their
participation in the three dockets and by using snowball sampling, meaning I asked each
interviewee to recommend other interviewees they felt would contribute to the research. The
personal in-depth interviews followed a semi-structured format, meaning I came to each
interview with a set list of questions, but also allowed the interview to veer away from those
questions in certain cases. Interviews lasted between 1 and 2.5 hours. Interviews took place at
offices, coffee shops, and restaurants. In some instances, and with the interviewee permission, I
digitally audio-recorded the interviews. I transcribed recorded interviews. I took either
handwritten or typed notes immediately before, during, and immediately after each interview.
Quotations from interviews are only attributed to individuals in cases where they gave explicit
consent or they are public record. A sample interview protocol can be found in Appendix C. I did
not interview PUC Commissioners. Commissioners were prohibited from engaging with me
outside of official hearings due to my status as official intervenor in the Net Metering docket.
Participant observation, interviews, and document analysis enabled me to triangulate my
findings.
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Table 1.6 – Summary of Data Collection Methods

Docket

Researcher’s
Role

Research Activities

EERS

Member of the
public

Grid Mod

Work Group
Member

Net
Metering

Intervenor

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Attended 5 EESE Board meetings
Attended 4 technical sessions
Conducted 10 interviews
Reviewed documents & email communications
Attended 8 Work Group meetings
Coordinated with Work Group members outside of meetings to
complete homework assignments and draft language for the Final
Grid Mod Report
Conducted 8 interviews
Reviewed documents & email communications
Attended 5 technical sessions
Attended 5 confidential settlement conferences
Attended 3 days of litigated hearings
Attended 1 extracurricular stakeholder meeting
Conducted 12 interviews
Reviewed documents & email communications

7
10

State Agency
Utility
DER Affiliate

7

Fig. 1.8 – Interviews by Sector
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I did not interview PUC Staff representing the Electric Division. Nor did I interview
Commissioners. My formal roles as a Working Group Member in the grid modernization docket
and as an intervenor in the net metering docket prohibited the Commissioners from having ex
parte communications with me. For this reason they declined to be interviewed. I was able to
gather data regarding the perspectives of these stakeholders through participant observation and
document reviews of their official statements.
In addition to the three subcases of New Hampshire’s PUC policy-making processes, I
conducted eight interviews in Berlin, Germany with experts and professionals involved in both
Berlin’s and Germany’s energy transitions, or Energiewende. Interviewees included consultants
involved in designing the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (Germany’s legislative policy
mechanism guiding national deployment of renewable energy technologies), experts from
prominent German energy think tanks, and professionals employed by Berlin’s DER and utility
sectors. Germany, the largest economy in Europe and the fourth largest economy in the world, is
widely considered a leader in the sustainable energy transition, both for its high deployment of
wind and solar energy technologies and for its ambitious emission reduction goals (Baake, 2013;
Laes, et al., 2014). There are significant differences between Germany’s energy policy context
and New Hampshire’s, such as the role of the federal government and state government over the
electric power sector, differing German and American manners of regulation of public utility
corporations and electricity markets, and fundamental disagreements regarding the role of
government intervention in the economy. Nevertheless, Germany grapples with similar 21st
century energy policy challenges as New Hampshire and the rest of the United States. The
information gathered from these interviews provided useful insights to broaden my perspective
of 21st century energy policy challenges and solutions and is summarized in Appendix D.
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Analysis
I coded all documents, field notes, personal interview data, and electronic
communications manually for recurring themes, following the approach described in Campbell,
et al. (2013).
Based on the variables presented in Table 1.5 I created a preliminary codebook. In the
codebook I listed preset codes and definitions and examples for each. Examples of codes include
“information used to attack/undermine,” “positional bargaining,” “interest sharing,” “flexible
agenda,” and “joint problem solvers.” I initially used the codebook to code a semi-randomly
selected transcript. Each transcript was numbered by line. I coded the transcript for both preset
and emergent codes by bracketing a unit of data (i.e., word, phrase, sentence, paragraph) in the
left-hand margin and writing the actual name of the code or codes for the unit of data in the
right-hand margin. Brackets, delineated by line numbers, and codes were recorded and organized
in an Excel workbook.
In duplicate copies of the Excel workbook, I removed codes leaving only line-numbers
marked by brackets representing each unit of data receiving a code. A fellow researcher coded
the same transcript with uncoded brackets using my codebook. Code reliability was calculated by
dividing the number of agreeing codes by the total number of data segments coded.
After calculating inter-coder reliability the team discussed codebooks and made
recommendations on codes and code definitions. We then discussed specific instances of coding
disagreement and sought to reconcile differences. The discussion focused on why codes were
selected and how they related to the literature, research designs, and the data. I revised the
codebook iteratively, adding emergent codes, deleting codes, integrating multiple codes,
disaggregating single codes into multiple codes, and rewriting code definitions.
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Early inter-coder reliability testing produced 23% reliability in codes, meaning that 23%
of coded segments were coded for the same theme by myself and by the secondary coder. After
discussion of disagreements and revision of codebook, subsequent inter-coder reliability tests
produced 60% reliability in coding, a high reliability according to Campbell, et al. (2013).
***
The coming chapters are organized as follows. In chapter two I provide an overview of
energy efficiency policy and review the PUC docket process for designing an Energy Efficiency
Resource Standard (EERS). In chapter three I provide an overview of electric grid modernization
and review the PUC docket process investigating the topic. In chapter four I provide an overview
of net metering and review the PUC docket process for revising the state’s net metering rate. In
each chapter I analyze the process and outcomes for opportunities and barriers to collaboration.
In chapter five I present a cross-case analysis, summary findings, recommendations, and a
conclusion.

44

Energy Efficiency Resource Standard

CHAPTER II: ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARD

In this chapter I provide a brief overview of energy efficiency and energy efficiency
policy in New Hampshire. I then provide an overview of the New Hampshire Public Utilities
Commission (PUC) docket for establishing an Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS), a
central policy for achieving statewide energy savings. Next, I describe each stage of the docket
process in greater detail and analyze them for opportunities and barriers to collaboration. I then
review the content of the EERS policy decision and analyze it according to stakeholder
outcomes. I close the chapter with a discussion.

What is Energy Efficiency?
Energy efficiency means using less energy to provide the same service. Common
examples of energy efficiency investments include replacing incandescent lighting with compact
fluorescent lighting, replacing dated fuel-guzzling boilers with modern ones, replacing older
energy-hungry appliances with efficiency-certified ones, and improving building envelopes with
better insulation. Energy efficiency is a passive distributed energy resource.
Investments in energy efficiency result in positive economic externalities. In addition to
the monetary benefit of a quick return on investment for the individual investing in energy
efficiency (often three to four years), there are additional benefits to the energy system, other
ratepayers, the state economy, and the environment. Investments in energy efficiency bring down
overall demand for energy, which reduces price by reducing overall system use and stress and
deferring costly investments in system expansion. Efficiency helps mitigate the upward trend in
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electricity prices for all ratepayers. Efficiency also provides environmental and public heath
benefits by reducing air pollution (e.g., sulfur compounds, oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter,
mercury) and greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change. Because of these
positive externalities, it is the policy of the state to support energy efficiency programs. For more
on the benefits of energy efficiency, see Lazar & Colburn (2013) and VEIC (2013).
NHSaves is the utility-administered energy efficiency program in New Hampshire that
distributes rebates and offers financing options for energy efficiency upgrades to qualifying
individuals, businesses, and municipalities. The Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) is
a policy that expands funding for existing energy efficiency programs and sets specific energy
savings targets.

Energy Efficiency Policy in New Hampshire
Four of the six New England states rank in the top six most energy efficient in the nation.
Of the six New England states, New Hampshire ranks least energy efficient. In 2018, it will be
the last of the six to implement an EERS, a policy that sets binding energy savings targets for
regulated utilities (gas and/or electric). New Hampshire’s energy savings targets under the newly
established EERS are the least ambitious of the New England states, as illustrated by Table 2.1.
Twenty-six U.S. states are currently implementing EERS policies and all of the top 15 energysaving states in 2015 had adopted EERS policies (ACEEE, 2017).
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Table 2.1 – New England State EE Ranking & EERS Electricity Savings Goals as of 2017

State

National EE
Ranking

Massachusetts
Vermont
Rhode Island
Connecticut
Maine
New Hampshire

1
3
4
5
11
21

EERS Electricity Savings Goals
Average incremental savings of 2.93% percent of electric sales for
2016–2018.
Average incremental electricity savings of about 2.1% per year
from 2015–2017.
Incremental savings of 2.5% in 2015, 2.55% in 2016, and 2.6% in
2017.
Average incremental savings of 1.51% of sales from 2016 through
2018.
Electric savings of 20% by 2020, with incremental savings targets
of ~ 1.6% per year for 2014–2016 and ~2.4% per year for 2017–
2019.
0.8% incremental savings in 2018, ramping up to 1.0% in 2019
and 1.3% in 2020.

Source: (ACEEE, 2017)

The EERS docket differed from standard PUC adjudications in several important ways. A
typical PUC adjudication is initiated when a regulated utility petitions the Commission and files
a proposal to adjust its rates or take some other action that requires regulatory approval.
Participation is generally limited to a single utility, the Office of the Consumer Advocate (OCA),
and Commission Staff. After the utility files its proposal, Staff and the OCA scrutinize the
appropriateness of the requested action, extract further data and information through the
discovery process, seek to resolve any disagreement through settlement negotiations, and finally
engage in a litigated hearing to contest the proposal before the Commissioners who would make
the final ruling.
The EERS docket differed from the typical PUC docket in origin, participation, content,
and process. While most dockets are initiated by a utility filing, the Commission initiated the
EERS docket in response to repeated recommendations and numerous studies insisting that the
state revise and improve its energy efficiency policy (GDS, 2009; VEIC et al., 2011; VEIC,

47

Energy Efficiency Resource Standard
2013; Hatfield et al., 2013; NH OEP, 2014). The EERS drew the attention and involvement of
significantly more parties than the typical PUC docket. Its purpose, rather than to approve or
disapprove the actions of a single regulated utility, was to design a complex statewide policy
affecting all three investor-owned utilities. And finally, as will be shown, the EERS process
differed from standard PUC procedure.

EERS Docket Process
In this section I provide a brief overview of the entire Public Utilities Commission (PUC)
docket process for designing New Hampshire’s EERS. I then analyze each stage of the process –
including pre-docket planning, prehearing conference, technical sessions, testimony filings,
discovery, settlement, external negotiations, and hearings – and identify opportunities and
barriers for collaboration within each stage of the process.
The docket began when the Commission issued its order of notice on May 8, 2015 and
convened a prehearing conference on June 3, 2015. Approximately 15 parties intervened
(formally participated) in the docket. Following the prehearing conference stakeholders met in a
series of technical sessions to hear presentations from technical experts, administrators of other
New England EERS programs, and professionals from New Hampshire’s utilities and to discuss
policy options. After these sessions, three stakeholder groups filed different sets of testimony:
the joint utilities (Eversource, Liberty Utilities, and Unitil), the Electric Division Staff, and the ad
hoc Sustainable Energy Group (New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association [NHSEA],
Conservation Law Foundation [CLF], the Jordan Institute, Northeast Clean Energy Council
[NECEC], and The Nature Conservancy [TNC]). Parties then conducted discovery on testimony
filings. The joint utilities, the Sustainable Energy Group, Acadia Center, and the Office of
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Consumer Advocate (OCA) then filed rebuttal testimony. Following testimony filings and
discovery, the stakeholders engaged in settlement negotiations, both at official PUC meetings
and at meetings hosted by non-PUC stakeholders. Following a settlement deadline extension, 20
parties filed a unanimously supported EERS proposal with the Commission. A panel of
witnesses, comprised of representatives from Liberty Utilities, Eversource Energy, Department
of Environmental Services (DES), PUC Electric Division, Acadia Center, and NHSEA, defended
the consensus proposal in a hearing before the Commissioners. The Commission issued Order
No. 25,392 on August 2, 2016, approving the settlement proposal in its entirety. The order
directs the Energy Efficiency and Sustainable Energy (EESE) Board to take on a new function as
advisory council to EERS implementation planning. Figure 2.1 maps the EERS docket process.
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Figure 2.1 – EERS Docket Process Map
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In this section I analyze each of the stages of the EERS docket process for opportunities
and barriers to collaboration using Table 2.2. Table 2.2 comes directly from Table 1.5, p. 38 of
my research design and is repeated here for the reader’s convenience.
Table 2.2 – Characteristics of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes

Basis for Dispute
Resolution

Process Design

Collaborative

Adjudicative

Characterized by integrative interestbased negotiation
Information used as a
common resource

Characterized by positional and
rights-based bargaining
Information used to further
each side’s position

Process tailored by stakeholders

Process prescribed, same for all cases

Procedures position parties as joint
problem solvers

Procedures position parties
as adversaries

Stage #1: Pre-docket Staff Investigation and EERS Straw Proposal
The PUC began planning for an EERS over a year in advance of the adjudicated docket.
Between 2014 and 2015 Electric Division Staff conducted an investigatory docket. Over the
course of a year Electric Division Staff distributed a questionnaire to the various stakeholder
groups with an interest in state energy efficiency policy and followed up by conducting one-onone interviews with each interested party. Interviewees included industry representatives, utility
Core program administrators, energy efficiency product vendors, sustainable energy and energy
efficiency advocates, relevant state agency representatives, representatives of specialist research
institutions, Federal government agencies, and neighboring state experts. The Electric Division
made an effort to keep an open door policy and encouraged members of the public to participate.
Based on these efforts, the Electric Division produced an EERS Straw Proposal (NHPUC,
2015c).

51

Energy Efficiency Resource Standard
Analysis – Process Design
The EERS investigation did not embody characteristics of a collaborative process. The
procedures of the investigation prevented stakeholder interaction. While a stated goal of the
Straw Proposal was to “further advance existing discussions among various stakeholders over
implementation of a state-wide energy efficiency resource standard (EERS)” (NHPUC, 2015c, p.
3), the one-on-one interview format by which it was produced failed to create a free-flowing
exchange of ideas among stakeholders. Electric Division Staff unilaterally made process and
agenda decisions in the pre-docket investigation, which prevented stakeholders from coming
together to discuss issues.
Several stakeholders would have preferred a different kind of process. For example, one
representative of a state agency would have preferred an “open stakeholder process with
education modules” rather than the one-on-one interview format (NH Interview 3, 2016). The
same public servant commented, in reference to the Straw Proposal process, the “biggest
frustration… we wasted a whole year of not being able to talk as a group and bat around ideas…
We lost a year and we could have been having some level of group discussion” (NH Interview 3,
2016). The interviewee suggested the PUC should have enlisted a facilitator to conduct the
process instead of relying on Electric Division Staff.
The process of the Straw Proposal allowed Electric Division Staff to learn, but failed to
build any capacity among the stakeholders to interact or learn from one another. Multiple
interview respondents reported that stakeholders did not have the opportunity to come together to
discuss the EERS and therefore felt they missed an opportunity for collective learning. Utility
and nonutility stakeholders referred to the yearlong Staff investigation and subsequent EERS
Straw Proposal that preceded the actual EERS docket as “not collaborative at all,” “a complete
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failure” in which “a year was wasted” (NH Interviews 3, 4, 6, 2016). The manner in which the
pre-docket Staff investigation was conducted limited opportunity for collaboration.
Table 2.3 – Pre-docket Staff Investigation and EERS Straw Proposal Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute Resolution
Process Design

Not applicable
Not collaborative; face-to-face interaction limited; process and agenda
decisions made unilaterally by PUC Staff

Stage #2: The Prehearing Conference: An Opportunity to Shape the Process
The prehearing conference is the first official meeting and marks the beginning of each
PUC adjudication. It is also the last time the intervening parties, aside from PUC Staff, will have
any direct interaction with the Commissioners until final hearings, many months later. Strict ex
parte rules preclude the Commissioners from participating in technical sessions or engaging with
intervenors outside of official hearings. This feature is designed to insulate the Commissioners
from any illicit lobbying influence and to preserve their neutrality. During the yearlong process
between the prehearing conference and the final hearings, the Commissioners’ only source of
information comes via official written testimony, evidentiary exhibits, and other legal filings,
and through the counsel of their Staff who attend these meetings and interact with intervenors.
During the prehearing conference for the EERS, Commissioner Martin Honigberg
explicitly invited stakeholders to share preliminary positions regarding the EERS, and, more
importantly, solicited stakeholder input about how the EERS docket should proceed (NHPUC,
2015a).
PUC Staff initially suggested the Electric Division take the lead in EERS policy design
by filing an initial policy proposal (testimony) for an EERS. However, a coalition of other
stakeholders conveyed a decidedly different vision about the best way to design an EERS.
Representatives from the Office of Energy and Planning (OEP), DES, and CLF delivered a
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coordinated message advocating for an alternative PUC process, one that did not begin with a
proposal from the Electric Division (NH Interview 3, 2016; NHPUC, 2015a).
OEP, DES, CLF, and other allies used the unique opportunity of the prehearing
conference to engage with the Commissioners and outline an alternative to traditional
adjudication. They suggested Electric Division Staff lacked the expertise and technical resources
necessary to design something as complex and intricate as an EERS. They encouraged the
Commission to seek outside assistance and tap the expert resources of organizations such as the
Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP), Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships (NEEP), and
professionals from more experienced neighboring states. They advised the Commission to begin
the process with educational meetings and workshops to establish a base of information, instead
of the standard approach in which parties begin by filing competing policy proposals and
contesting aspects of one another’s proposals. The parties suggested their alternative “creative
approach” might better afford the group opportunity to develop one consensus-based proposal
with the support of experts (NHPUC, 2015a).

Analysis – Process Design
The prehearing conference embodied characteristics of a collaborative process. It
provided the stakeholders an opportunity to design the EERS docket process in a way different
from typical PUC dockets. In contrast to the “very litigious filings” (FN., EERS, 2015) typical of
the start of many PUC dockets, EERS stakeholders coordinated their efforts to collectively create
a process to fit the unique circumstances of the EERS. The coalition of OEP, DES, CLF, and
others suggested the Commission revise the order and function of the steps in the process to
delay testimony filings and first convene a series of educational technical sessions. The coalition
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created a process where the intended purpose of the early steps was to allow stakeholders to learn
and to brainstorm options, rather than take positions or focus on creating a record of evidence.
The Commissioners used the prehearing conference to invite free-flowing exchange of ideas by
directing all intervenors present to, one-by-one, share ideas about how the process should
proceed. The prehearing conference represented an opportunity to shape the process towards
collaboration.
Table 2.4 – Prehearing Conference Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute Resolution
Process Design

Not applicable
Collaborative; stakeholders are invited to make process
recommendations; stakeholders make process recommendations to
create space for collective learning and deliberation

Stage #3: Educational and Deliberative Technical Sessions
In response to the suggestion by OEP, DES, CLF, and other stakeholders, the
Commission began the docket with a series of educational and deliberative technical sessions.
Stakeholders from utilities, state agencies, environmental organizations, energy efficiency firms,
and more convened over several months to hear from experts from RAP, NEEP, the investorowned utilities, and administrators of efficiency programs in other New England states. Topics
addressed in technical sessions included guiding principles and messaging, energy savings
targets, program funding, rate structures, regulatory process, and stakeholder involvement.

Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution
The educational and deliberative technical sessions embodied characteristics of a
collaborative process. The technical sessions allowed stakeholders to engage in dialogue, share
interests, and learn from experts and from each other. Stakeholders gathered information for the
purpose of clarifying issues, not for the purpose of undermining each other’s positions. One
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stakeholder felt, “[the technical sessions] helped us to get at questions like, ‘why do utilities feel
they can’t do efficiency?’” (NH Interview 26, 2017). One DES representative described the
technical sessions as follows:
During numerous technical sessions, as well as some external EESE Board meetings, parties were
able to hear from EERS experts… and administrators of other New England EERS programs, as well
as experts from our utilities. The information imparted by these experts helped to educate all parties
on the docket… Having the experts at the table during this whole process is what led us to all reach
an informed group settlement. And I can’t stress the importance of that enough (NHPUC, 2016a).

Stakeholders felt the addition of educational technical sessions was an essential process stage
contributing the eventual unanimous consensus agreement. Experts assisted the stakeholders
throughout the process, not only at discrete instances.

Analysis – Process Design
One participant commented that beginning with educational technical sessions was highly
unusual (NH Interview 4, 2016). Another commented that the technical sessions, “Increased the
level of understanding of all participants… [and] absolutely increased my understanding…” (NH
Interview 26, 2017). The intended purpose of the technical sessions was to learn and to “create a
basis of information” (NHPUC, 2015a), positioning parties more as joint problem solvers and
less as adversaries. The technical sessions provided an opportunity for stakeholders to engage in
collective learning prior to taking formal positions.
Table 2.5 – Technical Sessions Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute Resolution

Process Design

Collaborative; information and technical expertise shared among
stakeholders to build collective understanding; parties able to
brainstorm and share interests without formally taking positions;
experts participated throughout process
Collaborative; stakeholders agreed on process and agenda decisions;
created space for free-flowing exchange of ideas
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Stage #4: Testimony Filing, Discovery, and Rebuttal Filing
Following the educational technical sessions, three groups filed testimony: the joint
utilities, the Sustainable Energy Group, and the Electric Division Staff. In testimony filings,
parties take positions in the form of recommendations for how the Commission should design the
EERS. Table 2.6 highlights some examples of the positions taken in initial testimony.
Table 2.6 – Example Positions from Initial Testimony

Issue Area and Position Taken
Stakeholder
Group

Electric
Division Staff

Cumulative Savings
Targets as % of Sales
for years 2017–2019
Electric Savings: 2.04%
of sales
Gas Savings: 2.39% of
sales.
No explicit position

Joint Utilities

Sustainable
Energy Group

Electric Savings: 3.1%
of sales
Gas Savings: 2.25% of
sales of sales.

Program Administration
Utility-administered efficiency
programs should collaborate with
permanent EESE Board EERS
Advisory Council.
Utility-administered programs
with input from EESE Board
EERS Advisory Council.
There may be benefits from
transitioning some or all program
delivery to a statewide program
administrator.

Utility Lost Revenue
Recovery
Adoption of LRAM for
initial three-year period
to be replaced in the
future by full
decoupling.
LRAM preferred;
decoupling requires
full ratecase.
Full decoupling is
preferable to an
efficiency-specific
LRAM.

After initial testimony, the Sustainable Energy Group, the joint utilities, Electric Division
Staff, OCA, and Acadia Center filed rebuttal testimony. Rebuttal testimonies addressed positions
and issues raised in the initial testimony of others. Parties may not raise new issues in rebuttal.
All testimony and rebuttal testimony are subject to discovery requests from other parties.

Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution
Testimony filing, discovery, and rebuttal were all characteristic of adversarial, rightsbased dispute resolution. Parties took positions oftentimes in opposition to the positions of
others. Information in testimony filings was used to shore up one’s own position in preparation
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for the contested, adversarial hearing. The intent of testimony filing was to provide each
stakeholder group an opportunity to present evidence in support of their position and to create a
record of evidence in preparation for the final hearing.
The Sustainable Energy Group’s rebuttal testimony depicted a clear effort to undermine
and discredit the position of other stakeholders, in this case, the Electric Division. The rebuttal
testimony called attention to the “inconsistency of the [Electric Division] Staff’s position” in
designing calculations for program cost recovery, claiming “[Electric Division] Staff did not
research this issue” and that “[Electric Division] Staff’s proposal includes several ‘adjustments’
to the calculation of lost revenue that are… either unnecessary or inappropriate” (Loiter, 2016, p.
7, 8, 9). The author of the rebuttal testimony stated, “I have never seen an adjustment like this. I
believe this adjustment is inappropriate and that it demonstrates a lack of understanding
regarding energy efficiency programs and utility load forecasting” (Loiter, 2016, p. 10). One
representative from the joint utility coalition commented that, from the point of view of the
utilities, the Sustainable Energy Group’s rebuttal testimony was “spot on” and that the
Sustainable Energy Group is “able to say things that the utilities can’t really say” (NH Interview
4, 2016). Positional framing and an effort on the part of stakeholders to use information to
undermine one another’s positions characterize this example of rebuttal testimony. Efforts were
focused on one party prevailing over another, and not on reaching consensus.

Analysis – Process Design
Testimony filings are typical of PUC adjudication. However, testimony filings are
usually the first step in PUC adjudication. In the case of the EERS docket, stakeholders designed
the process so that testimony filings were postponed until after deliberative and educational
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technical sessions, and in this sense, testimony filings were characteristic of collaborative
processes.
The procedure of testimony filing was both collaborative and adjudicative. The three
coalitions – the joint utilities, the Electric Division, and the Sustainable Energy Group – each
filed a competing proposal making a case for their own vision of the final policy. In this way,
procedures positioned parties as adversaries. However, parties who join in coalitions – as
NHSEA, CLF, the Jordan Institute, NECEC, and TNC did (all of which are DER affiliated
organizations) – can be positioned as joint problem solvers.
Rebuttal testimony is typical of traditional PUC adjudication. Procedures organize
stakeholder interactions to be one-directional, as opposed to a multi-lateral free-flowing
exchange of ideas.
Table 2.7 – Testimony, Discovery, and Rebuttal Filing Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute Resolution

Process Design

Not collaborative; characterized by positional/rights-based bargaining;
information used to further own position and undermine positions of
others
Mixed; stakeholders collectively re-ordered process steps to delay
testimony filing until after collective learning and interest sharing; onedirectional attacks on positions, as opposed to free-flowing exchange

Stage #5: Joint Utility and Nonutility External Meetings
After the educational and deliberative technical sessions, and in parallel to PUC
settlement conferences convened at the PUC, sustainable energy advocates and utilities met
outside of formal meetings to negotiate a settlement proposal.

Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution
Multiple interview respondents underscored the fact that stakeholders convened informal
meetings outside of the PUC because they felt Electric Division Staff were acting as a barrier to
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reaching consensus (NH Interviews 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 2016). One utility stakeholder described the
process as, “Two ends of the spectrum [utilities and sustainable energy advocates] agreeing and
the regulators in the middle upsetting things, making it harder to reach agreement” (NH
Interview 5, 2016). An environmental advocate commented, “Utilities and other stakeholders had
shared interests that PUC [Electric Division] Staff did not necessarily share, and because of this,
there were these [informal] meetings” (NH Interview 13, 2016). The decision-making goal of
external negotiations was to reach consensus, something stakeholders felt they were not able to
accomplish during formal meetings.

Analysis – Process Design
Utility representatives and sustainable energy advocates felt Electric Division Staff were
making process and agenda decisions unilaterally. In response, the groups collectively made their
own process decision to host their own meetings, thus designing their own collaborative process.
According to one stakeholder,
A lot of collaboration goes on not at the PUC, not at scheduled meetings. Some non-Staff
participants in this are frustrated that we haven’t gotten further than we have, and we’ve been
holding our own meetings to see can we put together a consensus on some major items so areas of
litigation are reduced. A number of interveners and utilities are having sidebar conversations
because we know we are not agreeing with PUC [Electric Division] Staff… How [Electric
Division] Staff runs meetings is the reason others have decided to have our own meetings.
[Electric Division] Staff hasn’t let us choose our own topics. If we have more to talk about we
have more to talk about. [Informal negotiations] are very necessary, very productive. In two
hours, two weeks ago [during informal negotiations], we made more progress than this whole
process has made in five months. It is important for all parties to have conversations outside of
formal settings (NH Interview 3, 2016).

Stakeholders designed their own informal negotiations and used them as an opportunity
to work together as joint problem solvers and thereby minimized the number of issues decided in
the hearing. Typically, when settlement is not reached and there are competing sets of testimony,
the hearing positions parties as adversaries where each side cross-examines witnesses in an effort
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to discredit and undermine the positions of others. In the case of EERS, the stakeholders’
informal meetings allowed them to avoid the typical scenario of engaging as adversaries in the
hearing.
Table 2.8 – Joint Utility and Nonutility Informal Meetings Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute
Resolution
Process Design

Collaborative; intent to reach consensus; created space for free-flowing exchange
of interests and collective learning
Collaborative; stakeholders made process and agenda decisions collectively

Stage #6: Settlement
The PUC convened a series of settlement conferences in April 2016. On April 16, twenty
parties filed a unanimously supported settlement agreement. The settling parties include Liberty
Utilities, Unitil, Eversource, the New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, PUC Electric Division
Staff, OCA, DES, OEP, New Hampshire Community Action Association, The Way Home, CLF,
the Jordan Institute, Acadia Center, TRC Energy Services, New Hampshire Community
Development and Finance Authority, and NECEC.

Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution
The intent of settlement is to reach consensus and avoid litigation. According to one
stakeholder, “everyone’s desire is to not have this litigated. In an ideal world, we would have a
settlement with no litigation… no cross-examination. We would simply go to the PUC and say,
‘here is our agreement’” (NH Interview 3, 2016).
One utility stakeholder commented,
[Electric Division] Staff were excluded from the settlement agreement at first in EERS. Some
parties did not want Staff to be included in the discussions. They were frustrated with Staff, they
felt Staff was stuck in their ways and they didn’t want to deal with them. We brought staff in at
the end and were basically like, “here is our agreement, sign it or don’t” (NH Interview 14, 2016).
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Multiple interview respondents perceived Electric Division Staff as rigidly clinging to
their positions and thus convened their own settlement negotiations outside of formal meetings,
as described previously. However, once the utility and sustainable energy advocate stakeholders
reached agreement, they approached the Electric Division Staff using positional framing.

Analysis – Process Design
One stakeholder commented, in reference to settlement conferences, “[Electric Division]
Staff like to be in charge of [meetings], they like to control the agenda, control the questions.
Staff like to monopolize these meetings and this give others no time to be productive. It gave us
all a reason to have other meetings” (NH Interview 13, 2016). Some stakeholders perceived
Electric Division Staff as making process and agenda decisions unilaterally during official
settlement conferences.
Table 2.9 – Settlement Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute
Resolution
Process Design

Mixed; while intent was to reach consensus, stakeholders felt formal settlement
conferences were insufficient to share interests, learn, and reach consensus
Not collaborative; broad stakeholder perception that Electric Division Staff
made process and agenda decisions unilaterally

Stage #7: Hearing
On the day of the hearing, a witness panel comprised of representatives from Liberty
Utilities, Eversource Energy, DES, the PUC Electric Division, Acadia Center, and NHSEA took
the stand to testify on behalf of the unanimously supported settlement agreement. The witnesses
explained the contents of the settlement agreement to the Commissioners. The Commissioners
asked clarifying questions and engaged the witnesses in dialogue.
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Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution
Because of successful efforts to build a consensus, beginning in technical sessions and
continuing through settlement and informal negotiations, parties were able to avoid the
adversarial nature of a contested hearing. In place of the typical adversarial hearing, stakeholders
used the EERS hearing as an opportunity to explain the details of their proposal to the
Commissioners. The Commissioners engaged the parties with questions and dialogue for the
purpose of learning and bettering their understanding of the agreement. At the hearing, the
settling parties used information to clarify issues for the Commissioners, not to undermine
anyone’s position.
Table 2.10 – Hearing Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute
Resolution
Process Design

Collaborative (because consensus agreement reached); Commissioners asked
questions and used information to clarify issues, not to undermine or attack
positions
Not applicable

Content of the EERS Policy
In this section I review the content of the EERS policy decision and analyze the decision
according to whether or not it produced predicted stakeholder outcomes of collaborative
processes, according to Table 2.11. Table 2.11 comes directly from Table 1.5, p. 38 of my
research design and is repeated here for the reader’s convenience.
Table 2.11 – Stakeholder Outcomes of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes

Process
Outcomes

Collaborative

Adjudicative

Produces mutual gain solutions

Produces winner-take-all outcomes

Promotes positive relationships

Damages relationships

Collaboration institutionalized

Maintains silos of actors
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Some of the issues addressed in the EERS docket are:
•
•
•
•
•

Energy savings targets
Funding
Program cost recovery and utility lost revenue recovery
Program administration and stakeholder involvement
Evaluation, Measurement, and Verification (EM&V)

The following subheadings describe each of these issues in greater detail.

Energy Savings Targets
The Commission-approved settlement agreement puts forth the following energy savings
targets as a percentage of 2014 delivered sales:
YEAR

ELECTRIC

GAS

2018

0.80%

0.70%

2019

1.0%

0.75%

2020

1.3%

0.80%

Efficiency savings are cumulative, meaning that by the end of the first three-year period,
New Hampshire should have saved 3.1% of 2014 delivered electricity sales and 2.25% of 2014
delivered gas sales. This means, according to the 2018–2020 implementation plan, that
customers will save more than $838 million dollars in energy expenses over the initial three-year
period of the program (NHSaves, 2017).

Funding
The Commission-approved settlement agreement directs for ratepayer-funded energy
efficiency programs. Efficiency programs are funded in part by a small surcharge on electric and
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gas bills referred to respectively as the System Benefits Charge (SBC) and Local Distribution
Adjustment Charge (LDAC). For example, prior to the EERS, Eversource electric bills included
an SBC of 0.333 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh). This 0.333 cents per kWh of electricity paid by
Eversource customers goes into a pot of money to fund rebate programs that assist energy
consumers in covering the cost of energy efficiency upgrades.
The EERS directs for incremental increases in Eversource’s SBC from 0.333 cents per
kWh in 2016 to 0.850 cents per kWh in 2020 and directs similar increases for the other utilities,
virtually doubling the funding available for energy efficiency rebates for New Hampshire
residents and businesses. As a result, by 2020 the average Eversource residential customer
monthly bill will increase cumulatively by $3.25 or 2.8% and the average Eversource
commercial & industrial (C&I) customer monthly bill will increase cumulatively by $51.97 or
3.1% in order to pay for the increase in funding (NHPUC, 2016a).

Program Cost Recovery and Utility Lost Revenue Recovery
The monies generated from the SBC are divided into three categories:
1. The Electric Assistance Program (EAP), which provides electric bill discounts for
income-eligible customers (0.150 cents per kWh for Eversource in 2020). The EAP
surcharge remains unchanged by the EERS;
2. Customer-wide energy efficiency rebate programs and their administration (0.609 cents
per kWh for Eversource in 2020); and
3. A Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (LRAM) to allow utilities to recover the lost
revenue they experience due to the energy saved. In 2020, 0.091 cents per kWh paid by
Eversource customers will compensate the company for an estimated $7.16 million in
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lost revenues due to energy efficiency investments (Settling Parties in DE 15-137,
2016b).

Energy efficiency is the enemy of the traditional utility. Under the traditional
regulatory/business model, energy efficiency reduces utility sales and revenues (National
Renewable Energy Labs [NREL], 2009; National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners [NARUC], 2007; Moskovitz, 1992). This relationship between volume of
electricity sold and revenue is called the throughput incentive and it is an important concept to
understanding the conflict between utilities and distributed energy resource (DER) affiliates.
In order to obtain utility buy-in for energy efficiency programs, regulators allow utilities
to collect subsidies from ratepayers for the revenue they lose due to energy efficiency programs.
Under New Hampshire’s EERS, utilities collect these subsidies through the LRAM referenced in
the third bullet above. Subsidization of lost revenue is the priority issue for utilities.
Stakeholders designing the EERS considered two mechanisms to address utility lost
revenue: LRAM and a decoupling mechanism. During the very first educational meeting to
follow the EERS prehearing conference, one of the Regulatory Assistance Project’s (RAP) utility
regulation experts gave a presentation on why decoupling was the better option to addressing
utility lost revenue (Lazar, 2015). A decoupling mechanism makes the utility financially
indifferent to the volume of electricity it sells, whereas LRAM does not (Moskovitz et al., 1992;
Gilleo et al., 2015;). In a simplified example, decoupling regulates utilities so their rates
periodically adjust (increase or decrease) according to fluctuations in actual sales. If the utility is
under-earning, its rates increase accordingly. If the utility is over-earning, its rates decrease
accordingly. A decoupling mechanism ensures that energy efficiency is no longer the enemy of
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the utility (Moskovitz, 1992; NARUC, 2007; NREL, 2009). Decoupling is the “superior
solution” to the throughput incentive (Lazar, 2015).
Under LRAM, stakeholders estimate the amount of revenue a utility might lose due to
investments in energy efficiency and allow the utility to collect subsidies for estimated lost
revenue through a surcharge spread across all customers. Through this mechanism, utilities still
experience a financial benefit from selling higher volumes of electricity and still experience
financial losses due to lower electricity sales. The LRAM allows utilities to collect subsidies
based on estimated energy savings, while still experiencing increased revenues from higher
volumes of sales. Therefore, “for the utility… the way to play the [lost revenue adjustment]
game is to maximize measured savings but not to actually save anything at all” (Gilleo et al.,
2015). Commission Staff expressed concern that “unintended windfall profits” could accrue to
the utility as a result of the LRAM (Cunningham, et al., 2015). One stakeholder involved in the
EERS process describes the LRAM as “heads I win, tails you lose regulation… a toss of a coin
in which utilities are compensated for a certain level of lost revenue regardless of whether that
revenue was actually lost” (NH Interview 9, 2016).
The majority of nonutility stakeholders, excluding the Electric Division of the PUC,
advocated for a decoupling mechanism to address utility lost revenue instead of an LRAM.
However, according to the joint utility rebuttal testimony, “full decoupling… encompasses all
aspects of an individual distribution company’s business, not just its energy efficiency programs”
and thus “can only properly be implemented following individual company full rate cases”
(Davis E., et al, 2016). The settlement agreement addresses the compromise over LRAM and
decoupling in this way:
The Settling Parties agree that the LRAM for each utility will cease when a new decoupling
mechanism, or another mechanism as an alternative to the LRAM, is implemented. The Settling
Parties further agree that each of the Utilities shall seek approval of a new decoupling
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mechanism, or another mechanism as an alternative to the LRAM, in its next distribution rate
case following the first triennium of the EERS, 2018–2020 (Settling Parties in DE 15-137,
2016a).

Evaluation, Measurement, and Verification (EM&V)
The Commission will hire an independent third party to audit energy savings calculations
and lost revenue calculations.

Program Administration and Stakeholder Involvement – A New Advisory Role for the Energy
Efficiency & Sustainable Energy Board
In many ways, the Commission’s ruling is only the beginning of the EERS in New
Hampshire. The Commission-approved settlement agreement stipulates that the utilities will
continue to administer state energy efficiency programs through NHSaves, but it also directs the
Energy Efficiency and Sustainable Energy (EESE) Board, in coordination with an expert
consultant, to take on an advisory role to EERS implementation planning. The EERS will begin
on January 1, 2018.
The Energy Efficiency and Sustainable Energy (EESE) Board was established in 2008
pursuant to RSA 125-O:5-a “to promote and coordinate energy efficiency, demand response, and
sustainable energy programs in the state.” The Board meets monthly and is comprised of
representatives from a broad swath of organizations.4
A 2012 audit of the PUC and its administratively attached agencies, including the EESE
Board, found that, “the EESE Board was not able to operate effectively, due primarily to a lack

4

EESE Board members include representatives from: PUC; OEP; OCA; DES; the Department of
Administrative Services; NH Municipal Association; NH Legal Assistance; Homebuilders and
Remodelers Association of NH; two members of the House Science, Technology, and Energy Committee;
one member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee; the Business and Industry
Association (BIA); electric and gas utility efficiency programs; efficiency contractors; sustainable energy
contractors; and a member of the investment community.
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of resources and authority” and that because of these limitations, “in general had not fulfilled its
statutory obligations” (NH LBA, 2012). In spite of the documented shortcomings of the
volunteer board, the unanimously supported and Commission-approved EERS settlement
agreement provides that the EESE Board take on the role of advisory council to final EERS
design and implementation. The settlement also calls for the Commission to allocate funding to
hire an expert consultant to assist the EESE Board in fulfilling this function. Over the course of
2017, a newly established subcommittee of the EESE Board worked with the consultant to host a
series of workshops and to provide input to the utilities draft program implementation plans. The
plans will be finalized in fall 2017 and EERS implementation will begin in 2018.

Analysis – Process Outcomes
Table 2.12 illustrates some of the issue areas and interests and positions of utility and
DER stakeholders as they relate to these issue areas.
Table 2.12 Partial EERS Stakeholder Assessment Table

Utilities

DER
Affiliates

Funding
-Interest: Avoid lost revenue
from energy efficiency funding
-Position: Increase System
Benefit Charge (SBC) to allow
for lost revenue recovery
consistent with energy
efficiency funding
PRIORITY ISSUE
-Interest: Maximize funding
for energy efficiency
-Position: Increase System
Benefit Charge (SBC) to
increase funding for energy
efficiency

Issue Area
Lost Revenue/Cost Recovery
PRIORITY ISSUE
-Interest: Avoid lost revenue
from energy efficiency
-Position: Recover subsidies
for lost revenue through
LRAM
-Interest: eliminate utility
aversion to energy
efficiency
-Initial position: implement
decoupling mechanism
-Final position: Implement
LRAM

Program Administration
-Interest: Retain control of
energy efficiency programs
-Position: Utility
administered programs

-Interest: Gain influence
over program
administration
-Initial position: Transfer
program administration to
independent 3rd party
-Final position: Establish
stakeholder advisory board
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Produces Mutual Gain Solutions
The EERS policy decision was largely an integrative agreement. The agreement met
interests of the utilities on their priority issue by allowing them to collect subsidies for lost
revenue due to energy efficiency through the LRAM. The agreement also contains language
directing that utilities seek approval for a decoupling mechanism, or other mechanism, following
the first triennium of the EERS. By addressing utility concerns over lost revenue recovery with
LRAM and including language directing future action to address perverse utility incentives with
decoupling, the agreement meets both utility and DER interests as they relate to these two issues.
Finally, the agreement meets priority issues of the DER stakeholders by increasing statewide
funding for energy efficiency and by setting mandatory energy savings targets for the electric
and gas utilities.
The EERS process produced many of the predicted outcomes of collaborative processes.
The ruling met the interests of all parties to a certain degree, as made apparent by the
unanimously supported consensus agreement. However, consensus does not necessarily mean all
stakeholder interests were equally met. Power imbalances can cause parties to arrive at
consensus not because the agreement meets their interests to the fullest, but rather because the
agreement is perceived as the best they can achieve considering the circumstances.
One example of how a power imbalance resulted in a consensus that favors some
stakeholder interests over others has to do with ability of the utilities to shape the debate over
whether to collect subsidies for lost revenue via LRAM or decoupling (p. 66-67). One public
employee commented, “In [rebuttal testimonies] you see the utilities and [NHSEA] are pretty
much in agreement related to LRAM [and in] consolidated disagreement with [Electric Division]
Staff” (NH Interview 3, 2016). This agreement only occurred after utilities succeeded in framing
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the negotiation by making the case that LRAM, not decoupling, would be the mechanism used
by utilities to collect subsidies for lost revenue. The utilities successfully made the case that
decoupling could only be addressed in a full rate case, should be excluded from the EERS
process, and thus eliminated the priority policy option of DER affiliates from the negotiation.
The utilities succeeded in removing decoupling as a policy option, despite many expert accounts
that decoupling is the superior policy option (Moskovitz, 1992; NREL, 2009; Lazar, 2015; Gilleo
et al., 2015). The ability of the utilities to shape the negotiation agenda in their own favor
highlights the power imbalance between utilities and DER stakeholders.
Utilities derive power from their familiarity with both the PUC process and their
technical expertise in the details of utility regulation. In this case, the utilities’ power made them
more effective at tailoring the agenda of the process to best suit their interests. Utilities have
played the game of PUC adjudication for more than a century. Better still, the utilities
constructed the game of PUC adjudication. They are the dominant, established species of the
ecosystem. Their DER counterparts are amateurs, zealous but inexperienced and only beginning
to understand the rules and strategies of the game.
This particular power imbalance has important implications. The final agreement was a
product of consensus, but only after utilities succeeded in eliminating the priority policy option
of the DER affiliates (decoupling) from the scope of the negotiation. Because of this, while the
final agreement is a consensus, it still meets the interests of some stakeholders more fully than
others. Utility interest in collecting subsidies for estimated lost revenues was fully met by the
agreement, as their preferred mechanism of LRAM was agreed upon. DER interest in
eliminating utility aversion to energy efficiency was not fully met through LRAM. LRAM was
necessary in acquiring utility acquiescence to increased funding for energy efficiency, a priority
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issue for DER stakeholders, but the underlying perverse incentive for utilities to maximize
volumetric sales, a priority issue for DER affiliates, remains unaddressed.

Collaboration Institutionalized
In accordance with predicted outcomes of collaborative processes, the EERS process
resulted in the creation of further space for utility and nonutility stakeholders to continue to work
together to plan for EERS implementation in the form of the new advisory function of the EESE
Board. Many different stakeholder groups met regularly to plan for EERS implementation over
the course of 2017, causing further integration of utility and DER actors. One stakeholder
described the EESE Board implementation workshops as a forum where utilities, Commission
Staff, and other interested stakeholders work collaboratively. In describing the post-docket EESE
Board implementation-planning phase, one stakeholder commented,
[we] worked really collaboratively with PUC Staff and utilities to host workshops and info
sessions… The utilities were really listening to people’s thoughts and ideas on how we can take
things from the status quo and grow them, move them in a different direction to get to the higher
[energy] savings targets… The utilities did a fantastic job listening and participating… I think
there is a really good working relationship between interested parties, utilities and [Commission]
Staff (NH Interview 26, 2017).

Parties perceived the outcome of the EERS docket to improve relationships among the different
stakeholder groups by creating a new forum for cross-sector collaboration in the EERS Advisory
Board.
The outcome of the EERS docket also incorporated equity considerations, thus meeting
the interests of the Consumer Advocate and New Hampshire’s low-income communities. During
the final hearing a representative from The Way Home, a low- and moderate-income advocacy
organization, praised the settlement agreement for increasing the percentage of overall total
efficiency program budget apportioned to the Home Energy Assistance Program from 15.5% to
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17%. The increase in funding for low- and moderate-income groups is projected to result in 300
additional low- and moderate-income homes being weatherized in the first year and an additional
300 each year after that. The equity considerations of the settlement agreement highlight just one
aspect of diverse stakeholders achieving their interests through the settlement (NHPUC, 2016a).
Table 2.13 – EERS Stakeholder Outcomes Analysis Summary

Process Outcomes

Reflective of predicted results of collaborative process; met utility interests
(obtain subsidies for lost revenue) and DER interests (increase funding for energy
efficiency); further institutionalized collaboration between utility and DER
stakeholders through EESE Board advisory role in implementation planning

Discussion
In many ways, the EERS process embodied characteristics of a collaborative approach to
dispute resolution. However, the collaboration was made possible not because of any
longstanding institutional structure, but because of concerted efforts from a coalition of
stakeholders at the outset to redesign that process to better suit the needs of the issues at hand.
The OEP-led coalition assisted the Commission in adapting its process to fit to the complex and
novel circumstances of the EERS, both in formal and informal meetings. The PUC structure,
while not inherently conducive to collaboration, proved sufficiently flexible to allow for
stakeholders to bend it towards collaboration.
Beginning with the prehearing conference, non-PUC stakeholders drove decision making
that delayed proposal filings in favor of educational and deliberative meetings and the
incorporation of expert resources which may otherwise have remained absent. The resulting
technical sessions provided an opportunity for parties to better understand the complexities of
utility financial incentives, and allowed utility and nonutility stakeholders to gain a better
understanding of each other’s interests. Importantly, this learning occurred before parties took
formal positions through testimony filings.
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The same OEP-led coalition that took charge of shaping the process from the outset also
convened the informal negotiations between the sustainable energy advocates and utilities. These
external meetings were essential in creating space for the free-flowing exchange that allowed
parties to work together towards the eventual consensus agreement. It was through these
informal meetings between utility and nonutility stakeholders that the parties came to reach the
unanimous consensus agreement.
Table 2.14 – Summary of Characteristics of EERS Docket Stages

Process Stage
Pre-docket Staff
Investigation and
EERS Straw
Proposal
Prehearing
Conference

Basis for Dispute Resolution
Not applicable

Not applicable

Technical Sessions

Testimony,
Discovery, and
Rebuttal Filing

Joint Utility and
Nonutility External
Meetings
Settlement

Hearing

Collaborative; information and technical
expertise shared among stakeholders to
build collective understanding; parties
able to brainstorm and share interests
without formally taking positions
Not collaborative; characterized by
positional/rights-based bargaining;
information used to further own position
and undermine positions of others

Collaborative; intent to reach consensus;
created space for free-flowing exchange
of interests and collective learning
Mixed; while intent was to reach
consensus, stakeholders felt formal
settlement conferences were insufficient
to share interests, learn, and reach
consensus
Collaborative (because consensus
agreement reached); Commissioners
asked questions and used information to
clarify issues, not to undermine or attack
positions

Process Design
Not collaborative; face-to-face
interaction limited; process and agenda
decisions made unilaterally by PUC
Staff
Collaborative; stakeholders are invited
to make process recommendations;
stakeholder process recommendations
create space for collective learning and
deliberation
Collaborative; stakeholders agreed on
process and agenda decisions; created
space for free-flowing exchange of
ideas
Mixed; stakeholders collectively reordered process steps to delay
testimony filing until after collective
learning and interest sharing; onedirectional attacks on positions, as
opposed to free-flowing exchange
Collaborative; stakeholders made
process and agenda decisions
collectively
Not collaborative; stakeholders
perceived Electric Division Staff as
making process and agenda decisions
unilaterally

Not applicable
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One emergent finding was the widespread dissatisfaction stakeholders felt towards
Electric Division Staff of the PUC. Many stakeholders felt Electric Division Staff were neither
equipped with the appropriate technical knowledge nor the appropriate facilitation skills to
successfully manage the EERS docket process and steer the group towards a consensus
agreement. Stakeholders from utilities, sustainable energy advocates, and state agencies alike
repeatedly called attention to what they perceived to be the Electric Division’s inability to
successfully guide a collaborative and inclusive policy-making process, beginning with the predocket straw proposal and continuing through technical sessions, testimony filing, and settlement
conferences. Stakeholders perceived formal PUC meetings led by the Electric Division as a
barrier to reaching the collective goal of consensus and thus circumnavigated them through joint
external meetings.
The EERS process is also suggestive of a power imbalance among the stakeholder
groups. Utilities, being more familiar with the process and technical details of the PUC arena,
succeeded in eliminating decoupling, a priority policy option for DER affiliates, from the
negotiations. Power differentials can cause some stakeholder groups to be more or less effective
at tailoring process agendas to suit their needs.
Finally, the outcomes of the EERS docket were concurrent with the predicted outcomes
of collaborative processes. The interests of all stakeholders were satisfied to a high degree:
utilities obtained LRAM subsidies for lost revenues and DER stakeholders obtained increased
funding for efficiency and mandatory energy savings targets. While interests of DER
stakeholders could have been better satisfied if the underlying perverse utility incentive to
maximize volumetric sales were eliminated through a decoupling mechanism, they at least
succeeded in including language in the decision that directs utilities to seek decoupling approval
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following the first EERS triennium. Additionally, the final ruling directed for further
collaboration between utility and DER stakeholders through the EESE Board advisory role in
EERS implementation planning, further institutionalizing a collaborative approach to decision
making.
The EERS docket represented an early attempt to shift the standard adversarial PUC
adjudication towards a more collaborative approach better suited to address the challenges of 21st
century electricity market design. But the collaborative path came about not as a product of the
Commission’s standard institutionalized procedure, but as a result of non-PUC leadership
working to help the Commission redesign its process. The EERS process was successful in
producing a consensus agreement because of the leadership of the individuals who were
dedicated to corralling the broad range of viewpoints into one unanimously supported policy
proposal. Stakeholders from across the spectrum, from public servants to utility managers to
sustainable energy advocates, were dedicated to working together to build consensus and avoid
litigation.
The EERS docket was a learning process for many stakeholders who came into the
docket with varying degrees of experience and knowledge about both the PUC and the nuances
of utility regulation. Many of the stakeholders who engaged in the EERS docket went on to
participate in grid modernization (chapter 3) and net metering (chapter 4) dockets.
As will be shown in the coming chapter, the investigation into grid modernization lacked
a similar commitment by stakeholders to reach across sectors to build consensus, especially
outside of official working group meetings. While a collaborative process in name, the final grid
modernization report is replete with contradictory recommendations highlighting the inability of
the group to reach consensus on what grid modernization means for New Hampshire.
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CHAPTER III – ELECTRIC GRID MODERNIZATION
Traditional cost of service regulation… is unlikely… to capture potential benefits from grid
modernization for consumers and society.
–(Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2017, p.75)

In this chapter I provide an overview of electric grid modernization and explain some of
the topics addressed by the Grid Modernization Working Group. I then provide an overview of
the PUC docket process for investigating the topic of electric grid modernization. Next, I
describe each stage of the investigative docket in greater detail and explain some of the concepts
of grid modernization. I analyze each stage of the grid modernization investigation for
opportunities and barriers to collaboration. I then analyze the outcome of the docket, the final
grid modernization working group report, according to stakeholder outcomes. I close the chapter
with a discussion.

What is Electric Grid Modernization?
Electric grid modernization aims to fundamentally remake the utility regulatory model so
it may better facilitate the value-based proliferation of distributed energy resources (DERs). It is
about making the electric grid more competitive and efficient. This goal can be accomplished by
using new technologies to empower customers to reduce their energy costs while simultaneously
reducing overall electric system costs.
Under the current regulatory structure the monopoly utility alone is responsible for
electric grid planning and for making investments in electric system upgrades. However, with the
advent of DERs, new players are vying for a chance to compete to make investments that add
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value to the electric grid. These investments cover the range of DERs – from distributed solar, to
battery storage, to management of electricity demand – but in order to capture the value of these
resources, new regulatory approaches are needed. Utilities are unlikely to invest in grid
modernization because, even though it may be the cheapest, most efficient option for electric
system planning, it is often counter to their financial wellbeing (Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory [LBNL], 2017).5
Two of the main categories of grid modernization topics laid out in the PUC order on
scope and process and addressed by the grid modernization working group are:
(1) Utility cost recovery and incentives; and
(2) Customer engagement with DERs (including rate design, data issues, and customer
education).
In this section I will first explain why traditional utility financial incentives are antithetical to
grid modernization. I will then discuss issues of grid modernization through customer
engagement with DERs, and more specifically (1) issues of utility and customer data; and (2)
issues of time-variant rate (TVR) design.
The New Hampshire Grid Modernization Working Group spent considerable time and
resources addressing issues of customer engagement with DERs, which makes up 16 pages of
content in the report. Conversely, sections addressing distribution system planning and utility
cost recovery make up a combined five pages of content in the report. For this reason, I will
focus more attention on the issue of customer engagement with DERs.

5

Recall the throughput incentive (the incentive for the utility to increase volume of sales). This is one of
the components of the traditional regulatory model that prevents the utility from embracing grid
modernization. Decoupling is therefore a key component of grid modernization, but because decoupling
was addressed in the EERS settlement it was not addressed by the Grid Modernization Working Group
(Chapter 2, p. 65–68).
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Utility Cost Recovery and Financial Incentives
In order to understand the challenge of grid modernization, it is important to first
understand the perverse financial incentives of the traditionally regulated utility.
According to Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories [LBNL], 2017, p. 75, “financial
incentives for regulated utilities are misaligned with public policies... traditional regulation does
not incent utilities to support increased customer sovereignty.” Again, customer sovereignty, or
customer engagement and empowerment through access to DERs, was the major focus of the
New Hampshire Grid Modernization Working Group, the idea being that customers can be
empowered to adopt new technologies to reduce their own costs and to optimize the electric grid.
The problem is that increased customer sovereignty in this sense is antithetical to the utility’s
bottom line under traditional regulatory approaches.
The most apparent perverse utility incentive is the throughput incentive, or the direct
positive relationship between volumetric sales of electricity and utility revenue (chapter 2, p. 66).
Another perverse utility incentive is a colloquially referred to as the incentive to gold plate the
rate base. Because of its regulated monopoly status, the utility has a financial incentive to
engage in excessive capital accumulation and to increase capital expenditures above
economically efficient levels (Averch & Johnson, 1962; NHPUC, 2016b). This is because the
utility’s rate of return is set by central planning regulation and not by market forces. The
regulators set a rate of return for the utility, and the utility then generates that rate of return on
the value of its rate base. The rate base comprises all of the assets the utility owns for which it
receives a regulated return on investment. The rate base may be comprised of power plants,
transmission lines, substations, distribution poles and wires, meters, etc. The higher the total
value of the utility’s rate base, the greater its earnings. Thus the regulatory trope: gold plating the

79

Electric Grid Modernization
rate base. If the utility invests in gold-plated substations, the value of its rate base will increase
and so will its earnings. The incentive is formally known as the Averch-Johnson (A-J) effect.
Because of the A-J effect, it is counter to the financial interests of the utility to
accommodate third party DERs as alternative solutions to grid needs, regardless of the ability of
such alternatives to meet grid needs at competitive costs. If DERs can offset the need for the
utility to make large capital expenditures on rate base expansion, the utility loses out on an
opportunity to increase its earnings (NHPUC, 2016b). One can imagine a case in which demand
management, energy efficiency, distributed generation, or energy storage, empowered through
economically accurate price signals, might displace the need for a utility to invest in traditional
poles and wires grid expansion (e.g., substation upgrade, transmission extension). However, it is
against the financial interests of the utility to support these non-wires alternatives that offset the
opportunity for it to grow its rate base. The challenge of grid modernization is aligning the
financial incentives of utilities and third party DER providers so the deployment of DERs is
beneficial to the utility, the third-party, the user, and the grid as a whole.

Customer Engagement with DERs (Data Issues and Rate Design)
The PUC order on scope and process emphasized customer engagement and suggested
customers can be educated and empowered to reduce both their own energy costs and overall
system costs through smart metering technology, access to real-time information, and DER
integration (NHPUC, 2016b). Third-party access to utility and customer data and time-variant
rates (TVR) are the two main customer engagement approaches addressed by the New
Hampshire grid modernization working group. These two issues are also the source of the most
disagreement between utility and nonutility stakeholders.
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Data Issues
DER providers and utilities have conflicting interests when it comes to data collection
and sharing issues. DER providers want to compete with utilities to make distribution system
investments, but in order to do so they require equal access to utility data (see policy challenge
#6, p. 17). Table 3.1 from the final Grid Modernization Report (and originally from a SolarCity
white paper) (SolarCity, 2016)) illustrates the types of data DER providers seek access to.
SolarCity – represented by the Energy Freedom Coalition of America (EFCA) in both the grid
modernization and net metering dockets – contends that if DER providers, such as itself, have
access to temporal and geographic data about utility distribution systems (i.e., daily, monthly,
annual electricity demand/load profiles of individual segments of the distribution system
(circuits/feeders)), then they will be able to deploy DERs to meet distribution system needs more
cost effectively than traditional utility investments.
Table 3.1 – Data to Foster Engagement in General Grid Design and Optimization

Data Need
Circuit Model
Circuit Loading
Circuit DER
Circuit Voltage
Circuit Reliability
Circuit Resiliency
Equipment Ratings,
Settings, and
Expected Life
Area Served by
Equipment

Description
The information required to model the behavior of the grid at the location of grid
need.
Annual loading and voltage data for feeder and SCADA line equipment (15 min
or hourly), as well as forecasted growth
Installed DER capacity and forecasted growth by circuit
SCADA voltage profile data (e.g., representative voltage profiles)
Reliability statistics by circuit (e.g., CAIDI, SAIFI, SAIDI, CEMI)
Number and configuration of circuit supply feeds (used as a proxy for resiliency)
The current and planned equipment ratings, relevant settings (e.g., protection,
voltage regulation, etc.), and expected remaining life.

The geographic area that is served by the equipment in order to identify assets,
which could be used to address the grid need. This may take the form of a GIS
polygon.
Source: Grid Modernization Working Group, 2017

Utilities tend to disagree with the premise that entities other than they should have much
to do with making distribution system investments, as exhibited by the following excerpt from
Unitil’s comments submitted after the final Grid Modernization Report:
81

Electric Grid Modernization
Unitil sees itself as responsible for implementing enabling technologies supporting both
traditional electric company operations and new smart grid capabilities… Unitil’s business model
is changing in order to become an ‘enabling platform’ supporting diverse activities by third
parties and electricity customers… A fundamental premise in the development of this reliable
system is that one entity, the utility, is responsible for its planning. While traditional utility
planning will evolve to incorporate new technologies, new services and the input and needs of
new stakeholders… the planning, design and operation of the distribution system is the
responsibility of the utilities and needs to remain as such (Epler, 2017).

Unitil’s comments highlight one of the central challenges of grid modernization: who will
be able to partake in the planning and deployment of DERs, to what degree, and in what form? In
one breath, Unitil assures the Commission that the company is becoming “an ‘enabling platform’
supporting diverse activities by third parties and electricity consumers” while firmly maintaining,
“one entity, the utility, is responsible for… the planning, design and operation of the distribution
system” (Epler, 2017). The counterargument from SolarCity and other DER providers is that the
utility can only become an enabling platform by empowering third parties and electricity
consumers to participate in the planning, design, and operation of the distribution system by
providing access to utility data.

Rate Design
If utility customers could be persuaded through price signals to reduce their consumption
(or to shift consumption to off-peak hours), then existing plants could better serve their
needs. New construction could be delayed, perhaps defeated altogether.
–Thomas K. McCraw (1984)
The second key to grid modernization through customer empowerment is rate design,
specifically, time-variant rate (TVR) design. TVR is not a novel concept in utility regulation, but
the emergence of DERs has brought the TVR debate back to center stage.
Amidst the energy crisis of the 1970s, economist Alfred E. Kahn, the newly appointed
Chair of New York’s Public Service Commission, famously responded by implementing TVR to
more accurately communicate to energy consumers the real costs of their consumption. In place
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of typical flat rates (rates that remain unchanged regardless of demand at the time of
consumption) Kahn established time-of-day price differentials with ratios as high as 12:1.
Electricity was priced at 3.5 cents/kWh on a normal summer day, 2.5 cents/kWh during the
night, and 30 cents/kWh on hot days summer days when demand for air-conditioning
skyrocketed. Until this incorporation of economically accurate price signals, gluttonous demand
for artificially cheap air-conditioning drove significant system cost increases, as it required
utilities to invest in expensive system expansion (McCraw, 1984).
The point of TVR is to communicate to consumers, and particularly peak-time users, the
reality of the costs they impose upon the system and to reward off-peak users for helping to
realize a higher economic efficiency in overall system usage. In the time of Kahn, these price
signals applied only to consumption of electricity. Today, the same principles can be applied to
the distributed generation of electricity and across the plethora of DERs. For example, in the
same way Kahn used TVR to communicate the cost of peak-time energy consumption, TVR can
also be used to communicate the value of peak-coincident distributed generation and the services
of other DERs. The challenge lies in designing TVR that address utility cost recovery concerns
and create a value-based DER marketplace.6, 7
***
Three of the core issues of grid modernization are: (1) perverse utility financial incentives
that make grid modernization antithetical to the current utility bottom line; (2) access to utility
and customer data as a necessary component of grid modernization; and (3) how time-based rate

6

Remember, because of the throughput incentive (Chapter 2, p. 66) utilities “want” to grow demand, and
because of the A-J effect (Chapter 3, p. 79–80), utilities “want” to accumulate excessive capital through
system expansion.
7
Recall, states used real-time pricing and access to transmission infrastructure to make bulk generation
and wholesale electricity markets competitive and more economically efficient. Similar principles apply
to distributed generation, distributed energy resources, and retail electricity markets (Chapter 1, p. 9–12)
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design for consumption, distributed generation, and energy management can empower grid users
to realize a more efficient and competitive marketplace. Table 3.2 illustrates utility and DER
interests as they relate to these three issue areas.
Table 3.2 – Partial Grid Modernization Stakeholder Assessment Table

Issue Area

Utilities

DER
Affiliates

Utility Incentives and
Cost Recovery
PRIORITY ISSUE
Interest: Avoid risk and
uncertainty
Position: Traditional
incentives foundational
to utility revenue; new
business models are
risky and uncertain
Interest: Foster
competitive markets for
retail energy services
Position: Traditional
incentives antithetical to
DER integration

Data Issues

Rate Design

Interest: Minimize time
and resources for data
collection and sharing
Position: Distribution
system planning should be
responsibility of utility
alone; 3rd-party
investments remove profit
opportunity
PRIORITY ISSUE
Interest: Foster
competition, consumer
choice, and grid efficiency
Position: Data collection
and sharing are needed

Interest: Know effect on
utility revenue
Position: Using coincident
and non-coincident peaks
to inform TVR is
complicated
-Closely tied to utility
incentives and cost
recovery
PRIORITY ISSUE
Interest: Promote more
efficient energy
consumption/production
patterns
Position: TVR will
stimulate markets for DER

The issues of most importance to utility stakeholders are utility incentives and cost
recovery, which dictate utility profitability. The priority issues for DER affiliates are data
collection and sharing issues and rate design issues, because DER affiliates believe data driven,
time-based rates will animate markets for their services. An integrative agreement is one that
would allow utilities to achieve their interests in cost recovery, while also allowing DER
affiliates to achieve their interests regarding data and rate design. However, as will be shown,
utility and DER stakeholders were unable to reach an integrative agreement that allowed each to
achieve their interests on their priority issue.
In the coming section I will analyze each stage of the Grid Modernization Working
Group process – including pre–working group planning and data gathering; working group
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meetings (technical sessions); joint utility and nonutility informal meetings; and separate utility
and nonutility caucusing – and identify opportunities and barriers for collaboration within each
using Table 3.3. Table 3.3 comes directly from Table 1.5, p. 38, of my research design and is
repeated here for the reader’s convenience.
Table 3.3 – Characteristics of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes

Basis for
Dispute
Resolution
Process
Design

Collaborative

Adjudicative

Characterized by integrative interestbased negotiation
Information used as a
common resource

Characterized by positional and rightsbased bargaining
Information used to further
each side’s position

Process tailored by stakeholders

Process prescribed, same for all cases

Procedures position parties as joint
problem solvers

Procedures position parties
as adversaries

Electric Grid Modernization Docket Process
In many ways, the New Hampshire grid modernization investigation built upon the
foundation laid in Massachusetts several years prior. The Massachusetts working group
embodied one of the first attempts in the U.S. to define the scope of grid modernization and
started from a virtually blank slate.
The New Hampshire grid modernization docket was an investigative docket, as opposed
to an adjudicative docket, making it different from the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard
(EERS) docket (Chapter 2) and Net Metering docket (Chapter 4). The EERS and Net Metering
adjudicative dockets, through testimony filings, settlement negotiations, and litigated hearings,
produced official rulings setting forth imminent and impactful policy. In contrast, the grid
modernization investigation took the form of a collaboratively facilitated working group and
produced a report with policy recommendations. Unlike adjudicative dockets, investigations do
not result in any policy changes. Investigations are solely for the purpose of studying an issue.
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Because the grid modernization docket was an investigation and not an adjudication, its process
does not conform to the model of a PUC process depicted in Figure 1.7 in Chapter 1 (p. 36).
House Bill 614 directed the PUC to open a docket on electric grid modernization.
Between August 2015 and April 2016 the PUC collected data and comments from interested
stakeholders on grid modernization. The PUC incorporated information from this pre-docket
stage into the subsequent order on scope and process for the docket. The PUC also enlisted
consultants Raab Associates and Synapse Energy Economics to facilitate the forthcoming
working group process.
Seventeen organizations and individuals submitted requests to participate in the grid
modernization working group and all requests were granted. Investor-owned utility participation
was required. Between April 2016 and February 2017, facilitators Raab Associates and Synapse
Energy Economics convened eight official working group meetings (which are, for all intents
and purposes, the same as technical sessions). Stakeholders also convened in ad hoc groups
outside of official working group meetings to draft recommendations and language for the report.
Some ad hoc meetings convened both utility and nonutility stakeholders. The majority of ad hoc
meetings consisted of separate utility and nonutility caucusing. Raab Associates submitted the
final report to the Commission in March 2017. Figure 3.1 maps the grid modernization docket
process.
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Stage #1: Pre–Working Group Planning and Data Gathering (August 2015 – March 2016)
The first step in the New Hampshire grid modernization process was for the Commission
to solicit stakeholder input on the definition and elements of the subject through written
comments. Twenty-three organizations and individuals submitted written comments for the
PUC’s consideration.
The Commission also issued a round of discovery to the investor-owned utilities,
soliciting information regarding the automation and communication capabilities of their metering
and distribution systems (number and percent of smart meters, automated substations, etc.). The
utilities (Eversource, Unitil, and Liberty) complied with the discovery requests.
In April 2016, the Commission, in partnership with consultants Raab Associates and
Synapse Energy Economics (who had previously facilitated the Massachusetts grid
modernization working group), authored and issued a detailed order on scope and process for the
docket and invited stakeholder participation in the working group. Information from discovery
requests was included in the Commission’s order on scope and process and shared publicly.

Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution
This stage of the process embodied characteristics of a collaborative process in that
information was collected to be used as a common resource, and not to further any one
stakeholder’s position or undermine the positions of others. The Commission collected
information from interested parties through the comment process with the intent of using the
information to inform the scope and process of the working group. Importantly, the Commission
also collected information using the discovery process to determine what the current utility
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infrastructure was capable of accommodating in terms of grid modernization and shared the
information among all interested parties.

Analysis – Process Design
During the pre–working group planning and data-gathering phase the Commission and its
consultants made agenda decisions after soliciting input from all interested parties, as is
characteristic of a collaborative process. However, the procedures of the pre-investigation
planning and data-gathering phase organized stakeholder interactions as one-directional.
Stakeholders did not have an opportunity to meet face-to-face and engage in dialogue.

Table 3.4 – Pre–Working Group Planning and Data Gathering Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute
Resolution
Process Design

Collaborative; collected information from interested stakeholders to inform scope
and process; Commission shared information among stakeholders to be used as
common resource
Mixed; Commission invited input regarding process agenda, but no opportunity
for face-to-face dialogue among stakeholders

Stage #2: Working Group Meetings (Technical Session) (April – February 2016)
Consultants Raab Associates and Synapse Energy Economics facilitated eight daylong
New Hampshire Grid Modernization Working Group meetings (technical sessions). Table 3.5
lists the membership of the Grid Modernization Working Group. See Appendix
In initial meetings of New Hampshire’s grid modernization investigation stakeholders
were encouraged to brainstorm ideas about how they could build upon the foundation laid by the
Massachusetts process. Early meetings also consisted of presentations from various stakeholder
groups including the utilities, New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA), and
Retail Energy Supply Association (RESA). Stakeholders engaged in dialogue, shared their
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interests, and deliberated in an effort to reach consensus on the many facets of grid
modernization.
Table 3.5 – New Hampshire Grid Modernization Working Group Members

Organization / Individual
Acadia Center
City of Lebanon, NH
Conservation Law Foundation (CLF)
Energy Freedom Coalition of America (EFCA)
Eversource Energy
Liberty Utilities
New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES)
New Hampshire Legal Assistance
New Hampshire Office of Energy and Planning (OEP)
New Hampshire Office of the Consumer Advocate (OCA)
New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission Staff (ex officio)
New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA)
Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships (NEEP)
Patricia Martin, Retired Engineer
Retail Energy Supply Association (RESA)/Direct Energy
Revolution Energy
The Jordan Institute
Unitil Energy Systems Inc.

Category of Actor
DER Affiliate
DER Affiliate
DER Affiliate
DER Affiliate
Utility
Utility
State Agency
Low Income Advocate
DER Affiliate
State Agency
State Agency
DER Affiliate
DER Affiliate
DER Affiliate
Competitive Supplier
DER Affiliate
DER Affiliate
Utility

In between each of the first several meetings stakeholders were asked to complete
homework assignments designed to identify different stakeholder interests. The facilitators
compiled stakeholder interests into tables to share with the entire group to illuminate potential
areas of agreement and disagreement. Facilitators then worked to reconcile disagreements during
working group meetings.

Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution
The goal of the Grid Modernization Working Group, according to the ground rules laid
out by Raab Associates and agreed to by all working group members, was to “make substantive
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recommendations by unanimous agreement (i.e., consensus) of the Working Group members
(organizations) where possible” (Raab, 2016), as is characteristic of collaborative processes.
Utilities and DER affiliates mixed interest and positional framing throughout working
group meetings. For example, when addressing rate design and TVR, stakeholders individually
completed homework assignments designed to discover different parties interests as they related
to TVR. The working group facilitators compiled rate design interests in matrices and shared the
matrices with the entire working group to be discussed. During working group meetings,
facilitators worked to translate those interests into consensus recommendations for the report, but
were often unable to do so.
The rate design section of the final Grid Modernization Report contains ten sets of
dissonant recommendations labeled “utility recommendation” and “nonutility recommendation”
(see Grid Modernization Working Group, 2017, p. 13–23). Below is an example of one such
opposing recommendation:
Utilities: Time-Variant Rates (TVR) for distribution services is not practical to implement,
because distribution costs do not vary with time of use.
Nonutility Stakeholders: Time-Variant Rates (TVR) [for distribution services] using simple onpeak and off-peak [Time of Use] periods should be implemented for all customers in the near
future (Grid Modernization Working Group, 2017).

TVR design must take into consideration costs associated with energy demand and the
benefits associated with DERs that can manage that demand. These costs and benefits apply
differently to energy supply (generation), the transmission system, and the distribution system.8
Much of the utility cohort takes the position that there is no time-of-use benefit or cost to the
distribution and transmission systems. All other stakeholders take the position that there are
time-of-use benefits to the transmission and distribution system associated with DERs.
8

Figure 4.3, p. 117 is useful in understanding how utility rates are divided among these categories of
costs.
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Working group meetings were characterized by sharing of interests in an effort to
reconcile them and reach consensus recommendations. When interests could not be reconciled,
parties reverted to opposing positions.

Analysis – Process Design
The open dialogue format of working group meetings allowed stakeholders to engage in a
free-flowing exchange of ideas and interests and thus positioned the parties as joint problem
solvers. During early meetings, utility and nonutility stakeholders alike agreed by consensus to
expand the list of desired grid modernization outcomes established by Massachusetts. For
example, the New Hampshire Working Group included “customer engagement and
empowerment” as a desired grid modernization outcome. This new and collectively agreed upon
outcome then became the central focus of the entire working group process. In this way,
stakeholders collectively made agenda decisions, as is characteristic of a collaborative process.

Table 3.6 – Working Group Meetings (Technical Session) Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute
Resolution

Process Design

Collaborative; intent of process was to achieve consensus; experts enlisted to
facilitate interest sharing; parties brainstormed, engaged in dialogue, shared
interests; parties reverted to positional bargaining only when interests could not be
reconciled
Collaborative; stakeholders collectively made agenda decisions

Stage #3: Joint Utility and Nonutility External Meetings
During the working group process there were at least two instances of utility and
nonutility stakeholders collaborating outside of official working group meetings to draft
consensus language for the report. In one instance, representatives from the Northeast Clean
Energy Council (NECEC) and Eversource worked together to draft language regarding utility
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cost recovery and incentives. However, this section of the report is vague and lacks substantive
recommendations. This is in part due to the way utility incentives were addressed in the EERS
ruling. The EERS ruling directs utilities to recover lost revenue from efficiency through the
LRAM and further directs utilities to consider decoupling after the first triennium of the EERS
(see Chapter 2, p. 65–68). Because of this, utilities argue that the topic of correcting perverse
utility incentives is outside the scope of the grid modernization discussion.
A second instance of joint utility and nonutility external collaboration occurred in the
form of a volunteer subgroup task force on data issues. This task force met outside of official
meetings and reached consensus language on principles of utility and customer data. Task force
membership was self-selected and included both utility and DER affiliated stakeholders. Table
3.7 shows the data task force membership.
Table 3.7 – Grid Mod Data Task Force Membership

David Littell (facilitator)
Melissa Birchard
Brianna Brand
Jim Brennan
Justin Eisfeller
Kate Epsen
Todd Griset
Mark Hanks
Pat Martin
Kevin Sprague

Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP)
Conservation Law Foundation (CLF)
New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA)
Office of Consumer Advocate (OCA)
Unitil
New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA)
Energy Freedom Coalition of America (EFCA)
Direct Energy
Retired Engineer
Unitil

The data collection task force reached consensus on final report language pertaining to
“Customer and Utility Data Principles,” which include:
1. Sharing of data with the market (including third-party providers) can encourage market
competition for the provision of advanced energy technologies.
2. In general, use of standards and protocols for data sharing can facilitate interoperability,
empower third parties, and provide the opportunity for customers to reduce their costs or
system costs. (Examples of data standards include: Standard Energy Services/Usage Data,
Green Button, and “Connect My Data.”)
3. Security is an inherent risk related to the sharing of customer data and must be addressed.
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4. Interval data enables time varying rates, demand response, innovation, and can allow thirdparty service providers the opportunity to offer ways to reduce system costs, or for customers
to reduce their own costs.
5. Aggregated customer information can be made available if certain protocols to protect
individual customer usage and identity are adopted.
6. Individual customer data should be made available consistent with the requirements and
protections set forth in RSA 363:38.
7. An individual customer is always free to share the customer’s data with third parties, but
utilities and third parties should take care to make customers aware of the risks created by
such sharing (Grid Modernization Working Group, 2017).

While the data task force was successful in crafting consensus principles on utility and
customer data, the working group as a whole was unable to reach consensus on many specific
data recommendations. Where interests could not be reconciled to produce consensus language,
the utility and nonutility stakeholders composed their own recommendations in which they
defined their positions, but also explained the reasoning and interests behind those positions (See
Grid Modernization Working Group, 2017, p. 25–26).

Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution
Utilities and DER affiliates mixed interest and positional framing when discussing data
collection, access, and usage issues. Compiling the data requested requires intensive time and
resources from the utilities and, thus, they view it as against their interests to do so. Additionally,
as previously discussed, it may be damaging to the utility bottom line if third parties can take
data and use them to invest in grid optimization. This combination of utility interests predisposes
utilities to take the position articulated in Unitil’s post-report comments: it is the perogative of
the utility, and only the utility, to plan, design, and invest in distribution system upgrades.
Nevertheless, it is in the interest of the DER affiliates to obtain access to utility data
because they believe the data would allow them to calculate more accurately the value their
resources provide to the grid, thus allowing them to expand investment and growth opportunities
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for their businesses. DER affiliates, therefore, take the position that utilities should collect and
disclose temporal and geographic data about electricity usage across the electric distribution
system.

Analysis – Process Design
The procedure of a volunteer task force meeting outside of official meetings positioned
the stakeholders as joint problem solvers and resulted in consensus language regarding data
principles. The task force convened at the recommendation of the facilitator, but membership
was self-selected and in this way the task force was tailored by the stakeholders, as is
characteristic of a collaborative process.
Table 3.8 – Joint Utility and Nonutility External Meetings Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute
Resolution
Process Design

Collaborative; intent to share interests and learn with goal of consensus; when
interests cannot be reconciled stakeholders revert to positional bargaining
Collaborative; process decisions made collectively by group; group membership
self-selected and representative of major stakeholder perspectives

Stage #4: Separate Utility and Nonutility Caucusing Outside Formal Meetings
Towards the end of the process, nonutility and utility stakeholders caucused separately
outside of official working group meetings in several instances to craft recommendations and
language for the report. When the two caucuses reconvened in official meetings, the facilitators
attempted to reconcile positions into consensus recommendations but in many cases were
unsuccessful.
The Joint Stakeholders (nonutility stakeholders) – including Acadia Center, City of
Lebanon (CoL), Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), Northeast Energy Efficiency Partners
(NEEP), Energy Freedom Coalition for America (EFCA), Department of Environmental
Services (DES), New Hampshire Legal Assistance, The Jordan Institute, and Revolution Energy
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– convened on several occasions in person and via conference call. The group made no effort to
include utility stakeholders in these extracurricular meetings. Similarly, extracurricular meetings
among the utility representatives made no effort to involve the perspectives of the nonutility
stakeholders.

Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution
Separate utility and nonutility stakeholder caucusing set the stage for positional
bargaining in the final months of the working group process. DER affiliates and utility
stakeholders caucused separately and took opposing positions on final report recommendations.
Parties opted to forgo the goal of consensus in favor of making recommendations more suited to
their coalition’s interests. The intent of the informal meetings hosted by DER affiliates was to
craft recommendations that would allow them to better achieve their goals. The DER coalition
did not make substantive efforts to reach out to the utility stakeholders during these meetings to
seek consensus recommendations.

Analysis – Process Design
External caucusing that separately convened DER and utility stakeholders served to
further the already well-established division between these two stakeholder groups. The
traditional regulatory paradigm inherently sets utility and DER stakeholders at odds with one
another in a zero-sum game where, without creatively redesigning regulatory approaches, one’s
gain necessitates another’s loss. Without changes to the status quo utility business model, DERs
serve to erode utility revenue. This inherent conflict was exacerbated by the separate stakeholder
caucusing, which defined the final months of the grid modernization process. Rather than
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seeking to learn from one another and strive towards mutual gain solutions, the two camps only
became further entrenched in their existing adversarial positioning.
Table 3.9 – Separate Utility and Nonutility Caucusing Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute
Resolution
Process Design

Not collaborative; led major stakeholder groups (utilities and DER affiliates) to
become entrenched in oppositional positions
Not collaborative; positioned major stakeholder groups (utilities and DER
affiliates) as adversaries, not as joint problem solvers

Grid Modernization Process Outcomes
As of this writing there are no policy outcomes associated with the grid modernization
investigation. For this reason, analyzing process outcomes is problematic. The only outcome is
the final working group report to the Commission. In this section I review the content of the final
Grid Modernization Report and analyze the report according to whether or not it produced
predicted stakeholder outcomes of collaborative processes, according to Table 3.10. Table 3.10
comes directly from Table 1.5, p. 38 of my research design and is repeated here for the reader’s
convenience.
Table 3.10 – Stakeholder Outcomes of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes

Process
Outcomes

Collaborative

Adjudicative

Produces mutual gain solutions

Produces winner-take-all outcomes

Promotes positive relationships

Damages relationships

Collaboration institutionalized

Maintains silos of actors

The final report contains consensus language from all parties, consensus
recommendations from all parties, and separate recommendations of utility and nonutility
stakeholders. In this way, the interests of all parties were represented in the final report, either as
consensus language or as divergent recommendations. The process promoted understanding, as
all parties had the opportunity to learn about the various components of grid modernization
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collectively.
I have insufficient data to determine whether most stakeholders perceived their
relationships to be affected by the grid modernization docket, but, from personal experience as
an active member of the working group, the grid modernization docket improved my own
relationships with both DER and utility stakeholders.
It is too early to say whether or not grid modernization will produce further
institutionalization of collaborative procedures, as the Commission has not yet indicated any next
steps for grid modernization. However, the net metering ruling, discussed in the next chapter,
includes next steps associated with data collection and rate design, two of the central issues of
grid modernization. It is plausible that the final Grid Modernization report helped inform the
Commissioners as they made their ruling in the net metering docket, which, as will be shown in
the coming chapter, most certainly did create further forums for continued collaboration around
grid modernization. In this sense, the grid modernization docket may have contributed to the
development of new formal collaborative procedures.

Table 3.11 – Stakeholder Outcomes Analysis Summary

Process Outcomes

Reflective of predicted results of collaborative process; all interests represented in
final report; potential to further institutionalize collaborative policy making
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Discussion
Table 3.12 – Summary of Characteristics of Grid Modernization Docket Stages

Stage
Pre–Working
Group Planning
and Data
Gathering

Joint Utility and
Nonutility
External
Meetings

Basis for Dispute Resolution
Collaborative; collected information from
interested stakeholders to inform scope and
process; Commission shared information
among stakeholders to be used as common
resource
Collaborative; intent of process was to
achieve consensus; experts enlisted to
facilitate interest sharing; parties
brainstormed, engaged in dialogue, shared
interests; parties reverted to positional
bargaining only when interests could not be
reconciled
Collaborative; intent to share interests and
learn with goal of consensus; when interests
could not be reconciled stakeholders reverted
to positional bargaining

Separate Utility
and Nonutility
Caucusing

Not collaborative; led major stakeholder
groups (utilities and DER affiliates) to
become entrenched in oppositional positions

Working Group
Meetings
(Technical
Session)

Process Design
Mixed; Commission invited input
regarding process agenda, but no
opportunity for face-to-face dialogue
among stakeholders
Collaborative; stakeholders
collectively made agenda decisions

Collaborative; process decisions made
collectively by group; group
membership self-selected and
representative of major stakeholder
perspectives
Not collaborative; positioned major
stakeholder groups (utilities and DER
affiliates) as adversaries, not as joint
problem solvers

One stakeholder representing a DER-affiliated organization described the overall grid
modernization docket as, “Useful… an opportunity to share information and to learn
collectively… We can have stakeholder discussions to create shared knowledge and
understanding of the positions and that is valuable...” (NH Interview 13, 2016). The working
group was a rare opportunity to convene utility and DER stakeholders for an extensive crash
course in the regulatory, technical, and financial complexities of the electricity system. This
learning occurred primarily through interested-based sharing and dialogue occurring during
formal meetings and facilitated by expert consultants.
Yet despite the enlistment of expert facilitators to manage a collaborative process, the
Grid Modernization Working Group was unsuccessful in producing a broad consensus on what
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grid modernization means for New Hampshire. The final Grid Modernization Report contains 14
separate instances of contradictory recommendations labeled “utility” and “nonutility” (Grid
Modernization Working Group, 2017). What was lacking in the grid modernization docket was a
commitment by utility and DER stakeholders to work jointly beyond formal PUC meetings.
Working group members diligently attended meetings, completed homework assignments, and in
a few discrete instances (and at the direction of the facilitators) convened diverse task forces in
an effort to hash out consensus on particular issues. But neither of the two coalitions made a
serious effort to engage and collaborate with the other beyond formal working group meetings.
Instead, utilities and DER affiliates opted to caucus separately with members of their respective
tribes. Even during working group meeting lunch breaks the two tribes unfailingly selfsegregated, forgoing opportunities to build relationships and understanding across the divide.
The importance of extracurricular meetings and informal gatherings cannot be overlooked, yet
these grid modernization meetings served to reinforce existing divisions.
According to Meredith Hatfield, the former director of OEP and the driving force behind
the success of the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) process, leadership is “about
finding common ground and collaborating to create solutions that work for everyone—and
seeing how often you can achieve better outcomes by incorporating diverse views” (Hatfield,
2016). Hatfield’s leadership in pulling together utility and DER perspectives outside of formal
PUC procedure was essential in realizing the EERS consensus agreement. Unfortunately for the
Grid Modernization Working Group, no similar such leadership emerged to take advantage of
the opportunity to further bridge the division between utilities and DER affiliates.
External meetings serve an essential function in PUC processes because they can free
stakeholders from the formal and suppressive litigious atmosphere of official meetings, meetings
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that literally take place in a hearing room. External meetings are an opportunity for stakeholders
to engage on their own terms and in alternative settings, which can be more conducive to candid
exchanges and relationship building. But this opportunity is squandered when external meetings
reinforce tribal divisions between utility and DER participants, as was the case for much of grid
modernization.
Two factors contributed to the lack of stakeholder commitment and capacity to
collaboration in the grid modernization case. First, each coalition’s best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA) was acceptable. Because the docket was an investigation with
no immediate policy actions, the stakes were lower than in the EERS and net metering cases, and
thus there was less risk associated with a non-consensus outcome. Second, the grid
modernization investigation occurred at the same time as the net metering adjudication, which,
as will be discussed in the coming chapter, required high levels of time and resources from all
parties. The high stakes of net metering demanded that stakeholders allocate their resources to
that docket, which lessened stakeholder capacity to pursue consensus in the grid modernization
case.
The grid modernization investigation showed that the PUC process is just one component
of successful collaboration. In chapter two we learned how stakeholders can work together to
shape both the formal PUC process and informal extracurricular meetings towards collaboration.
In the EERS docket, when official PUC meetings proved insufficient to allow stakeholders to
reach a consensus agreement, the parties convened on their own terms outside of the PUC.
Stakeholder commitment to reaching an agreement that worked for all parties proved equally, if
not more important, than the procedures employed by the Commission. The burden of achieving
consensus and fostering collaboration is only in part the responsibility of the PUC and the
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facilitator, whether that facilitator is a PUC Staff Attorney or a professional consultant. Much of
the responsibility lies with the stakeholders, the utilities, DER affiliates, and other parties
engaging in the policy process.
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CHAPTER IV: NET METERING

In this chapter I first provide an overview of net metering. I then provide an overview of
the PUC docket process for revising the net metering policy. Next, I describe each stage of the
docket process in greater detail and analyze each for opportunities and barriers to collaboration. I
then describe in greater detail the content of the Net Metering policy decision and analyze it
according to stakeholder outcomes. I close the chapter with a discussion.

What is Net Metering?
Net Metering is the reason there is a solar industry in the United States. It is a policy that
allows distributed generation (e.g., rooftop solar) to sell excess electricity not consumed at the
site of production into the electric grid. This excess generation turns the electricity meter
backwards as it flows out to the grid to be consumed by a neighboring point of demand. At the
end of the billing cycle, the meter is billed for the net amount of energy that passes from the grid
to the customer. If the distributed generation system exports an equal amount of energy onto the
grid as is imported from the grid, the volumetric portion of the customer’s bill will equal zero.
The customer will still pay the fixed monthly customer charge (e.g., $12.89 for residential
Eversource customers in New Hampshire) (see Fig. 4.1). When exported electricity to the grid
exceeds imported electricity from the grid (e.g., in summer months) the customer is credited for
the difference and can then tap into that credit in later months when imports exceed exports (e.g.,
winter months). A well-sized solar array will offset the customer’s annual electricity load,
leaving them only with fixed monthly charges, virtually zeroing out their bill.
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Net metering is a hotly contested issue in states across the country. Net metering
proponents argue that solar power and other forms of distributed generation (DG) provide
economic, social, and environmental benefits, as well as benefits to the electrical grid, and
should be compensated accordingly. Utilities argue that by allowing customers to zero out their
bills, the policy affords net metering customers free access to the electrical grid and shifts costs
for maintaining the grid onto ratepayers who cannot or will not invest in distributed generation.
Net metering, like energy efficiency, reduces utility revenue.9

Net Metering Docket Process Overview
In this section I provide an overview of the PUC docket process for revising New
Hampshire’s net metering rate, or the rate of compensation for rooftop solar and other DG. I then
analyze each stage of the process – including prehearing conference; testimony, discovery, and
rebuttal; settlement; prehearing technical session and hearing – and identify opportunities and
barriers for collaboration within each stage of the process.
The Net Metering docket occurred at the direction of the bipartisan HB1116, “An Act
Relative to Net Metering,” which directed the PUC to open a docket and to establish a new net
metering rate within ten months. This ten-month timeline proved untenable, and the Commission
amended the procedural schedule several times and extended the deadline by three months to
allow the participants adequate time to complete the process.
The PUC issued an order of notice and opened the docket on May 19, 2016. Dozens of
stakeholders from across the state and several from across the country filed motions to intervene
(formally participate in the docket). In initial technical sessions, the parties agreed it would be

9

For an informative debate over net metering in New Hampshire, see The Exchange (2017).
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useful to conduct a preliminary round of discovery on the utilities to collect data to be used in
official testimony. After initial discovery, twelve of the 30 intervening parties filed testimony.
The parties then conducted a round of discovery on one another’s proposals. Eleven parties,
including the Commission Staff (who did not file initial testimony), then filed rebuttal testimony.
Staff’s rebuttal testimony summarized the positions of the parties and provided commentary and
recommendations based upon the record of evidence up to that point. Parties conducted a round
of discovery on rebuttal testimony.
The Commission then convened a series of settlement conferences. The Energy Future
Coalition (EFC) – initially comprised of The Alliance for Solar Choice (TASC), Conservation
Law Foundation (CLF), Energy Freedom Coalition of America (EFCA), New Hampshire
Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA), and ReVision Energy – filed an initial confidential
settlement proposal. The Utility Consumer Coalition (UCC) – initially comprised of Eversource,
Liberty, and Unitil – offered a counterproposal. The two coalitions negotiated back and forth and
reached agreement on some issues but not others. Both coalitions expanded to include more
stakeholders (see Fig 4.1). The Commission cancelled the first week of hearings to allow the
parties further time to explore settlement and narrow the scope of issues. The two coalitions filed
distinct but similarly structured settlement agreements. The Commission granted a “motion in
limine to focus issues at hearing,” which limited issues to an agreed upon list of 16 in order to
manage the scope of the hearing. All major parties formally supported limiting the scope of
issues to be addressed at hearings (Birchard, M., 2017; Below, C., 2017; Sheehan, M., 2017).
The Commission held three full days of hearings in late March 2017, one devoted to the
EFC proposal, one devoted to the UCC proposal, and one to hear from Commission Staff and the
City of Lebanon (CoL), neither of which signed on to a settlement agreement. On June 23, 2017,
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the Commission issued an order establishing a new net metering rate to be effective as of
September 1, 2017. The order also set in motion a number of work groups to address pilot
projects, data collection issues, and a value of distributed energy resources (DER) study. Figure
4.2 depicts a detail map of the PUC net metering docket process.

By the final hearing of the net metering docket, parties had narrowed down their positions from an
original twelve separate policy proposals to two dueling settlement agreements supported by the
following coalitions:
The Energy Future Coalition (EFC): Acadia Center, The Alliance for Solar Choice (TASC),
Borrego Solar Systems, Inc., Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), Energy Freedom
Coalition of America, LLC (EFCA), New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association
(NHSEA), ReVision Energy, Granite State Hydropower Association, Sunraise Investments
LLC, Solar Endeavors LLC, and Revolution Energy, LLC.
The Utility Consumer Coalition (UCC): Eversource, Liberty, Unitil, the Office of the
Consumer Advocate (OCA), New England Ratepayers Association (NERA), Consumer
Energy Alliance (CEA), the Office of Energy and Planning (OEP), and Standard Power of
America, Inc.
The City of Lebanon (CoL) was the only party that filed initial testimony but did not sign with
either of these two coalitions. Commission Staff did not sign with either of the two settlement
agreements.
Fig. 4.1 – Dueling Settlement Agreements: A First for the Commission
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I now analyze each of the stages of the net metering docket process for opportunities and
barriers to collaboration in accordance with Table 4.1. Table 4.1 comes directly from Table 1.5,
p. 38 of my research design and is repeated here for the reader’s convenience.
Table 4.1 – Characteristics of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes

Basis for
Dispute
Resolution
Process
Design

Collaborative

Adjudicative

Characterized by integrative interestbased negotiation
Information used as a
common resource

Characterized by positional and rightsbased bargaining
Information used to further
each side’s position

Process tailored by stakeholders

Process prescribed, same for all cases

Procedures position parties as joint
problem solvers

Procedures position parties
as adversaries

Stage #1: Prehearing Conference and Opening Technical Session (June 10, 2016)
Table 4.2 lists organizations and individuals appearing at the prehearing conference for
the net metering docket.
Table 4.2 – Appearances at Net Metering Prehearing Conference

Unitil
Liberty Utilities
Eversource
Borrego Solar Systems
Granite State Hydro Association
Office of Energy and Planning (OEP)
The Jordan Institute
ReVision Energy
City of Nashua
Freedom Energy Logistics
Acadia Center
Conservation Law Foundation (CLF)
Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP)

City of Lebanon (CoL)
Barrington Power
Norwitch Technologies
Standard Power of America
New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA)
Energy Emporium
Revolution Energy
The Alliance for Solar Choice (TASC)
Representative Lee Oxenham
Pentti Aalto
Business and Industry Association (BIA)
PUC Staff (Legal, Electric, Sustainable Energy)
Presiding Commissioners

The utilities, OCA, and Staff were invited to give preliminary statements of their
positions regarding net metering. Following the prehearing conference, intervening parties met in
a technical session to establish a procedural schedule.
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Analysis – Process Design
Chairman Honigberg made clear during the prehearing conference that while both the
statute directing PUC action on net metering and the order of notice put forth by the Commission
set out many of the issues that would be addressed by the docket, “the schedule is completely
open at this point, and you will be developing the schedule” in the forthcoming technical session
(NHPUC, 2016d, p. 6). In this docket, the legislature and the Commission made agenda
decisions, but the collective stakeholders were presented with opportunities to mold process
decisions in initial technical sessions. In this way, the prehearing conference and following
technical session were characteristic of a collaborative process.
Table 4.3 – Prehearing Conference and Initial Technical Session Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute
Resolution
Process Design

Not Applicable
Collaborative; stakeholders provided with opportunity to make process
decisions from the outset

Stage #2: Technical Sessions
During early technical sessions parties collectively agreed upon a procedural schedule.
The schedule outlined a series of deadlines beginning with an opportunity for parties to conduct
a round of discovery on the utilities. Several parties suggested the process begin with discovery
and not testimony so that information gleaned from discovery could inform testimony.
Subsequent technical sessions were for the purpose of discussing issues related to discovery,
testimony, and rebuttal. Unlike the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) docket, net
metering technical sessions were not used to hear presentations from experts, or to deliberate
policy options with the intent of moving the group towards consensus. Instead, technical sessions
were organized around the more adversarial stages of PUC process.
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Analysis – Process Design
Early technical sessions allowed stakeholders to make process recommendations and
collectively agree upon a procedural schedule. The agreed upon procedural schedule consisted of
a series of deadlines for discovery requests, discovery responses, testimony, and rebuttal.
Table 4.4 – Technical Sessions Analysis Summary

Not Applicable

Basis for Dispute
Resolution
Process Design

Collaborative; stakeholders collectively make process decisions and design a
procedural schedule

Stage #3: Testimony Filings, Discovery, and Rebuttal – Building a Cache of Ammunition (June
2016 – January 2017)
All parties vomit onto the table their positions… It’s overwhelming.
- NH Utility Manager (NH Interview 15, 2017)
The first eight months of the docket were dedicated to discovery, testimony filing, and
rebuttal filings. Twelve parties filed initial testimony by the October 24 deadline. These filings
were comprised of 32 documents and over 1,000 pages. Filings included written testimony,
spreadsheets, cost benefit analyses, and various studies assessing the value of solar and other DG
to the electric grid, each with widely varying conclusions. Many parties filing testimony did so in
partnership with their individual expert consultants. Almost all filings were accompanied by
resumes and CVs building the credibility of the party filing and highlighting long and
distinguished careers in the energy sector. Commission Staff did not file initial testimony or
policy proposals. Table 4.5 breaks down the volume of initial testimony.
Testimony submitted as part of PUC proceedings is held to a high standard of credibility.
For example, the Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA) withdrew its testimony from the record due
to a deposition request filed by EFCA and assented to by CLF and TASC (Brown, 2017). The
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deposition request accused CEA of having “jeopardized the orderly and systematic presentation
of evidence and argument” in the case “by providing apparently unsupported and inadmissible
information” (Buxton, 2017).
Table 4.5: Initial Testimony Filing Breakdown

Party
CEA
CLF
CoL
EFCA
Eversource
Liberty
NERA
NHSEA
OCA
OEP
TASC
Unitil
Total

Documents Filed
2
2
2
2
4
2
1
6
2
1
2
6
32

Pages Filed
68
93
43
69
50
29
30
292
76
4
95
173
1,022

Two weeks after initial testimony filings, a flood of emails inundated the Net Metering
service list with 80 new documents and over 1,000 discovery requests. One public servant
responded to the surge of discovery by stating the following in an email to the service list:
I am concerned that the massive amount of discovery requests now in circulation and the ten-day
timeline present an untenable situation… We confront over 300 questions... Many of the
questions are unhelpfully argumentative; in my judgment, attention at this phase of the docket is
best devoted to finding common ground rather than engaging in combat disguised as discovery
(FN., 2017).

Another stakeholder representing a DER affiliate shared a similar perspective, stating, “nobody
can process all of the data generated from discovery and filings. It is overwhelming” (NH
Interview 16, 2017).
All parties are obligated to answer discovery questions to the best of their ability. And so,
two weeks after all interrogatories were submitted, the responses came gushing through the
service list in an even more impressive aftershock of 218 documents. Initial filings, discovery
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requests, and responses totaled over 300 documents and thousands if not tens of thousands of
pages by mid-November.
After discovery on initial filings, eleven parties filed rebuttal testimony. Rebuttal
testimony is an opportunity for parties to defend against attacks made on their filings and to
rebuke positions of opponents (NH Interview 14, 2016). Parties may not introduce any new
issues into the record during rebuttal. They may only respond to issues that have already come
up in the previous round of testimony. Table 4.6 breaks down the volume of rebuttal testimony.
Table 4.6: Rebuttal Testimony Filing Breakdown

Party
Acadia
CLF
CoL
EFCA
Eversource
NERA
NHSEA
OCA
Staff
TASC
Unitil
Total

Documents
2
1
2
2
2
3
5
1
2
2
4
26

Pages
36
48
32
37
34
186
115
8
165
66
146
873

The discovery process was repeated after the filing of rebuttal testimony. Parties
subjected one another’s rebuttal testimonies to a similarly overwhelming glut of discovery
requests and responses as described for initial testimony. All told, initial and rebuttal testimonies
and discovery requests and responses to those testimonies generated many thousands of pages of
content.

Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution
The net metering docket started out embodying many of the characteristics of a typical
adversarial adjudication, particularly during testimony filing, discovery, and rebuttal
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components. Early in the process parties took positions by filing testimony and policy proposals
in preparation for a rights-based contest in which they would strive to win a favorable decision
from the Commission.
Multiple parties described the discovery and rebuttal processes as opportunities to attack
and undermine the positions of others (NH Interview 9, 2016; NH Interview 14, 2016). A less
common but perhaps more appropriate label for discovery is interrogatory. The purpose of
discovery is to afford the parties equal opportunity to interrogate one another’s proposals, to
subject them to rigorous scrutiny. Participants use the discovery and rebuttal processes to
highlight weaknesses in the positions of others and to create a written record of those weaknesses
that may then be used as ammunition to discredit their opponents in the coming hearing. In the
case of net metering, the discovery component of the process was about stockpiling ammunition
that would help individual parties achieve favorable rulings over each other in preparation for the
litigated hearing.

Analysis – Process Design
The testimony, discovery, and rebuttal components of the process are typical of PUC
adjudication. Stakeholders extract information from one another in a one-directional fashion,
rather than a free-flowing dialogue with an exchange of ideas. In this way, parties are positioned
as adversaries, not as joint problem solvers.
There is value in the adversarial nature of testimony, discovery, and rebuttal components
of the process. These components afford all parties equal opportunity to be heard, and all
stakeholders did collectively agree to a procedural schedule based around discovery, testimony,
and rebuttal. These phases of the process also allow for transparency and lend legitimacy to the
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positions of the parties. Parties have the opportunity to formally draw attention to questionable
testimony, as was the case with the requested deposition of CEA by EFCA and others, which
resulted in CEA withdrawing the testimony in question.
But this phase of the process is resource intensive, requiring large expenditures of money
and time on expert consultants, on drafting testimony, discovery, and rebuttal, and on responding
to discovery. One utility manager had the following to say in the immediate aftermath of the
discovery/testimony/rebuttal storm:
My participation in [the net metering docket] is nothing short of a burden… And I look at the
Staff and they are in so many different dockets and then the legislature gives us a 10-month
window and they have a mountain of paper work… I can commiserate with them. This is brutal.
When we go to hearing, what am I going to do? Say [to our attorney], ‘ok [sic], develop crossexamination for 12 different parties who submitted hundreds of pages of testimony each’?! (NH
Interview 15, 2017).

At roughly the same point in time a member of the DER affiliates described the process
as, “personally nerve-wracking”, an “enormous power struggle” akin to a “high stakes poker
game” (NH Interview 17, 2017). Many parties, ranging from state agencies to utilities to DER
affiliates, expressed similar dismay at the burdensome quality of this portion of the process,
especially in the case of twelve separate sets of testimony and the amount of discovery that
comes with them (NH Interview 12, 2016; NH Interview 14, 2016; NH Interview 15, 2017; NH
Interview 16, 2017).
Table 4.7 – Discovery, Testimony, and Rebuttal Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute
Resolution
Process Design

Not collaborative; characterized by ammunition stockpiling in preparation for
adversarial, rights-based contest; information used to support own position and to
attack and undermine positions of others
Mixed; as result of early stakeholder dialogue, parties agreed to schedule of
discovery, testimony, and rebuttal; stakeholder interactions one-directional, not
free-flowing exchange
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Stage #4: Joint Utility and Nonutility External Meetings
Throughout much of the process utility and DER affiliate organizations met informally
outside of PUC meetings to negotiate a potential agreement. These external negotiations failed to
achieve any level of agreement between these two major coalitions. I do not have sufficient data
to adequately analyze these meetings.

Stage #5: Settlement – Where the Magic Happens (Late January – March 2017)
Commission Staff began convening settlement conferences in late January 2017, eight
months after the start of the docket. At the start of settlement Staff reminded all parties:
Pursuant to PUC 203.20(a), ‘all participants in settlement conferences shall treat discussions at
settlement conferences as confidential and shall not disclose the contents of such discussions to
third parties or seek to introduce them into evidence.’ As a result of these confidentiality
restrictions, only parties and their authorized representatives may attend the settlement discussion
portions of the technical sessions (FN., 2017).

Very little progress was made during the initial two meetings with “a lot of posturing on
both sides” (NH Interview 21, 2017). The coalition of solar interest groups, led by Energy
Freedom Coalition of America (EFCA), insisted that in order to quantify the value that solar
provides to the electric grid, the utilities need to collect and make available a year’s worth of
temporally and geographically granular data regarding their distribution systems. The utilities
expressed skepticism that such an expensive and laborious undertaking would produce any
worthwhile findings. Towards the end of the first day of settlement, Unitil addressed the solar
coalition and made the position of the utilities explicit: “We are not hearing anything that makes
us have any reason to believe we will do better in a settlement than in a hearing… We are not
going to be able to agree to full retail net metering less the non-bypassable charges [SBC, ECT,
SCRC]. You need to put more on the table” (FN., 2017) (see Fig. 4.3).
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At the third settlement conference, occurring on February 14 2017, the solar coalition
arrived early and representatives from The Alliance for Solar Choice (TASC), EFCA, ReVision
Energy, New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA), and SolarCity positioned
themselves in the front of the room facing everyone else (see Fig. 4.4). At Staff’s direction they
opened the meeting with a coordinated overview of their settlement proposal, which they – along
with Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) – had formally filed four days prior. The proposal
stressed the importance of “collecting the necessary data” in order to send “improved price
signals [that] more accurately reflect the locational and temporal value and costs of [DERs]”
(Culley, et al., 2017). The proposal included a series of pilot projects to test out new rate designs
as a bridging step, which would eventually inform a more data-driven approach, referred to as
“Phase II” (Culley, et al., 2017).
OCA praised the proposal and suggested it could be improved by including provisions
expanding DER access to low- and moderate-income communities. CoL noted the proposal
failed to address utility lost revenue concerns, but indicated he might support the proposal if it
were expanded to include his proposed real-time pricing and municipal aggregation pilot. Liberty
expressed concern that the Liberty’s billing and metering systems are not capable of
accommodating such a proposal. Eversource expressed a desire for more clarity about how and
when the transition to the theoretical Phase II would occur.
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Fig 4.3 – A Typical NH Monthly Electricity Bill

Customer Charge …………….………………… (fixed) ………..……………. $12.89
Generation Supply Charge (energy service) … 600kWh * $0.110 ……………… $66.00
Distribution Charge ………………………… 600kWh * $0.042 ……………… $25.20
Transmission Charge ……….…….………..... 600kWh * $0.024 ……………… $14.40
Stranded Cost Recovery Charge ….………… 600kWh * $0.001 ……………… $00.60
System Benefits Charge ………….………… 600kWh * $0.003 ……………… $01.98
Electricity Consumption Tax ……………….. 600kWh * $0.00055 …………… $00.33
Total = $121.40
Under net metering, customer-generators who produced 600kWh during the month pay
only the fixed customer charge.
Non-bypassable charges: Stranded Cost Recovery Charge (SRCR), System Benefits
Charge (SBC), and Electricity Consumption Tax (ECT).
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Fig. 4.4 – Map of PUC Hearing Room A, Net Metering Settlement Conference #3, 2/14/17
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In the third-to-last settlement meeting the utility coalition presented its counterproposal to
the solar coalition’s proposal. This meeting was scheduled last minute by Staff in a last ditch
attempt to achieve a consensus agreement before the hearing. One stakeholder said the meeting
“saw a lot of movement” on both the utility and solar side of the issue (FN., 2017).
Staff opened the penultimate settlement conference by stating the following: “Today is a
critical day – time is running out. I expect it will be helpful to, throughout the day, take breaks,
have breakout groups and caucuses – perhaps staff can circulate and facilitate these frank
discussions as we go” (FN., 2017).
The solar coalition circulated a rushed counter-counterproposal and SolarCity’s
representative took the floor stating the following: “We sincerely appreciate the efforts of the
utilities in this counterproposal. We feel that we are not too far off [from an agreement].
However, here are our concerns…” (FN., 2017). He went on to list the lack of a clear direction
towards time-based rate design, the absence of the four pilot programs the solar coalition, OCA,
and CoL have been fighting for, and, perhaps most importantly, the lack of any compensation for
distribution charges (see Fig. 4.3). As a compromise, he suggested instead a “gradualist
approach” in which the distribution rate be reduced by 10% each year until sufficient data allows
for more accurate pricing of distributed energy resources (DERs).
During the first half of the day conversations were fast-paced, parties alert and energetic.
There was an air of excitement in the room and for the first time some dared to hope a settlement
agreement might be possible. At 10:30 we broke for caucusing and the utility coalition and the
solar coalition retreated to separate quarters.
Parties reconvened after about an hour and Liberty took the floor on behalf of the utilities
to announce the utilities had made a number of “concessions” (FN., 2017). They conceded to
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extend grandfathering from 15 to 20 years. They conceded on the establishment of task forces to
address various pilot projects. They conceded on a data collection task force. They conceded and
agreed to support a value of DER study. But on the issue of the distribution charge, they held
their ground. The utilities maintained net metering customers should receive no compensation
for the distribution charge portion of the retail electric rate (see Fig. 4.3).
At the end of the day, Staff closed the meeting as follows:
Everyone should take some time tonight and tomorrow morning to review with their coalitions
and be ready to come back at 10:00am tomorrow. I don’t think we are ready to give up on this
settlement yet. So tomorrow, we will give it one more shot and if we decide we need to go to
hearing we can discuss the logistics of that as well (FN., 2017).

One member of the solar coalition who works mostly outside of New Hampshire
reflected on the final day’s settlement conference in the following way:
[Someone] actually bought like 15 pizzas on the last day of settlement for everyone. We had
made what was basically our final proposal and Staff was playing shuttle diplomacy between our
room and the utility room and everyone was sitting around eating pizza while we were waiting
around until the end of the day. And then the clock ran out and nobody blinked. But we all stuck
it out until the end… I have been active in similar cases in Maine and I will say that people in
New Hampshire are way more engaged, way more involved. I really enjoy working here quite a
bit. New Hampshire people have just been so great (NH Interview 22, 2017).

Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution
During settlement conferences, conflict management frames were largely interest based.
Stakeholders asked questions, made suggestions, responded respectfully and politely to the
concerns of other stakeholders, and worked to understand one another’s needs in an effort to
reach a consensus agreement. Stakeholders used information gained about each other to clarify
and to work to find creative solutions that would meet all parties’ interests. No effort was made
to use information to undermine positions of others. The explicit decision-making goal was
consensus.
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The free-flowing exchange of settlement allowed parties to better understand the
complexity of the issues and allowed parties to learn about which issues were most important to
each of them. In some cases, some issues were of higher importance to one party than another.
For example, utilities were willing to concede on issues such as grandfathering, pilot projects,
and the value of DER study, which were of higher importance to the solar coalition but did not
have much importance to the utilities. However, other issues, such as whether solar and other DG
should receive compensation for distribution charges, were addressed using positional
bargaining.

Analysis – Process Design
Stakeholders had the opportunity to collectively shape agenda decisions during
settlement. The solar coalition filed the first settlement proposal and set the agenda of the
following settlement conference by explaining their proposal to the other parties. Parties then
provided constructive commentary on how the proposal might be improved to better include a
greater range of interests. The utility coalition then had the opportunity pick up agenda design
where the solar coalition left it by submitting their counterproposal. The group collectively
designed and redesigned the agenda during settlement.
One intended purpose of settlement was to learn about the interests of others and learn
whether those interests could be met through brainstorming, deliberation, and integrative
negotiations. Settlement conferences are confidential; only once a settlement agreement has been
formally filed with the Commission does it become fair content for the hearing. The
confidentiality of the settlement conferences created space for creative brainstorming of a wide
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range of issues as it freed parties from the fear that their words or ideas would be used against
them in the hearing and allowed parties to engage as joint problem solvers.
Table 4.8 – Settlement Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute Collaborative; characterized by sharing of interests, dialogue; confidentiality allowed
information to be used for learning, not undermining and attacking
Resolution
Collaborative; stakeholders collectively made agenda and process decisions by
Process Design
sharing and revising settlement proposals; interactions characterized by free-flowing
exchange of ideas and information

Stage #6: Prehearing Technical Session, Hearing Design, and Hearing (March 2017)
After the close of official settlement negotiations, Staff canceled the first week of
hearings to “provide parties a greater opportunity to develop and file settlement proposals and to
prepare for hearing” (FN., 2017). Staff reasoned, “in view of the likelihood that one or more
settlement agreements will be filed in this docket… the scope of the hearings therefore should be
more focused and limited” (FN., 2017). In other words, parties should “set guard rails” for the
hearing by leaving their initial positions from initial testimony at the door and limiting the issues
at hearing to differences between the two settlement proposals (FN., 2017).
The City of Lebanon (CoL) applauded the decision to cancel the first week of hearings in
the following email to the net metering service list:
To the extent that very substantive issues are at stake in settlement agreements, this modest
amount of additional time may well give the parties a very meaningful opportunity to better think
through and flesh out their settlement proposals and perhaps find more common ground and thus
further narrow the issues to be addressed at hearing. Thank you! (FN., 2017).

The following week, the Energy Future Coalition (EFC) and the Utility Consumer
Coalition (UCC) filed “dueling” settlement agreements (see Fig. 4.1), a first for the Commission.
Staff then convened a prehearing technical session in which stakeholders collectively agreed
upon the format and scope that the hearings would take. A Unitil representative offered up a road
map for the hearing and other stakeholders agreed to these provisions:
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1. All prefiled and rebuttal testimony are submitted into the record as evidence;
2. Each of the two coalitions calls a panel of witnesses to defend their settlement
agreements; panels subject to cross-examination;
3. Each of the two coalitions calls a panel of witnesses to critique the other settlement
agreement; panels subject to cross examination;
4. Each coalition may submit other exhibits into evidence.
Staff, OCA, and CLF drafted a “motion to focus issues at hearing” which both coalitions
formally endorsed (Birchard, 2017). The Commission held three days of hearings in late March.
One day was dedicated to the EFC settlement proposal, one day was dedicated to the UCC
settlement proposal, and one day was dedicated to the CoL and Commission Staff testimony. The
Commission deliberated in isolation for the next two months and issued its final order in late
June.

Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution
Preparation for the hearing was characterized by interest-based issue framing. Parties
communicated their shared interest in creating a manageable hearing process, listened to the
suggestions of one another, and collectively agreed upon a hearing format.
Hearings are all about undermining the positions of your opponents and supporting your
own positions so they may prevail in the final ruling. Contested hearings have no room for
interest sharing. Stakeholders cross-examine each other in an effort to extract information that
will discredit their positions. The explicit goal of the hearing is to emerge victorious over your
opponents. Hearings are textbook adversarial rights-based contests.
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Analysis – Process Design
Staff extended the deadline once more by cancelling the first week of hearings (Wiesner,
2017). In the end, only three days of hearings were necessary and by cancelling the first week,
the parties were afforded still further time to narrow issues and file settlements. Once settlements
were filed, the parties collaborated again to design the format and content of the hearing
(Howland, 2017). A majority of parties formally endorsed the motion to focus issues at hearings,
further simplifying and streamlining the process (Birchard, 2017; Below, 2017; Sheehan, 2017).
The prehearing technical session provided parties opportunity to collaboratively design the
agenda and prepare for the hearing.
Table 4.9 – Prehearing Technical Session, Hearing Design, and Hearing Analysis Summary

Basis for Dispute Not collaborative; adversarial, rights-based contest; cross-examination as tool to
attack and undermine positions
Resolution
Collaborative; stakeholders collectively designed agenda and process of hearing
Process Design
together as joint problem solvers before engaging as adversaries in the actual hearing

Content of Net Metering 2.0 Policy – Remember Data and Rate Design?
The new rates [for net metering in New Hampshire] are essentially a mashup of utility- and
solar-backed proposals, and represent a more collaborative approach to developing new net
metering rates. –Walton (2017)

In this section I review the content of the net metering policy decision and analyze the
decision according to whether or not it produced predicted stakeholder outcomes of collaborative
processes, according to Table 4.10. Table 4.10 comes directly from Table 1.5, p. 38 of my
research design and is repeated here for the reader’s convenience.
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Table 4.10 – Stakeholder Outcomes of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes

Process
Outcomes

Collaborative

Adjudicative

Produces mutual gain solutions

Produces winner-take-all outcomes

Promotes positive relationships

Damages relationships

Collaboration institutionalized

Maintains silos of actors

A New Net Metering Rate
The final order from the Commission made the following decision regarding the new net
metering rate:
Customer generators will receive monthly excess export credits equal to the value of kWh
charges for energy service and transmission service at 100 percent and distribution service at 25
percent, while paying non-bypassable charges, such as the system benefits charge, stranded cost
recovery charge, other similar surcharges, and the state electricity consumption tax, on the full
amount of their imports from the grid (NHPUC, 2017a).

The most significant change, in terms of economic impact, is the reduction in the
distribution credit received by net metering customers from 100% to 25% (see Fig 4.1). This was
one of the issues that divided the solar and utility coalitions. The Commission made the ruling to
reduce the distribution rate even when finding that neither coalition provided a “significant
record of evidence supporting the amount of the reduction proposed or the actual net benefits of
[distributed generation] energy exports to the utility distribution system” (NHPUC, 2017a).
Some stakeholders suggested that this reduction, despite the lack of evidence justifying it, was in
part due to the influence of legislative expectation that the rate should be reduced, a political
consideration that played a role in the decision making of the Commission (FN., 2016; FN.,
2017; NH Interview 17, 2017; NH Interview 20, 2017). The perceived danger was that if the
Commission ruled to leave the rate unchanged, they risked legislative retaliation in the form of
HB518, a bill that, if passed, would reduce the rate received by net metering customers to a level
that would destroy the economic value proposition of solar (FN., 2017; NH Interview 20, 2017).
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In addition to setting a new net metering rate, the order also set in motion work groups
that will take on two of the main issues investigated by the Grid Modernization Working Group:
data collection and rate design.

Data Collection and Value of Distributed Energy Resources Study
Both Commission Staff and the solar coalition made the lack of sufficient utility data
available to accurately quantify the costs imposed by DER or the value that DER provides to the
electric grid an issue of central importance in the docket (Faryniarz, 2016; NHPUC, 2017b).
Accordingly, the Commission ordered the collection of the necessary utility data to inform a
value of DER study by an independent party. The Commission directed that the utilities:
should collect and make available load shape data for individual distribution circuits, or at least
for a selected sample of distribution circuits, as well as customer load data on an hourly or shorter
interval basis for at least a representative sample of customers, provided that the privacy of any
customer-specific information is adequately protected (NHPUC, 2017a).

Furthermore:
the utilities should propose data collection plans in the first instance, including detailed current
cost estimates. Those plans would then be reviewed and discussed with interested stakeholders
through a working group process... Following the completion of the working group process, final
detailed plans for data collection and dissemination should be prepared and implemented. If
necessary to resolve disputed issues that cannot be worked out by the stakeholders, the data
collection and dissemination plans may be submitted to the Commission for review and
determination (NHPUC, 2017a).

The Commission delegated data collection responsibility to the utilities under the
condition that the utilities collaborate with interested parties in the data collection planning. If
the parties cannot agree upon data collection efforts, they can bring their disagreement before the
Commission for further adjudication.
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Pilot Projects – Time-Variant Rates (TVR), Non-wires Alternatives, and Equity Considerations
In addition to the new rate, the data collection efforts, and the value of DER study, the
Commission ordered the utilities, in collaboration with other stakeholders, to implement a series
of pilot projects to explore alternative methods of DER integration. One key argument of the
solar coalition was that accurate valuation of the benefits of DER requires dynamic or timevariant rate design (TVR), an issue of key importance to grid modernization. The data generated
by the pilot projects “should be made available to a broad range of interested stakeholders, as
well as Staff and Commission consultants” (NHPUC, 2017a). The pilot projects include:
•

A time-of-use (TOU) pilot that will be available to both customer generators (e.g.,
customers with solar) and nonsolar customers;

•

The City of Lebanon municipal aggregation through real-time pricing pilot (Below,
2016);

•

A pilot that expands the benefits of distributed generation to low- and moderate-income
communities; and

•

A “non-wires alternative” in which “the utilities should identify all distribution circuits or
substations that are planned for upgrades within the next 5 years, the reason for the
planned upgrades, the reliability criteria and benefits of the planned upgrades, and the
estimated costs of the planned upgrades” (NHPUC, 2017a)

The order reads on:
With respect to the pilot program development process, we believe that the utilities should
propose pilot program designs and related evaluation, measurement, and verification (EM&V)
plans in the first instance, to be reviewed and discussed with interested stakeholders through a
working group process similar to that contemplated for the value of DER study design (NHPUC,
2017a).
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Analysis – Process Outcomes
Table 4.11 illustrates utility and DER interests and positions as they relate to a subset of
net metering issues, namely, which volumetric bill components should distributed generation
(DG) receive compensation for (see Figure 4.3 for typical customer bill).
Table 4.11 – Partial Net Metering Stakeholder Assessment Table

Issue Area (Volumetric Bill Components)

Utilities

R DER
Affiliates

Energy Supply
(Generation)
(~$0.11/kwh)
-Interest: Passthrough charge,
does not affect
utility revenue
-Position: DG
receives credit
for 100% for
exports

-Interest:
Protect profit;
avoid precedent
of DG
compensation
decreasing
below retail10
-Position: DG
receives 100%
of Supply rate

Transmission
(~$0.02/kwh)

Distribution
(~$0.04/kwh)

-Interest: Passthrough charge,
does not affect
utility
-Position: DG
receives 100%
credit for
exports

PRIORITY
ISSUE
-Interest: Source
of utility revenue
-Position: DG
receives no credit
for exports

-Interest:
Protect profit;
avoid precedent
of DG
compensation
decreasing
below retail
-Position: DG
receives 100%
of
Transmission
rate

-Interest: Protect
profit; avoid
precedent of DG
compensation
decreasing below
retail
-Position (post
settlement
negotiation):
Ratchet down rate
of compensation
for Distribution
charge in 2019 by
10% and 2020 by
10% pending
PUC V-DER
study results

Nonbypassable
Charges
(>$0.01/kwh)
-Interest:
Collective
charges for
social programs
and energy
efficiency
-Position: DG
receives no
credit for
exports
-Interest:
Collective
charges for
social programs
and energy
efficiency
-Position: DG
receives no
credit for
exports

Issue Area
Work Groups
-Interest:
Minimize costs
associated with
data collection
and pilot
projects

-Interest:
Collect data to
better inform
DER
compensation
based on
temporal and
locational
values

The learning that occurred through settlement negotiations revealed that the priority issue
for utilities is the rate of compensation for distribution charges. Across the other three volumetric
10

Retail electricity rates are equal to the sum of per kWh charges for Generation, Transmission,
Distribution, and Nonbypassable rates. See Figure 4.3, p. 117 for typical bill breakdown.
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components of energy rates (energy supply/generation, transmission, and nonbypassable
charges) utility and DER stakeholder interests did not conflict. However, in regard to the
distribution rate component, stakeholders were unable to imagine a creative solution that allowed
them to resolve interests that appeared to be in direct conflict.
The outcomes of the Net Metering docket met a diverse array of interests. The ruling on
the new rate may have tipped in the favor of the Utility Consumer Coalition by reducing the
distribution rate received by DG to 25% of retail, but the reduction to the rate is unlikely to
significantly damage the solar industry. The ruling also directed that data collection and pilot
project work groups be established, thus meeting interests of the Energy Future Coalition.
The Commission ordered utility and DER affiliates to address two main issues from the
grid modernization docket: data collection and rate design. In addressing next steps for data
collection and rate design, the Commission directed the creation of further forums for
collaboration between utility and DER stakeholders. In August 2017, utilities and DER
stakeholders began reconvening to establish workgroups to address data collection issues, and
value of DER study, and four pilot projects. These work groups represent a further
institutionalization of collaborative opportunities for utility and DER stakeholders.
Table 4.12 – Net Metering Stakeholder Outcomes Analysis Summary

Process Outcomes

Reflective of predicted results of collaborative process; produced mutual gain
solutions; further institutionalized collaboration; effect on relationships unclear
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Discussion
Table 4.13 - Summary of Characteristics of Net Metering Docket Stages

Stage
Prehearing Conference
and Initial Technical
Session
Technical Sessions

Basis for Dispute Resolution
Not applicable

Discovery, Testimony,
and Rebuttal

Not collaborative; characterized by
ammunition stockpiling in
preparation for adversarial, rightsbased contest; information used to
support own position and to attack
and undermine positions of others

Joint Utility and
Nonutility External
Meetings
Settlement
Conferences

Prehearing Technical
Session, Hearing
Design, and Hearing

Not applicable

Insufficient data
Collaborative; characterized by
sharing of interests, dialogue;
confidentiality allowed information
to be used for learning, not
undermining and attacking
Not collaborative; adversarial,
rights-based contest; crossexamination as tool to attack and
undermine positions

Process Design
Collaborative; stakeholders provided
with opportunity to make process
decisions from the outset
Collaborative; stakeholders collectively
agreed upon procedural schedule
Mixed; as result of early stakeholder
dialogue, parties agreed to schedule of
discovery, testimony, and rebuttal;
stakeholder interactions as onedirectional, not free-flowing exchange

Insufficient data
Collaborative; stakeholders collectively
made agenda and process decisions by
sharing and revising settlement
proposals; interactions characterized by
free-flowing exchange of ideas and
information
Collaborative; stakeholders collectively
designed agenda and process of hearing
together as joint problem solvers before
engaging as adversaries in the actual
hearing

Testimony filing, discovery, and rebuttal, the components which dominated the docket
for the first eight months, embodied characteristics of adversarial processes. The purpose of
these components of the process was to stake out a position, to critique the positions of
opponents, and to stockpile ammunition that could be used in the hearing to help win the case.
Conversely, settlement conferences, the component of the process that is relegated to the last few
weeks before the hearing, embodied characteristics of collaborative processes. In settlement,
parties made creative proposals, learned about each other’s interests and priorities, and sought
agreement on issues, rather than attacking each other’s positions. It was during settlement that
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nearly all of the substantive decision making that went into the Commission’s final ruling took
place.
Again, as was the case in the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) docket, from
the outset stakeholders were provided with an opportunity to design their own procedural
schedule. However, unlike the EERS in which stakeholders designed a process around collective
learning, the net metering docket was designed around the litigious process of testimony,
discovery, and rebuttal. The net metering docket showed how a collaborative process design
without a collaborative basis for dispute resolution is insufficient to foster true collaboration. The
basis for dispute resolution found in discovery, testimony, and rebuttal stages lacked any
collaborative characteristics. It was only during settlement conferences, which embodied
collaborative characteristics of both basis for dispute resolution and process design, that
successful integrative negotiations occurred. Particularly, dialogue, information sharing, and
learning were missing from discovery, testimony, and rebuttal.
Testimony, discovery, and rebuttal did serve an important function: they allowed all
parties an equal opportunity to make an evidence-based argument in favor of their desired
outcomes. They also helped ensure only high-quality data and evidence were being considered in
the decision making process. But they were also burdensome, time and resource intensive, and
divisive. Conversely, settlement conferences allowed parties to leave behind their initial
positions and creatively brainstorm solutions that would meet the needs of each. While parties
did not reach a unanimous consensus, they did reach consensus on many of the issues at stake
and were able to leave behind the extreme positions taken in testimony in favor of a more
integrative agreement.
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CHAPTER V: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS, SUMMARY FINDINGS,
DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION
The Decentralization of Power
The most important new sources of competitive advantage in today’s rapidly changing electricity
sector are not technology or market position; they are the ability of innovators to work efficiently
and effectively in complex multi-stakeholder environments. Shifting the electricity sector will
require engagement and innovation across traditional institutional boundaries.
–Rocky Mountain Institute (2017)

One of the fundamental legal concepts in these United States is the idea that the
adversarial process that you find in courts… is one of the best processes to get to the
truth. There is this general underlying belief that the adversarial process is beneficial
because it enables people to get to what the facts actually are. But it doesn’t always
work… I think that there are some cases, probably Net Metering being one of them,
EERS, Grid Mod, anywhere you are trying to set policy across a wide spectrum, I think
you need to lean more towards a collaborative process. Having 30 parties present 30
different ideas and attack each of those ideas, by the time we are done with all this stuff,
assuming its fully adjudicated and we argue all this stuff out to the nth degree, is anybody
going to feel any smarter? Is anyone going to feel like they got to the truth of what solar
can provide to the system? What the system’s needs really are?
–NH Utility Manager (NH Interview 15, 2017)

The three dockets analyzed in this research depict a Public Utilities Commission (PUC)
beginning to grapple with the challenges of 21st century energy system design. The standard
PUC process, a process designed to set rates for monopoly corporations, has been deemed
inappropriate for addressing this new challenge (VEIC, 2011; NHLBA, 2012; Hatfield, et al.,
2013; VEIC, 2013; NHOEP, 2014; LBNL, 2017). In contrast, the cases I have observed, which
embody the new policy challenges of DER integration, provide examples of opportunities for
collaboration, but also examples of continued barriers to collaboration. Table 5.1 presents a
cross-case summary of the analyses of the three docket processes.
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Basis for Dispute
Resolution

Pre-docket
Planning
Not applicable

Prehearing
Conference
Not applicable

Technical
Sessions

Testimony,
Discovery,
Rebuttal

Settlement
Conferences

External
Meetings

Hearing

Collaborative; info and
technical expertise shared
among stakeholders to
build collective
understanding;
brainstorming and interest
sharing
Not collaborative;
characterized by
positional/rights-based
bargaining; info used to
further own position and
undermine positions of
others
Mixed; intent –
consensus, but insufficient
to share interests, learn,
and reach consensus
Collaborative; goal =
consensus; allowed for
free-flowing exchange,
learning
Collaborative (b/c
consensus settlement);
info used to clarify, not to
attack/undermine

Mixed; stakeholders
collectively re-ordered
process steps to delay
testimony filing; onedirectional attacks on
positions, as opposed to
free-flowing exchange
Not collaborative; Electric
Division made agenda
decisions unilaterally
Collaborative; process set
collectively

Not applicable

Not applicable

Not applicable
Mixed; collaborative
when joint IOU &
DER; adversarial
when separate
Not applicable

Not applicable

Not applicable
Mixed; collaborative
when joint IOU &
DER; adversarial
when separate
Not applicable

Net Metering
Basis for Dispute
Process Design
Resolution

Not applicable

Not collaborative;
select parties
provided positional
framing

Not applicable

Not collaborative;
ammunition
stockpiling; info used
to support own
position and to attack
and undermine
positions of others
Collaborative;
interest sharing,
dialogue; info used
for learning
Insufficient data
Adversarial; rightsbased contest; crossexamination to
attack/undermine

Not applicable

Collaborative;
parties had
opportunity to shape
process
Collaborative;
stakeholders
collectively agreed
upon procedural
schedule

Mixed; parties
agreed to procedural
schedule;
interactions onedirectional, not freeflowing exchange
Collaborative;
process set
collectively; freeflowing exchange
Insufficient data
Collaborative;
process set
collectively

13

Process Stage

Table 5.1 – Cross Case Summary of Docket Characteristics
Grid Modernization
Basis for Dispute
Process Design
Resolution
Not collaborative; EERS
Collaborative;
Mixed; PUC invited
Straw Proposal process
collected info from
input regarding
limited face-to-face
stakeholders to
process/agenda, but
interaction; process and
inform scope and
no opportunity for
agenda decisions made
process; info used as
face-to-face dialogue
unilaterally by Electric
common resource
among stakeholders
Division
Collaborative; parties made
process recommendations;
recommendations created
Not applicable
Not applicable
space for collective learning,
deliberation
Collaborative; parties agreed Collaborative; goal = Collaborative; parties
on process/agenda decisions; consensus; expert
collectively made
created space for freefacilitators;
agenda decisions
flowing exchange of ideas
brainstorming,
dialogue, interest
sharing, learning

EERS
Process Design

Cross-Case Analysis, Summary Findings, Discussion, Conclusion
In this section I organize my cross-case findings into three categories: (1) findings about
the structure of the PUC process; (2) findings about the function of the PUC process stages; and
(3) emergent findings.

Findings about the Structure of the PUC Process
The structure of the PUC process is flexible. Better still, the broader energy policymaking community has the power to contribute to the shaping of the PUC process.
In the EERS case stakeholders constructively contributed to shaping PUC process in two
important ways. First, at the prehearing conference they encouraged the Commissioners to begin
the docket with educational and deliberative technical sessions, which the Commission obliged.
The prehearing conference represents a rare opportunity for stakeholders to engage directly with
the Commissioners and in this instance the opportunity was well capitalized on. Second, when
stakeholders felt they were unable to find common ground in formal settlement conferences, they
brought together DER and utility stakeholders in informal meetings to work out an agreement. In
this case leadership, particularly OEP leadership, brought about collaboration. These two
components of the process structure, educational technical sessions and joint DER and utility
informal negotiations, were identified as critical components to achieving consensus in the EERS
case.
The grid modernization investigation provided a valuable contrast to the way the
structure of informal stakeholder meetings can influence a process. In this case, informal
meetings, which divided utility and DER stakeholders into opposing caucuses, were
counterproductive to reconciling the interests of these two groups. Those who wish to cultivate a
greater consensus among the sectors of New Hampshire’s energy policy-making community will
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note the contrasting lessons of EERS and grid modernization informal meetings and seek to
bring together utility and DER stakeholders beyond the walls of PUC proceedings.
Paradoxically, the standard structure of the PUC process as applied to the net metering
case appears to have contributed to bringing the stakeholders to the negotiation table with a
strong desire to seek consensus. Each party’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement
(BATNA) was a fully contested litigation among dozens of parties and 13 sets of testimony,
something all parties wished to avoid due to the risk and burden it would entail. By the time
settlement negotiations were convened, many key parties were more than ready to seek common
ground in order to avoid the risks of a courtroom showdown, in which a decision could go
against their interests. In contrast, the grid modernization investigation, in which the stakes were
lower due to lack of immediate policy actions resulting from the process, had no similar
motivation to seek common ground in order to avoid a risky legal contest. In the grid
modernization case, each coalition’s BATNA, a report containing non-consensus
recommendations, was acceptable, far more so than their net metering BATNA of a risky
multiparty litigation, which lessened the incentive to collaborate.
In net metering, the standard PUC process convened settlement only after the long and
resource-intensive period of adversarial ammunition stockpiling of testimony filing, discovery,
and rebuttal, which limited opportunities for creative joint problem solving to the tail end of the
process. Hosting confidential settlement negotiations earlier in the process has the potential to
help parties avoid repeating the exhaustive ordeal of testimony, discovery, and rebuttal depicted
in the net metering case.
It is important for those stakeholders just beginning to engage in PUC proceedings and
those long familiar with the institution to think critically about the way things are done and the
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way things might be done differently to better meet the needs of the challenges at hand. The
cases of EERS, grid modernization, and net metering make clear that the structure of the PUC
process can be molded and shaped by those with the leadership and commitment necessary to
tackle the energy challenges of our modern era.

Findings about the Functions of the PUC Process Stages
Different stages of PUC process serve different functions. If the Commission wishes to
achieve the policy goal of creating a more collaborative approach to decision making it will
expand the role of those stages that serve the functions associated with collaborative processes. I
refer primarily to technical sessions (work groups), settlement conferences, and informal
collaboration between utilities and DER affiliates.
EERS technical sessions served the function of creating space for collective learning,
sharing of interests, and deliberation between utility and DER groups. These technical sessions
also allowed stakeholders to incorporate perspectives from a wide range of expertise.
Contributions from experts were used to create a shared basis of understanding, as opposed to
expert contributions during testimony and discovery, which were used by some stakeholders to
shore up their own positions and attack the positions of others. Additionally, informal meetings
convening utility and nonutility stakeholders in the EERS case provided the parties with
supplementary negotiation space when formal meetings proved insufficient. Informal meetings
served the important function of creating space for creative exchanges and deliberation.
Again in grid modernization, working group meetings served much the same function as
EERS technical sessions. Stakeholders convened to learn about issues together, engage in
dialogue and creative exchanges, and work jointly to craft a report for the Commission. The
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Commission enlisted technical and facilitation experts to help the working group serve these
collaborative functions. While the final product was not a consensus, the process itself fostered
collective learning between DER and utility stakeholders.
Settlement conferences served the collaborative function in the net metering case. These
meetings create space for interest-based exchanges among the parties and allowed for creative
brainstorming of policy solutions and joint problem solving. A key factor in the ability for
settlement conferences to serve these functions was their confidential nature. The confidential
nature of settlement freed stakeholders from the fear that their words would be used as a weapon
against them in future hearings. During settlement, utility and DER stakeholders reached
consensus on many issues, even if in the end they submitted dueling settlement agreements.
The three key process stages that serve collaborative functions are educational technical
sessions, confidential settlement conferences, and joint informal meetings between utilities and
DER stakeholders. Each serves a related but distinct function. Technical sessions were used
primarily for learning, dialogue, and incorporation of expert resources for the collective.
Settlement conferences allowed parties to take the next step in crafting creative agreements and
trading across issues. Informal negotiations provide for the more candid and free-flowing
exchanges that are not always easily achieved in formal proceedings. Each stage represents an
opportunity for the Commission to expand its ability to foster a collaborative decision making
environment.

Emergent Findings
PUC process alone, while necessary to achieving collaborative and innovative energy
policy solutions, is insufficient to reaching consensus. In my research I identified other critical
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variables, including stakeholder leadership and stakeholder commitment to guiding New
Hampshire’s energy policy-making community towards mutually beneficial policy solutions.
The EERS and net metering cases illustrate two starkly different drivers of collaboration.
In the former case, OEP Director Meredith Hatfield and other leaders took charge of shaping the
process, both formal and informal, towards collaboration. In the latter case, the coercive threat of
a chaotic and risky multiparty litigation brought stakeholders to the negotiation table during
settlement. Both factors, leadership and the risky BATNA of an uncertain courtroom showdown,
helped motivate the parties and instill in them a commitment to collaboration.
The grid modernization case embodied neither the positive motivator of strong leadership
nor the negative motivator of a weak BATNA. This case, while professedly collaborative, was
less successful than EERS and net metering in reaching consensus, highlighting the importance
of stakes, leadership, or some other motivating force to foster collaborative problem-solving
between utilities and DER affiliates.
Finally, the cases make clear that the Commission is no longer merely an institution
necessary for “controlling the evils that result from monopoly [utility] corporations” (Meunier,
1932). The disruption caused by DER proliferation has thrust a new responsibility upon the
Commission, the responsibility of guiding the evolution of our energy system towards
competition, decentralization, and sustainability. But this responsibility also falls to the energy
policy-making community as a whole. Leaders representing the state, solar and other DER
businesses, environmental advocates, utilities, and other interest groups must share the weight of
this responsibility, not only in redesigning our energy policies, but also in redesigning the
Commission itself as it evolves to take on a new role for a new century.
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Recommendations
The following is a list of recommendations for the Commission and for stakeholders from
New Hampshire’s energy policy-making community who engage in Commission proceedings
and wish to continue to cultivate a more collaborative approach to 21st century electricity market
design.

Recommendations for the Commission
•

The Commission should structure future proceedings addressing 21st century energy
challenges to incorporate collaborative functions early on and throughout dockets.

•

The Commission should make hosting educational and deliberative technical sessions the
norm, prior to proposal filings.

•

The Commission should consider hosting confidential settlement conferences earlier in
the process.

•

The Commission should enlist expert resources such as RAP regularly to assist in
educating stakeholders and facilitating processes.

•

The Commission should strengthen the capacity for facilitation of dockets, for example
through facilitation and mediation training for Staff and/or regularly employing a
facilitator.

•

The Commission should conduct investigative dockets addressing 21st century energy
policy challenges using working groups, educational modules, or other formats that bring
utility and DER stakeholders together for the purpose of collective learning.

•

The Commission should reassess the roles and mandates of both the Sustainable Energy
Division and the Electric Division in light of the new challenges presented by 21st century
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energy sector disruption and consider avenues to further integrate and expand the
functions of these two divisions.

Recommendations for New Hampshire’s Energy Policy-making Community
•

Stakeholders should approach the prehearing conference strategically and in concert with
one another and use it to make process recommendations to suit the needs of each
docket’s unique circumstances.

•

Stakeholders convening extracurricular meetings should include both DER and utility
representatives.

The outcomes of EERS and of Net Metering set in motion further collaborative
opportunities and forums dedicated to the task of DER integration. The EERS decision directed
the EESE Board to take on a new role as a stakeholder advisory board to the energy efficiency
implementation plan. During the post-docket implementation planning phase, utility
stakeholders, efficiency professionals, OCA, DES, and other stakeholders continued to work
together in preparation for the policy rollout in 2018. In the Net Metering decision, the
Commission ordered their staff to convene multiple working groups comprised of utility and
DER stakeholders: one to assist in the development of the Value of DER Study through data
collection efforts, and others to design pilot DER projects. These forums are critical
opportunities for the state, the utility industry, and the DER coalition to build upon the progress
that has been made over the past two years. And it is as we look forward to these new
opportunities that I provide my concluding recommendations.
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These recommendations are not directed at the Commission, for there is only so much we
can collectively ask of them as we design the distributed grid of the 21st century. These
recommendations are directed at New Hampshire’s community of energy professionals, the
utilities and DER affiliates alike who have only just begun the hard work of decentralizing the
power system. Dr. Raab (1994) writes of integrative negotiation that, “This somewhat radical
concept is based on the assumption that we can better satisfy our own interests only through
seeking to better satisfy the interests of our opponents.” I challenge the DER interest groups
engaging in these new forums to learn as much as they can from their utility counterparts and
then to use that knowledge to find solutions that satisfy the interests of the utility as well as their
own. I challenge the utility managers to strive to make New Hampshire a national leader in
dynamic and competitive DER markets in such a way that will simultaneously earn the utilities
preeminence in their industry.
I see in New Hampshire a state that has often led the nation in power sector innovation.
Its cities were some of the first on Earth to be lit with electric light. New Hampshire played
essential roles in the introduction of competition to the national energy sector, both in bulk
power generation as made possible by PURPA, and in competitive retail electricity supply. Now,
New Hampshire has an opportunity to again lead the nation by bringing innovation to markets
for retail electricity services through competitive DER integration. The Energy Efficiency
Resource Standard, Grid Modernization, and Net Metering dockets, while foundational in
bringing the new structure and function of the Commission to the fore, are only the beginning.
The hardest work is yet to come. It is up to this community to determine whether to proceed
through an adversarial power struggle, or through a collaborative commitment to realize a
collective benefit for us all.
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APPENDIX C – SAMPLE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
1. What is your current position? How long have you held this position and can you tell me
how you became involved in this work? Could you talk briefly about your professional
background and your current role with (insert organization here)?
2. Could you describe your role/(insert organization here) role in New Hampshire’s energy
policy-making process?
3. How and when does (insert organization here) interact with other stakeholder groups
throughout the process?
a. During the various policy design processes you have participated in, do you
engage with/collaborate with other stakeholders outside of formal meetings and
procedural steps? Explain.
4. Are there examples of times where you and other stakeholders in the process have been
able to “think outside the box”, i.e. develop/brainstorm new policy options that surprised
you (even if ideas did not end up being adopted)?
5. In what ways, if any, does the process foster collaboration?
6. In what ways, if any, does the process make it hard to collaborate with other
stakeholders?
7. What do you see as the benefits/limitations of adjudication? Of collaboration?
a. Can you talk about the benefits and limitations of discovery?
b. Can you talk about the benefits and limitations of technical sessions?
c. Can you talk about the benefits and limitations of settlement conferences?
d. Can you talk about the benefits and limitations of litigated hearings?
8. During the process do stakeholders tend to share or conceal information/interests?
Explain.
9. To what degree to you think different stakeholders in the process understand each other’s
interests and positions? Can you provide examples?
10. What about the process do you feel is successful? Could you provide examples?
11. Can you describe frustrations or challenges you have experienced with the process?
Could you provide examples?
12. What kind of changes do you think would do most to improve the process?
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APPENDIX D – OBSERVATIONS FROM GERMANY
During the summer 2016 I visited Berlin as a guest research at the Freie Universität
Berlin. During my visit I conducted eight interviews with experts and professionals involved in
both Berlin’s and Germany’s energy transitions, or Energiewende. Interviewees included
consultants involved in designing the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (Germany’s legislative
policy mechanism guiding national deployment of renewable energy technologies), experts from
prominent German energy think tanks, and professionals employed by Berlin’s DER and utility
sectors. Below is a summary of some observations from Germany that helped to broaden my
perspective of the energy policy challenges the world is currently facing.
Germany, the largest economy in Europe and the fourth largest economy in the world, is
widely considered a leader in the sustainable energy transition (Baake, 2013; Jacobsson, 2004).
Through its pioneering adoption of stable, long-term public policy support for clean energy
under the Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz) (EEG), Germany has become a
global center for research and investment in renewable energy technologies and a testing ground
for technologies, policies, and regulatory models. (Wüstenhagen, 2004; Laes, et al., 2014).
Berlin, the largest urban center in Germany and one of the 16 German länder (internal federal
states of Germany), plays an important role in this leading nation’s overall energy transition.
Germany is facing many of the same policy challenges as New Hampshire and the rest of
the United States. The country is grappling with a surge of new technologies, and the associated
challenges of redesigning its utility sector and energy marketplace to accommodate these new
technologies. Below I summarize some observations from my research in Germany.
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How to Compensate 21st Century Utilities for their Services?
The high levels of DERs in Germany that have resulted from the EEG feed-in tariff
highlight the conflict between deployment of these new energy technologies and the
conventional electric utility business model. Since 2008, European electric utilities have faced
extreme financial losses equal to more than half of their one trillion euro company value (Helms,
2016). As a result, German utilities are scrambling to remake their business models to be more
innovative, customer centric, and service oriented (e.g., distributed generation, micro-grid
services, energy performance contracting, energy efficiency, demand response, and smart
communication technologies) (Helms, 2016). The financial losses of German utilities highlight
the risk posed to American utilities if they fail to address 21st century energy policy challenges
and emphasize the need for utilities to remake their business models and discover new revenue
streams.

How to Compensate DERs for their Services?
One 21st century energy policy challenge relates to determining appropriate methods to
compensate DERs including distributed generation (DG) such as solar. In contrast to net
metering policies in the US, which in general terms compensate DG at retail electricity prices,
similar systems in Germany receive compensation via a feed-in tariff established by the EEG.
The feed-in tariff is a policy that sets prices per kWh for renewable energy technologies. Early
feed-in tariff prices paid to renewables were as high as 40-50 cents per kWh, or 250% as much
as retail electricity rates (Germany Interview 7, 2016). By comparison, distributed solar in the
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continental U.S. is compensated at retail prices of no more than 18 cents per kWh, and
oftentimes closer to 10 cents per kWh.
In the US, policy makers are considering more sophisticated DER compensation
approaches such as time-variant rates. Alternatively, Germany has shifted its approach from the
feed-in tariff to a reverse auction for renewable energy projects.

How to Design Adaptive Policies?
Rapidly advancing technologies and markets pose another challenge to 21st century
energy policy makers. In order to keep up with the pace of technology, Germany’s EEG is
constantly being amended and revised as technologies improve and markets evolve. One German
energy expert commented, “the EEG has been changed sometimes twice in one parliamentary
period” (German Interview 6, 2016). The German model raises interesting questions about how
to address the need for policy revisions in a rapidly changing environment.

How to Manage Dispute Resolution Between New Market Actors and Utilities?
Policy disputes between German utilities and DER affiliates are addressed by the
Clearingstelle EEG, an institutional alternative dispute resolution mechanism that helps to avoid
regular legal contests between the two sectors (German Interview 6, 2016).

How to Address Issues of Data Access?
Unlike their American counterparts, German energy market operators are not neutral and
independent of the companies owning and operating power plants, transmission systems, and
distribution systems within their territories (Germany Interview 3, 2016). The absence of an
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independent and neutral market operator in German markets likely contributes to the relative
lack of transparency found in those markets.
To quote from the Agora Energiewende report Transparenzdefizite der Netzregulierung
(Transparency Deficits of Network Regulation),
The level of transparency in [German electricity markets] is highly insufficient. While countries
such as Norway, UK and the Netherlands publish detailed data on the regulatory process and its
results, German regulatory authorities have published no information on the results of their
activities, not even aggregate data on distribution network costs. This broad lack of transparency
and the resulting lack of data is problematic in several respects: Firstly, it hinders political
decision making by effectively withholding data needed to evaluate economic effects of
necessary decisions in light of the “Energiewende” (energy transition). Secondly, it considerably
limits participation by consumers and thus precludes meaningful evaluation of the success (or
failure) of electricity network regulation while raising the risk of regulatory capture. Thirdly,
without sufficient transparency of the regulatory process and its results, new and innovative
market players will hesitate to enter the market. Yet the observed lack of transparency doesn’t
primarily result from inadequate or absent legal provisions. Rather… relevant provisions are
either not effectively enforced or not adhered to (Agora Energiewende, 2008).

As is the case in New Hampshire, transparency and access to data regarding the electricity
system are of central importance to German energy policy challenges. Transparency deficiencies
in German regulatory proceedings exacerbate this challenge.

What is the Role of Public Participation in Energy Policy Making?
The major policy addressing 21st century energy challenges in Berlin is the 2016 Energy
Transition Act (EEC), which stipulates that by 2050 Berlin should reduce overall CO2 emissions
by 85% relative to a 1990 baseline. The Berlin Energy and Climate Program 2030 (BEK) is the
action plan that accompanies the legal framework of the EEC. The BEK is a result of a year of
participatory processes (e.g., city forums, public comment sessions, public workshops) including
hundreds of stakeholders from different areas of expertise. Three German energy professionals,
two DER affiliates and one utility manager, said they expected little to come of the participatory
processes that resulted in the BEK, and dismissed it as a toothless report (Germany Interviews 1,
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2, 8, 2016). Other major efforts to address 21st century energy policy challenges in Berlin include
initiatives to obtain cooperative ownership of Berlin’s power grid. The organizations leading
these efforts, Bürger Energie Berlin and Berliner Energietisch, are backed by significant public,
financial, and political support. Comparable cooperative utility models in the US include the
Sacramento Municipal Utility District and Colorado’s city of Boulder utility municipalization
efforts. These examples raise questions about the how to account for and accommodate public
participation and engagement in 21st century energy policy decision making.
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APPENDIX E – GRID MODERNIZATION ROOM CONFIGURATION DIAGRAM

(Commissioner’s Bench)

(Door)

(Door)

(Facilitators/
Mediators)

During the grid modernization investigation, facilitators reconfigure the meeting room
space to create a more conducive atmosphere for dialogue, learning, and free-flowing exchanges
among the stakeholders.
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